{"title":"A decision frame theory for uncertainty with applications to regret and choice acclimatization","authors":"C. Feige","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3872458","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3872458","url":null,"abstract":"An axiomatization of expected utility under uncertainty is extended in several steps to characterize more complicated decision models. Central to each step is a bijective mapping that, applied to the set of prospects, changes the framing of the decision problem. Static models of subjective expected utility and reference dependence result from stretch mappings and translations (i.e., shifts), respectively. Dynamic models, such as regret and aspiration learning, involve groups of models each of which applies a translation by a different reference prospect (aspiration). The resulting regret model accommodates preference cycles in a higher-dimensional decision space without violating transitivity. An equilibrium of such a dynamic model is characterized as the prospect that is a maximal element in reference to itself. Under aspiration learning, asymptotic stability thus ensures that the aspiration (eventually) matches the equilibrium prospect. The concepts of regret and aspiration learning are combined to a model of choice acclimatization for the purpose of equilibrium selection. The valuation function of this equilibrium selection model is then further specified to accommodate cumulative regret that accrues during the acclimatization process.","PeriodicalId":154400,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Expected Utility Theory (Sub-Topic)","volume":"101 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131725516","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Who Are I: Time Inconsistency and Intrapersonal Conflict and Reconciliation","authors":"X. He, X. Zhou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3839887","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3839887","url":null,"abstract":"Time inconsistency is prevalent in dynamic choice problems: a plan of actions to be taken in the future that is optimal for an agent today may not be optimal for the same agent in the future. If the agent is aware of this intrapersonal conflict but unable to commit herself in the future to following the optimal plan today, the rational strategy for her today is to reconcile with her future selves, namely to correctly anticipate her actions in the future and then act today accordingly. Such a strategy is named intra-personal equilibrium and has been studied since as early as in the 1950s. A rigorous treatment in continuous-time settings, however, had not been available until a decade ago. Since then, the study on intra-personal equilibrium for time-inconsistent problems in continuous time has grown rapidly. In this chapter, we review the classical results and some recent development in this literature.","PeriodicalId":154400,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Expected Utility Theory (Sub-Topic)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127230970","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Complete Ranking of Risky Prospects Consistent with Stochastic Dominance","authors":"Olivier Le Courtois, Xia Xu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3729152","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3729152","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce a new and complete ordering of prospects that is consistent with stochastic dominance (SD). Featuring loss aversion and skewness preference, it mitigates the low discriminatory power of SD and circumvents implementation difficulties associated with third order SD. To highlight its edge, we show that the Aumann-Serrano and the Foster-Hart general riskiness indicators do not conform to third order SD. The ordering we introduce sheds light on mean variance theory and performance measurement, related SD developments, and optimal diversification. Besides, it contributes to the explanation of Rabin's paradox and reconciles the discrepancy between moment preferences and expected utility theory.","PeriodicalId":154400,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Expected Utility Theory (Sub-Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125467917","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Risks and Optimal Migration Duration: The Role of Higher Order Risk Attitudes","authors":"Siwar Khelifa","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3693719","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3693719","url":null,"abstract":"Using a bivariate expected utility framework, we develop a two-period model where households determine, in the presence of risks, the parents' migration duration when children are left behind. Our model suggests that the optimal migration duration may respond differently to an increase in a given risk. We provide conditions under which it is optimal for households to decrease the parents' migration duration despite an income risk in the place of origin, and to increase it even though the income in the place of destination is risky. The idea of preference for \"harm disaggregation\" is used to explain the results. In the absence of uncertainty, we also show the role of the interaction between child human capital and wealth in the household's utility function in determining the optimal migration duration of parents. Empirical implications of this analysis are presented in the last part of the paper.<br>","PeriodicalId":154400,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Expected Utility Theory (Sub-Topic)","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116391541","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Measuring and Comparing Two Kinds of Rationalizable Opportunity Cost in Mixture Models","authors":"J. Bland","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3160979","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3160979","url":null,"abstract":"In experiments of decision-making under risk, structural mixture models allow us to take a menu of theories about decision-making to the data, estimating the fraction of people who behave according to each model. While studies using mixture models typically focus only on how prevalent each of these theories is in people’s decisions, they can also be used to assess how much better this menu of theories organizes people’s utility than does just one theory on its own. I develop a framework for calculating and comparing two kinds of rationalizable opportunity cost from these mixture models. The first is associated with model mis-classification: How much worse off is a decision-maker if they are forced to behave according to model A, when they are in fact a model B type? The second relates to the mixture model’s probabilistic choice rule: How much worse off are subjects because they make probabilistic, rather than deterministic, choices? If the first quantity dominates, then one can conclude that model a constitutes an economically significant departure from model B in the utility domain. On the other hand, if the second cost dominates, then models a and B have similar utility implications. I demonstrate this framework on data from an existing experiment on decision-making under risk.","PeriodicalId":154400,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Expected Utility Theory (Sub-Topic)","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122405469","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Resolving the WTP-WTA Gap in Changes in Morbidity Risks","authors":"Jiakun Zheng","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3266029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3266029","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we examine the gap between the willingness to pay and to accept in changes in morbidity risks. We show that if the decision maker has a reference-dependent preference with the reference point being his status-quo, the willingness to accept will be strictly larger than the willingness to pay for small changes in morbidity risks. This reconciles with what’s usually observed in this literature. The model generates a testable prediction that the more loss averse the decision maker is, the higher is the gap between the willingness to pay and to accept. Moreover, with other things being equal, the willingness to pay (or accept) of an expected utility individual lies between the willingness to accept and the willingness to pay of the decision maker.","PeriodicalId":154400,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Expected Utility Theory (Sub-Topic)","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127888883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Once Upon a Time Preference - How Rationality and Risk Aversion Change the Rationale for Discounting","authors":"Christian P. Traeger","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2045990","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2045990","url":null,"abstract":"The paper develops an axiomatic framework for rational decision making. The von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms give rise to a richer risk attitude than that captured in the standard discounted expected utility model. I derive three models that permit a more comprehensive risk evaluation. These preference representations differ regarding the consistency requirements that are imposed in the evaluation of uncertain scenarios. Imposing all rationality constraints jointly eliminates pure time preference from economic evaluation. The resulting preference representation still gives reduced weight to expected future utility when uncertainty increases over time. The more we know about the future welfare consequences of our (in)actions, the more weight they receive. If uncertainty is endogenous to the decision process, the new rationale for discounting will yield quite different policy implications than the discounted expected utility model based on pure time preference.","PeriodicalId":154400,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Expected Utility Theory (Sub-Topic)","volume":"2020 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133451067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}