Journal of Economic Perspectives最新文献_第9页

North America’s rapidly growing electric vehicle market: Implications for the geography of automotive production 北美快速增长的电动汽车市场:对汽车生产地理的影响

IF 8.4 1区经济学

Journal of Economic Perspectives Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.21033/ep-2022-5

T. Klier, James M. Rubenstein

引用次数: 1

Quantitative effects of temporary employment contracts in Spain 西班牙临时雇佣合同的数量效应

IF 8.4 1区经济学

Journal of Economic Perspectives Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.21033/ep-2022-1

F. Álvarez, Marcelo Veracierto

{"title":"Quantitative effects of temporary employment contracts in Spain","authors":"F. Álvarez, Marcelo Veracierto","doi":"10.21033/ep-2022-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21033/ep-2022-1","url":null,"abstract":"In many countries, employers are forced to make large severance payments to workers when their employment is terminated for reasons other than worker misconduct.1 Actually, it is not uncommon for severance payments to exceed 20 days of pay per year worked, with a cap of one year of wages (for example, in Argentina, Italy, and Spain). In addition, employers often face substantial legal costs when they terminate their workers. Economic theory indicates that these firing costs have large effects on the hiring and firing decisions of firms. Not surprisingly, in an effort to economize their immediate costs, firms respond to the firing costs by reducing their firing rates. However, because they are afraid of the costs that they will have to face in the future, firms also respond by reducing their hiring rates. The net effects on their employment levels depend on whether the decrease in firing rates exceeds the decrease in hiring rates. While their effects on average employment are ambiguous, firing costs generate a clear misallocation of labor across firms. The reason is that firms that receive positive shocks do not expand as much as they should and firms that receive negative shocks do not contract as much as they should. Perhaps because of this misallocation of resources across firms, governments have introduced legislation attempting to improve the efficiency of their countries’ labor markets. One common way that governments have done this is through the introduction of temporary employment contracts of fixed lengths. These temporary contracts effectively provide a period of time during which workers can be fired at no costs. If a temporary worker is retained after their temporary contract ends, they become a permanent worker subject to regular firing costs. The purpose of this article is to provide a quantitative assessment of temporary contracts. In particular, we are interested in determining how effectively temporary contracts of observed length bring the economy close to laissez-faire outcomes (that is, to the economic outcomes that would be obtained under zero firing costs to firms).","PeriodicalId":15611,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Perspectives","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73094896","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Confessions of a repentant bubble theorist 一个悔过的泡沫理论家的自白

IF 8.4 1区经济学

Journal of Economic Perspectives Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.21033/ep-2022-3

Gadi Barlevy

引用次数: 1

Children and the US Social Safety Net: Balancing Disincentives for Adults and Benefits for Children. 儿童与美国社会安全网:平衡成人的不利因素与儿童的有利因素。

IF 6.9 1区经济学

Journal of Economic Perspectives Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1257/jep.36.2.149

Anna Aizer, Hilary Hoynes, Adriana Lleras-Muney

{"title":"Children and the US Social Safety Net: Balancing Disincentives for Adults and Benefits for Children.","authors":"Anna Aizer, Hilary Hoynes, Adriana Lleras-Muney","doi":"10.1257/jep.36.2.149","DOIUrl":"10.1257/jep.36.2.149","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>A hallmark of every developed nation is the provision of a social safety net-a collection of public programs that deliver aid to the poor. Because of their higher rates of poverty, children are often a major beneficiary of safety net programs. Countries vary considerably in both the amount of safety net aid to children and the design of their programs. The United States provides less aid to families with children as a share of GDP (0.6 percent) than most countries: Among 37 OECD countries, only Turkey provides less, as shown in Figure 1. Countries that provide less aid to families with children have higher rates of child poverty. Among these same 37 countries, only Turkey and Costa Rica have higher child poverty rates than the United States. Why does the United States appear to be such an outlier in terms of the amount of aid it provides to families and child poverty rates? While there are likely multiple reasons, in this paper we focus on one possible explanation: Past emphasis on the negative behavioral effects of safety net programs for families over the benefits of such programs for children.</p>","PeriodicalId":15611,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Perspectives","volume":"36 2","pages":"149-174"},"PeriodicalIF":6.9,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10659762/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138176348","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Inequality in Early Care Experienced by US Children. 美国儿童在早期护理方面的不平等。

IF 8.4 1区经济学

Journal of Economic Perspectives Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1257/jep.36.2.199

Sarah Flood, Joel McMurry, Aaron Sojourner, Matthew Wiswall

引用次数: 0

The US Pretrial System: Balancing Individual Rights and Public Interests 美国审前制度:平衡个人权利与公共利益

IF 8.4 1区经济学

Journal of Economic Perspectives Pub Date : 2021-11-04 DOI: 10.1257/jep.35.4.49

Will Dobbie, Crystal S. Yang

{"title":"The US Pretrial System: Balancing Individual Rights and Public Interests","authors":"Will Dobbie, Crystal S. Yang","doi":"10.1257/jep.35.4.49","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.35.4.49","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, we review a growing empirical literature on the effectiveness and fairness of the US pretrial system and discuss its policy implications. Despite the importance of this stage of the criminal legal process, researchers have only recently begun to explore how the pretrial system balances individual rights and public interests. We describe the empirical challenges that have prevented progress in this area and how recent work has made use of new data sources and quasi-experimental approaches to credibly estimate both the individual harms (such as loss of employment or government assistance) and public benefits (such as preventing non-appearance at court and new crimes) of cash bail and pretrial detention. These new data and approaches show that the current pretrial system imposes substantial short-and long-term economic harms on detained defendants in terms of lost earnings and government assistance, while providing little in the way of decreased criminal activity for the public interest. Non-appearances at court do significantly decrease for detained defendants, but the magnitudes cannot justify the economic harms to individuals observed in the data. A second set of studies shows that that the costs of cash bail and pretrial detention are disproportionately borne by Black and Hispanic individuals, giving rise to large and unfair racial differences in cash bail and detention that cannot be explained by underlying differences in pretrial misconduct risk. We then turn to policy implications and describe areas of future work that would enable a deeper understanding of what drives these undesirable outcomes.","PeriodicalId":15611,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Perspectives","volume":" 61","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.4,"publicationDate":"2021-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138494475","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Fragile Algorithms and Fallible Decision-Makers: Lessons from the Justice System 脆弱的算法和易犯错误的决策者:来自司法系统的教训

IF 8.4 1区经济学

Journal of Economic Perspectives Pub Date : 2021-11-04 DOI: 10.1257/jep.35.4.71

Jens Ludwig, Sendhil Mullainathan

引用次数: 0

Neighborhoods Matter: Assessing the Evidence for Place Effects 邻里关系:评估地方效应的证据

IF 8.4 1区经济学

Journal of Economic Perspectives Pub Date : 2021-11-04 DOI: 10.1257/jep.35.4.197

Eric Chyn, Lawrence F. Katz

引用次数: 0

When Innovation Goes Wrong: Technological Regress and the Opioid Epidemic 当创新出错:技术倒退和阿片类药物流行

IF 8.4 1区经济学

Journal of Economic Perspectives Pub Date : 2021-11-04 DOI: 10.1257/jep.35.4.171

David M. Cutler, Edward L. Glaeser

引用次数: 0

The Economics of Policing and Public Safety 治安与公共安全经济学

IF 8.4 1区经济学

Journal of Economic Perspectives Pub Date : 2021-11-01 DOI: 10.1257/jep.35.4.3

Emily C. Owens, Bocar A. Ba

{"title":"The Economics of Policing and Public Safety","authors":"Emily C. Owens, Bocar A. Ba","doi":"10.1257/jep.35.4.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.35.4.3","url":null,"abstract":"The efficiency of any police action depends on the relative magnitude of its crime-reducing benefits and legitimacy costs. Policing strategies that are socially efficient at the city level may be harmful at the local level, because the distribution of direct costs and benefits of police actions that reduce victimization is not the same as the distribution of indirect benefits of feeling safe. In the United States, the local misallocation of police resources is disproportionately borne by Black and Hispanic individuals. Despite the complexity of this particular problem, the incentives facing both police departments and police officers tend to be structured as if the goals of policing were simple—to reduce crime by as much as possible. Formal data collection on the crime reducing-benefits of policing, and not the legitimacy costs, produce s further incentives to provide more engagement than may be efficient in any specific encounter, at both the officer and departmental level. There is currently little evidence as to what screening, training, or monitoring strategies are most effective at encouraging individual officers to balance the crime reducing benefits and legitimacy costs of their actions.","PeriodicalId":15611,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Perspectives","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.4,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46637916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 14