{"title":"Penetrating Beauty","authors":"Jesse J. Prinz","doi":"10.4324/9780429462658-15","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429462658-15","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":152495,"journal":{"name":"Perception, Cognition and Aesthetics","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115391078","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Thinking Differently About Thought","authors":"N. Georgalis","doi":"10.4324/9780429462658-10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429462658-10","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":152495,"journal":{"name":"Perception, Cognition and Aesthetics","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125961239","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Immediate and Reflective Senses","authors":"Angela Mendelovici","doi":"10.4324/9780429462658-11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429462658-11","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues that there are two distinct kinds of senses, immediate senses and reflective senses. Immediate senses are what we are immediately aware of when we are in an intentional mental state, while reflective senses are what we understand of an intentional mental state’s (putative) referent upon reflection. I suggest an account of immediate and reflective senses that is based on the phenomenal intentionality theory, a theory of intentionality in terms of phenomenal consciousness. My focus is on the immediate and reflective senses of thoughts and the concepts they involve, but it also applies to other mental instances of intentionality.","PeriodicalId":152495,"journal":{"name":"Perception, Cognition and Aesthetics","volume":"81 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124484250","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How Do I Know When I Am Dancing?","authors":"Romain Bigé","doi":"10.4324/9780429462658-17","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429462658-17","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":152495,"journal":{"name":"Perception, Cognition and Aesthetics","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132935547","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Interview with James Cohan","authors":"D. Shottenkirk","doi":"10.4324/9780429462658-18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429462658-18","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":152495,"journal":{"name":"Perception, Cognition and Aesthetics","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124471147","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Phenomenal Experience and the Thesis of Revelation","authors":"Michelle Liu","doi":"10.4324/9780429462658-13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429462658-13","url":null,"abstract":"The term “revelation,” introduced by Mark Johnston (1992 ), is used in the debate about the metaphysics of color properties to refer to the view that the whole nature of color properties is given in color experience. This chapter is not concerned with the thesis of revelation in the philosophy of color but with a parallel idea that also goes by the name “revelation” in the philosophy of mind. This is the claim that the whole nature of qualia (phenomenal properties) is given in phenomenal experience. This latter thesis of revelation is by no means unfamiliar to philosophers of mind, although the name “revelation” has not always been used to identify it. Discussions on the idea of revelation can be traced to Descartes (1985 : 215–217) in his writings on the notion of a clear and distinct idea and Hume (2000 : 136) in the Treatise . 1 One can also fi nd contemporary discussions on revelation in relation to the topic of phenomenal experience and the physicalist-dualist debate about the nature of consciousness ( Strawson, 1989 ; Lewis, 1995 ; Nida-Rümelin, 2007 ; Stoljar, 2006 , 2009 ; Damnjanovic, 2012 ; Go , 2015 , 2017 ; Majeed, 2017 ; Trogdon, 2017 ). Two things are worth noting regarding the contemporary literature on revelation. First, revelation is often thought of as being in tension with physicalism. For instance, Lewis (1995 ) takes revelation to be incompatible with physicalism. More recently, Philip Go (2015 , 2017 ) has appealed to the thesis of revelation to argue against physicalism. Of course, whether there is an incompatibility between revelation and physicalism, and how this incompatibility is to be understood provided that there is one, depends on how we cash out revelation and physicalism ( see Damnjanovic, 2012 ; Trogdon, 2017 ; Stoljar, 2018 ). The second thing worth noting about the contemporary literature on revelation is that revelation is often thought of as an intuitive claim. Among those who think this way about revelation are physicalists who also acknowledge the incompatibility between revelation and physicalism. ( Lewis, 1995 : 142; McLaughlin, 2003 : 378; Braddon-Mitchell, 12 Phenomenal Experience and the Thesis of Revelation","PeriodicalId":152495,"journal":{"name":"Perception, Cognition and Aesthetics","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132242158","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Xenophanes’s Figs and Honey","authors":"M. Curado","doi":"10.4324/9780429462658-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429462658-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":152495,"journal":{"name":"Perception, Cognition and Aesthetics","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115242889","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Interview with Leonel Moura","authors":"S. Gouveia","doi":"10.4324/9780429462658-19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429462658-19","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":152495,"journal":{"name":"Perception, Cognition and Aesthetics","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115588726","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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