System & Policy Design in Public Sector eJournal最新文献

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On Withholding Capacity from Strategic Patients 论对战略病人的扣留能力
System & Policy Design in Public Sector eJournal Pub Date : 2020-05-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3601113
Yunchao Xu, Mor Armony, Nan Liu
{"title":"On Withholding Capacity from Strategic Patients","authors":"Yunchao Xu, Mor Armony, Nan Liu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3601113","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3601113","url":null,"abstract":"Common wisdom suggests that, everything else being equal, seeing patients sooner rather than later is preferable. In particular, health outcomes improve with reduced delay and so does patient satisfaction. Meanwhile, if the delay in access to care is reduced, rescheduling becomes easier and thus patients may be more inclined not to show up for their current appointments and to reschedule. We investigate how an outpatient care provider should manage capacity in the presence of such patient strategic behavior. We find that under some circumstances, it is optimal for the service provider to withhold capacity from patients to elicit them to show up for their scheduled appointments. Yet, withholding capacity alone cannot fully eliminate strategic no-shows in all circumstances. Thus, we consider two supplementary policies which may be used to further prevent patient strategic no-show and rescheduling: assigning a lower priority to rescheduling patients or charging rescheduling fees. While both policies may further reduce or even eradicate patient strategic no-shows, they are not without drawbacks. Giving rescheduling patients a low priority to get appointments may lead to more patient reneging and thus may hurt the provider’s throughput and total patient utilities. Allowing service providers to freely charge rescheduling fees may induce an even higher rate of no-shows and rescheduling among patients, as an revenue maximizing provider has an incentive to encourage rescheduling so as to collect more rescheduling fees. This may, again, result in lower patient utilities. Our study generates valuable insights on how and when to use these policies to address patient strategic no-show and rescheduling behaviors.","PeriodicalId":153244,"journal":{"name":"System & Policy Design in Public Sector eJournal","volume":"82 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117238883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Managing Outpatient Service with Strategic Walk-ins 策略性预约管理门诊服务
System & Policy Design in Public Sector eJournal Pub Date : 2020-03-07 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3558209
Nan Liu, Willem van Jaarsveld, Shan Wang, Guanlian Xiao
{"title":"Managing Outpatient Service with Strategic Walk-ins","authors":"Nan Liu, Willem van Jaarsveld, Shan Wang, Guanlian Xiao","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3558209","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3558209","url":null,"abstract":"Outpatient care providers usually allow patients to access service via scheduling appointments or direct walk-in. Patients choose strategically between these two access channels (and otherwise balking) based on the trade-off of appointment delay and in-clinic waiting. How to manage outpatient care with such dual access channels, taking into account patient strategic choice behavior, is a challenge faced by providers. We study three operational levers to address this management challenge: service capacity allocation between these two channels, appointment delay information revelation via the choice and design of online scheduling systems, and a walk-in triage system that restricts the use of walk-in hours only for acute care. By studying a stylized queueing model, we find that neither a real-time online scheduling system (which offers instant access to appointment delay information at time of booking) nor an asynchronous online system (which does not directly provide delay information) can be universally more efficient. Although real-time systems appear more popular in practice, asynchronous systems sometimes can result in higher operational efficiency. Under the provider’s optimal capacity allocation, which scheduling system is more efficient hinges on two key factors: the patient demand–provider capacity relationship and patient willingness to wait. For the walk-in triage system, we find that it may or may not be beneficial to adopt; the provider’s own cost trade-off between lost demand and overtime work is the key determinant. Our research highlights that there is no one-size-fits-all model for outpatient care management, and the best use of operational levers critically depends on the practice environment. This paper was accepted by Jayashankar Swaminathan, operations management. Funding: S. Wang’s work was supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 72001220 and 71931008]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4676 .","PeriodicalId":153244,"journal":{"name":"System & Policy Design in Public Sector eJournal","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128611538","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Study of Financial Distress of Public Sector Undertakings Companies in India 印度公共事业公司财务困境研究
System & Policy Design in Public Sector eJournal Pub Date : 2019-05-31 DOI: 10.34218/JOM.6.3.2019.009
Richard Paul V, K. B
{"title":"Study of Financial Distress of Public Sector Undertakings Companies in India","authors":"Richard Paul V, K. B","doi":"10.34218/JOM.6.3.2019.009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.34218/JOM.6.3.2019.009","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyses financial distress of two group of public sector undertakings of companies in India. The present study using the Kolmogorov-Smirnove for testing if a variable follows a given distribution in a population. This “given distribution” is usually - not always - the normal distribution. The data collected from the journals, reports bse.com and money control.com and other websites. 15 companies were selected for this present study based on the convenient sampling method. SPSS and MS-excel software used for the present paper. Moreover 15 financial ratios have been taken for analysis that is net cash, total assets, total debt, sales, net worth, net income, long term liability, current assets, current liability, working capital, cash flow from operating activities, cash flow from financial activities, total external source, dividend and cash flow in investment activities. The selected companies are grouped based on the total debt ratio financial ratio. Based on the ratio, the company classified into seven distress companies and eight non-distress companies. It is resulted that the distress and non-distress companies has been identified based on the z value. It is equal to the proportion of the total variance in the discriminant scores, not explained by differences among the distressed and non-distressed companies.<br>","PeriodicalId":153244,"journal":{"name":"System & Policy Design in Public Sector eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130900164","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Restructuring Primary Health Care Network to Maximize Utilization and Reduce Patient Out-of-Pocket Expenses 重组初级卫生保健网络,以最大限度地利用和减少病人自付费用
System & Policy Design in Public Sector eJournal Pub Date : 2018-11-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3382053
A. Bardhan, Kaushal Kumar
{"title":"Restructuring Primary Health Care Network to Maximize Utilization and Reduce Patient Out-of-Pocket Expenses","authors":"A. Bardhan, Kaushal Kumar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3382053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3382053","url":null,"abstract":"Providing free primary care to everyone is an important goal pursued by many countries under universal health care programs. Countries like India need to efficiently utilize their limited capacities towards this purpose. Unfortunately, due to a variety of reasons, patients incur substantial travel and out-of-pocket expenses for getting primary care from publicly-funded facilities. We propose a set-covering optimization model to assist health policy-makers in managing existing capacity in a better way. Decision-making should consider upgrading centers with better potential to reduce patient expenses and reallocating capacities from less preferred facilities. A multinomial logit choice model is used to predict the preferences. In this article, a brief background and literature survey along with the mixed integer linear programming (MILP) optimization model are presented. The working of the model is illustrated with the help of numerical experiments.","PeriodicalId":153244,"journal":{"name":"System & Policy Design in Public Sector eJournal","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129846019","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
On Queue-Length Information When Customers Travel to a Queue 当客户到达队列时,关于队列长度的信息
System & Policy Design in Public Sector eJournal Pub Date : 2018-10-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3268117
Refael Hassin, Ricky Roet-Green
{"title":"On Queue-Length Information When Customers Travel to a Queue","authors":"Refael Hassin, Ricky Roet-Green","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3268117","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3268117","url":null,"abstract":"Problem definition: We consider a service system in which customers must travel to the queue to be served. In our base model, customers observe the queue length and then decide whether to travel. We also consider alternative information models and investigate how the availability of queue-length information affects customer-equilibrium strategies, throughput, and social welfare. Academic/practical relevance: A common assumption in queueing models is that once a customer decides to join the queue, joining is instantaneous. This assumption does not fit real-life settings, where customers possess online information about the current wait time at the service, but while traveling to the service, its queue length may change. Motivated by this realistic setting, we study how queue-length information prior to traveling affects customers’ decision to travel. Methodology: We prove that a symmetric equilibrium exists in our base model. We perform the calculation numerically as a result of the model complexity, which is due to the fact that the arrival rate to the traveling queue depends on the current state of the service queue, and vice versa. The alternative models are tractable, and we present their analytical solution. Results: When customers can observe the service-queue length prior to traveling, their probability of traveling is monotonically nonincreasing with the observed queue length. We find that customers may adopt a generalized mixed-threshold equilibrium strategy: Travel when observing short queue lengths, avoid traveling when observing long queue lengths, and mix between traveling and not traveling when observing intermediate queue lengths, with a decreasing probability of traveling. Managerial implications: Our results imply that when system congestion is high, the provider can increase throughput by disclosing the queue-length information, whereas at low congestion, the provider benefits from concealing the information. With respect to social welfare, queue-length information prior to departure is beneficial when congestion is at intermediate to high levels and yields the same social welfare otherwise.","PeriodicalId":153244,"journal":{"name":"System & Policy Design in Public Sector eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127423038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 12
Navigating a Changing Private Rental Sector: Opportunities and Challenges for Low-Income Renters 驾驭不断变化的私人租赁行业:低收入租房者的机遇与挑战
System & Policy Design in Public Sector eJournal Pub Date : 2018-07-19 DOI: 10.18408/AHURI-5112301
S. Parkinson, Amity James, Edgar Liu
{"title":"Navigating a Changing Private Rental Sector: Opportunities and Challenges for Low-Income Renters","authors":"S. Parkinson, Amity James, Edgar Liu","doi":"10.18408/AHURI-5112301","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18408/AHURI-5112301","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigated how low-income renters navigate the private rental sector (PRS) via three core pathways: the formal (via traditional or mainstream real estate agent intermediaries), informal (direct to rooms and dwellings privately managed by landlords and sub-landlords) and supported pathways (via community housing agencies). It provides practitioners and policy makers with an evidence base on changing practices and ways forward in shaping equitable PRS institutions.","PeriodicalId":153244,"journal":{"name":"System & Policy Design in Public Sector eJournal","volume":"139 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130902189","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 22
Cooperative Games with Polymatroid Optimization and Applications in Multiclass Queueing Systems 多矩阵优化的合作博弈及其在多类排队系统中的应用
System & Policy Design in Public Sector eJournal Pub Date : 2018-01-19 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3105412
Hanlin Liu, Yimin Yu
{"title":"Cooperative Games with Polymatroid Optimization and Applications in Multiclass Queueing Systems","authors":"Hanlin Liu, Yimin Yu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3105412","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3105412","url":null,"abstract":"We study resource sharing whereby multiple independent service providers collaborate by pooling their resources into a single service facility and deploying an optimal scheduling policy for their customers collectively by accounting for their individual waiting costs and service level requirements. We model the pooled systems as M/M/c queueing systems with heterogeneous waiting costs subject to service level constraints. The optimal scheduling policy for such a system is a (mixed) priority policy. We investigate cost allocation rules to the pooled systems by applying concepts from cooperative game theory. We consider both the case with a fixed number of servers and the case with endogenous capacity optimization. To empower our analysis, we show that a cooperative game with polymatroid optimization can be analyzed via simple auxiliary games. By exploiting the analytical properties of the continuous extension of the total virtual workload and multiclass queueing systems with polymatroidal structures, we provide sufficient conditions for the games to possess a core allocation. If the cores of the cooperative games do not exist, we also provide approximate stable allocations. Finally, we explore the extent to which our results remain valid for general multiclass queueing systems.","PeriodicalId":153244,"journal":{"name":"System & Policy Design in Public Sector eJournal","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126370812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Welfare Implications of Congestion Pricing: Evidence from SFpark 拥堵收费对福利的影响:来自SFpark的证据
System & Policy Design in Public Sector eJournal Pub Date : 2017-12-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2834019
P. Feldman, Jun Li, Hsin-Tien Tsai
{"title":"Welfare Implications of Congestion Pricing: Evidence from SFpark","authors":"P. Feldman, Jun Li, Hsin-Tien Tsai","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2834019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2834019","url":null,"abstract":"Problem definition: Congestion pricing offers an appealing solution to urban parking problems—charging varying rates across time and space as a function of congestion may shift demand and improve allocation of limited resources. It aims to increase the accessibility of highly desired public goods and to reduce traffic caused by drivers who search for available parking spaces. At the same time, complex policies make it harder for consumers to make search-based decisions. We investigate the effect of congestion pricing on consumer and social welfare. Academic/practical relevance: This paper contributes to the theory and practice of the management of scarce resources in the public sector, where welfare is of particular interest. Methodologically, we contribute to the literature on structural estimation of dynamic spatial search models. Methodology: Using data from the City of San Francisco, both before and after the implementation of a congestion-pricing parking program, SFpark, we estimate the welfare implications of the policy. We use a dynamic spatial search model to structurally estimate consumers’ search costs, distance disutilities, price sensitivities, and trip valuations. Results: We find that congestion pricing increases consumer and social welfare by more than 4% and reduces search traffic by more than 10% in congested regions compared with fixed pricing. However, congestion pricing may hurt welfare in uncongested regions, in which the focus should be on increasing utilization. Moreover, an unnecessarily complex congestion-pricing scheme makes it difficult for consumers to make search-based decisions. We find that a simpler pricing policy may yield higher welfare than a complex one. Lastly, compared with a policy that imposes limits on parking durations, congestion pricing increases social welfare by allocating the scarce resource to consumers who value it most. Managerial implications: The insights from SFpark offer important implications for local governments that consider alternatives for managing parking and congestion and for public-sector managers who evaluate the tradeoffs between approaches to manage public resources.","PeriodicalId":153244,"journal":{"name":"System & Policy Design in Public Sector eJournal","volume":"63 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123149669","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
Introduction to Reports and Theses 报告和论文导论
System & Policy Design in Public Sector eJournal Pub Date : 2016-05-05 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2775664
D. Mahto, Anjani Kumar
{"title":"Introduction to Reports and Theses","authors":"D. Mahto, Anjani Kumar","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2775664","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2775664","url":null,"abstract":"A report is a manuscript that illustrates the process, progress, or results of research. A report is good when it is easy to recognize, title is precise and informative. The layout and format are well organized. The binding is trouble-free to handle and open. Reading a well written report is pleasurable, if, the style is accurate, fluent and concise, with headings to indicate the content of each section. There are no absolute rules about the details of report production, because every report must be totally adapted to the needs of its reader.","PeriodicalId":153244,"journal":{"name":"System & Policy Design in Public Sector eJournal","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122138465","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Dynamic Capabilities, Developmental Industrial Strategy and The Strategic SCA of Nations 动态能力、发展产业战略与国家战略SCA
System & Policy Design in Public Sector eJournal Pub Date : 2016-03-21 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2749110
C. Pitelis, D. Teece
{"title":"Dynamic Capabilities, Developmental Industrial Strategy and The Strategic SCA of Nations","authors":"C. Pitelis, D. Teece","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2749110","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2749110","url":null,"abstract":"Economics and management literatures fail to properly articulate the interrelationship between enterprise-level appropriability/value capture strategies and the acquisition and sustainability of economy-wide co-created value. We propose a developmental industrial strategy that aims to help capture for the nation state co-created value hence foster the strategic SCA of the nation, by leveraging dynamic organizational capabilities.","PeriodicalId":153244,"journal":{"name":"System & Policy Design in Public Sector eJournal","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123936074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
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