{"title":"Most Individuals Prefer to Compromise among Competing Normative Principles of Taxation","authors":"I. Sher, M. Weinzierl","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3922920","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3922920","url":null,"abstract":"We use a novel survey to gather direct and indirect evidence on how individuals reconcile their simultaneous support for opposing normative principles when forming their policy preferences. Our evidence suggests that, when choosing policy, a minority (approximately one-third) of individuals follow the recommendations of the principle they most strongly support, while the majority of individuals prefer, instead, to compromise. Those who compromise give multiple competing principles weights that roughly correspond to their relative levels of support for them.","PeriodicalId":157531,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation (Topic)","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133372445","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Prices, Non-homotheticities, and Optimal Taxation","authors":"Xavier Jaravel, Alan Olivi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3383693","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3383693","url":null,"abstract":"We characterize theoretically and quantitatively the effects of price changes on optimal tax design in the presence of non-homothetic preferences. We provide decompositions showing how price changes transform the cost-benefit analysis of tax policy, as they affect both the marginal social value of redistribution and the efficiency cost of taxation. We find that, rather than offsetting price changes, the optimal tax system amplifies their redistributive effects. Price changes affect the marginal utility of disposable income and generate income effects such that it is optimal to increase redistribution toward households with a higher marginal propensity to spend on goods with falling relative prices. Optimal tax design creates a feedback loop whereby taxes shift demands for products, inducing a further change in prices in general equilibrium, and a new response of the tax schedule. With a quantitative model matching observed non-homotheticities and the empirical elasticity of prices to market size in the United States, we find large impacts on optimal marginal tax rates and welfare across the skill distribution. Due to the amplification channel, (i) the optimal tax schedule is more redistributive when accounting for non-homothetic spending patterns, (ii) observed heterogeneous inflation rates, which are lower for luxuries relative to necessities in the United States, generate a regressive tax response.","PeriodicalId":157531,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation (Topic)","volume":"130 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129243628","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Stephan Zheng, Alexander R. Trott, Sunil Srinivasa, David C. Parkes, R. Socher
{"title":"The AI Economist: Optimal Economic Policy Design via Two-level Deep Reinforcement Learning","authors":"Stephan Zheng, Alexander R. Trott, Sunil Srinivasa, David C. Parkes, R. Socher","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3900018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3900018","url":null,"abstract":"AI and reinforcement learning (RL) have improved many areas, but are not yet widely adopted in economic policy design, mechanism design, or economics at large. At the same time, current economic methodology is limited by a lack of counterfactual data, simplistic behavioral models, and limited opportunities to experiment with policies and evaluate behavioral responses. Here we show that machine-learning-based economic simulation is a powerful policy and mechanism design framework to overcome these limitations. The AI Economist is a two-level, deep RL framework that trains both agents and a social planner who co-adapt, providing a tractable solution to the highly unstable and novel two-level RL challenge. From a simple specification of an economy, we learn rational agent behaviors that adapt to learned planner policies and vice versa. We demonstrate the efficacy of the AI Economist on the problem of optimal taxation. In simple one-step economies, the AI Economist recovers the optimal tax policy of economic theory. In complex, dynamic economies, the AI Economist substantially improves both utilitarian social welfare and the trade-off between equality and productivity over baselines. It does so despite emergent tax-gaming strategies, while accounting for agent interactions and behavioral change more accurately than economic theory. These results demonstrate for the first time that two-level, deep RL can be used for understanding and as a complement to theory for economic design, unlocking a new computational learning-based approach to understanding economic policy.","PeriodicalId":157531,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation (Topic)","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130893400","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bunching Responses to Training Expenses Deduction Policy: Evidence from Kinks in China","authors":"Ruohong Liu, Weibo Yan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3901224","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3901224","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores firms’ bunching responses to training expenses deduction policy using microdata on Chinese manufacturing firms from 2004 to 2007. By exploiting a bunching method, we estimate elasticities of training intensity with respect to (one plus) the marginal tax rate at the kink points. We provide robust evidence that firms bunch at the kink points and gradually respond to threshold change. Taking the policy compliance into account, the estimated elasticity of fiscal incentive is −0.713 and −0.499 for DOEs and FOEs, respectively. Based on these estimates, we find that if all the training expenses are deductible, the training intensity will increase by 23.5% (DOEs) and 7.5% (FOEs). Heterogeneous analyses indicate that the wage-ratio-based policy may spur more bunching incentives among firms with higher wage bills. Finally, we rule out alternative explanations of tax evasion and relabeling.","PeriodicalId":157531,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation (Topic)","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127376322","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Anastasios Elemes, Bradley S. Blaylock, Crawford Spence
{"title":"Tax-Motivated Profit Shifting in Big 4 Networks: Evidence from Europe","authors":"Anastasios Elemes, Bradley S. Blaylock, Crawford Spence","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3842597","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3842597","url":null,"abstract":"Accounting research on tax has primarily focused on documenting the income shifting strategies of multinational corporations. However, no studies, as far as we are aware, have hitherto explored how large accountancy firms manage their own tax affairs despite being huge economic entities in their own right. Using a unique private firm dataset of Big 4 affiliated firms from 30 European countries we examine whether the Big 4 shift income among their separate legal entities. Despite apparent disincentives to doing so, we find archival evidence consistent with tax-motivated income shifting. Difference-in-difference specifications around the incorporation of Deloitte EMEA in the U.K. and PwC Europe in Germany provide further evidence consistent with income shifting increasing among Deloitte and PwC affiliates subsequent to the incorporation of their respective regional coordinating entities. In cross-sectional analyses we find evidence consistent with incentives to engage in outbound income shifting being weaker for unprofitable affiliates. We also provide evidence consistent with the Big 4 engaging in income shifting only in countries with favorable tax conditions/weak tax enforcement. Finally, we find evidence in line with debt allocation and intangible asset placement being important channels through which the Big 4 achieve their income shifting objectives. Our study contributes to the literature by being the first to open the black box of the Big 4’s own tax planning practices.","PeriodicalId":157531,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation (Topic)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127747693","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
S. Belev, Olga Suchkova, E. Leonov, Alfiia Khuzina, Konstantin Vekerle, E. Matveev
{"title":"Теоретико-эмпирические подходы к оценке оптимальности системы налогообложения в Российской Федерации (Theoretical and Empirical Approaches to Assessing the Optimality of the Taxation System in the Russian Federation)","authors":"S. Belev, Olga Suchkova, E. Leonov, Alfiia Khuzina, Konstantin Vekerle, E. Matveev","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3677894","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3677894","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Russian Abstract:</b> В данном докладе представлены основные результаты научно- исследовательской работы по теме Теоретико-эмпирические подходы к оценке оптимальности системы налогообложения в Российской Федерации. В работе представлен обзор международной практики анализа эффективности налоговых расходов. Оптимальность налоговой системы строится на трёх китах: эффективность (понимается как снижение потерь для всех индивидов при заданных поступлениях в бюджет), справедливость (понимается как выравнивание потерь от налогообложения среди индивидов) и качество администрирования (понимается как снижение издержек, связанных с необходимостью содержания аппарата налоговых служб и неизбежностью возникновения издержек уплаты налогов). В рамках данной работы по данным критериям будут проанализированы основные виды налогов и акцизов в РФ.<br><br><b>English Abstract:</b> This article presents the main results of research on the topic of theoretical and empirical approaches to assessing the optimality of the tax system in the Russian Federation. The paper provides an overview of international practice of analyzing the effectiveness of tax expenditures. The optimal tax system is based on three basic principles: efficiency (understands how to reduce losses for all individuals with given revenues to the budget), justice (understands how to reduce losses from taxation among individuals) and the quality of services and the inevitability of tax payments. In the framework of this work, according to these criteria, the main types of taxes and excise taxes in the Russian Federation will be analyzed.","PeriodicalId":157531,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation (Topic)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131318140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Tax Collection and Anti-Corruption Strategy to Reform Afghanistan’s Legal Code","authors":"Arash Sahebe","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3591664","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3591664","url":null,"abstract":"Afghanistan has made considerable progress in domestic revenue mobilization (DRM) over the past two decades. Afghan government has collected a total of only $10 million in total government revenue in 2020. It collected $2.4 billion, or about 12 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) in 2016. The government has focused its efforts on the simplest taxes to collect, namely, import duties, a tax referred to as the business receipts tax (BRT), and simple income taxes for both individuals and companies and for which a very simplified tax was developed for small businesses that could be paid in place of the corporate income tax (CIT) and the BRT. The Afghans implemented a new, partially rationalized duty schedule, with fewer rates and a schedule following the Harmonized System of codes for classifying traded goods to enhance transparency and fairness for the sake of import duties. On the administrative side, the Afghan government had to build both tax and customs administrations almost from scratch – developing their staff and equipping them with the tools to do their jobs which included skills, procedures, equipment, facilities, and information technology (IT). The international donor agencies took pragmatic steps in this regard by providing training, materials, and technical assistance to rebuild the Afghan Revenue Department (ARD), design new procedures, construct or refurbish facilities, implement IT-based solutions, and extend ARD’s reach to all of the country’s provinces. Experts from different countries helped the Afghan government draft new laws and regulations, prepare manuals, and train staff to implement them. Although a considerable progress has been made, Afghanistan still faces many challenges -- to strengthen its tax and customs administrations, root out corruption, and facilitate taxpayer compliance. The long desired value added tax (VAT) has been enacted into law and is planned for implementation starting in 2020.","PeriodicalId":157531,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation (Topic)","volume":"96 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124595145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Traditional Internet Economy, Blockchain Economy and The Optimal Tax Policy","authors":"Jingran Yang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3501763","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3501763","url":null,"abstract":"This model explores how the optimal tax policy changes by the government on traditional internet economy and the blockchain economy when political regime changed. Also, our model compares how social welfare varies before and after the blockchain economy or the government involves. After analyzing, we get several interesting findings, first, without government, blockchain economy makes no influences on the monopoly ability of traditional internet economy and social welfare maximized in Nash equilibrium. Second, when government implements tax policy on economies, a loss in social welfare exists if the government is more self-interest (less democratic). Third, pure blockchain economy only exists when the democratic level of a government is very low and the technical cost of running a traditional internet platform is very high. This is because, in the mixed economy, the independence of more-dictatorial government with traditional internet economy leads to non-subsidy tax policy for traditional internet platform with high technology costs, thus the participation constraint for traditional internet platform cannot be satisfied. And without traditional internet economy, more self-interested government prefers to implement exploitative tax policy on citizens in pure blockchain economy, thus leads to a loss in social welfare. Finally, we find that even though maximization of social welfare cannot be realized in pure blockchain economy, with government's tax policy, social welfare is generally higher after blockchain economy was introduced.","PeriodicalId":157531,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation (Topic)","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114997556","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"U.S. Maritime Policy and Economic Efficiency","authors":"Joshua R. Hendrickson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3486330","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3486330","url":null,"abstract":"Critics argue that maritime policy is protectionist legislation that restricts competition and reduces economic efficiency. In this paper, I argue the contrary. I begin with the premise that the primary role of the state is to provide national defense. A country must be able to protect its wealth, and therefore its capital, from plunder and/or destruction. This implies that a sufficient level of defense spending is increasing in the capital stock. An efficient solution is to tax capital to finance defense. Nonetheless, there is reason to believe that capital devoted to shipping imposes a lower marginal defense cost than other forms of capital because ships can be used as a naval auxiliary. If so, then one would expect that the optimal tax rate on shipbuilding and the merchant marine would be lower than other capital-intensive firms. Put differently, maritime subsidies during peacetime can be understood as the result of a Coaseian bargain in which the government compensates shipbuilders and the merchant marine during peacetime in exchange for their services during wartime. I argue that the history of U.S. maritime policy is broadly consistent with my theory. I conclude by discussing the current state of the merchant marine and maritime policy.","PeriodicalId":157531,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation (Topic)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122232742","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Social Comparisons and Optimal Taxation in a Small Open Economy","authors":"T. Aronsson, O. Johansson-Stenman, Tomas Sjögren","doi":"10.1111/sjoe.12308","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12308","url":null,"abstract":"Almost all previous studies on optimal taxation and status consumption are based on closed model-economies. This paper analyzes how international capital mobility – which may constrain the use of capital income taxation – affects the optimal redistributive income tax policy in a small open economy when consumers care about their relative consumption. If the government can perfectly observe (and tax) returns on savings abroad, it is shown that the policy rules for marginal labor and capital income taxation derived for a closed economy largely carry over to the small open economy analyzed here. However, if these returns are unobserved by the government, the marginal tax policy rules will be very different from those pertaining to closed model-economies. In this case, capital income taxes on domestic savings will be completely ineffective, since such taxes would induce the consumers to move their savings abroad. The labor income tax must then indirectly also reflect the corrective purpose that the absent capital income tax would otherwise have had.","PeriodicalId":157531,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation (Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132942289","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}