{"title":"Architectures for intrusion tolerant database systems","authors":"Peng Liu","doi":"10.1109/FITS.2003.1264924","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/FITS.2003.1264924","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we propose four architectures for intrusion-tolerant database systems. While traditional secure database systems rely on prevention controls, an intrusion-tolerant database system can operate through attacks in such a way that the system can continue delivering essential services in the face of attacks. With a focus on attacks by malicious transactions, Architecture I can detect intrusions, and locate and repair the damage caused by the intrusions. Architecture II enhances Architecture I with the ability to isolate attacks so that the database can be immunized from the damage caused by a lot of attacks. Architecture III enhances Architecture I with the ability to dynamically contain the damage in such a way that no damage will leak out during the attack recovery process. Architecture IV enhances Architectures II and III with the ability to adapt the intrusion-tolerance controls to the changing environment so that a stabilized level of trustworthiness can be maintained. Architecture IV enhances Architecture IV with the ability to deliver differential, quantitative QoIA services to customers who have subscribed for these services even in the face of attacks.","PeriodicalId":149495,"journal":{"name":"Foundations of Intrusion Tolerant Systems, 2003 [Organically Assured and Survivable Information Systems]","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130371137","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"COCA: a secure distributed online certification authority","authors":"Lidong Zhou, F. Schneider, R. V. Renesse","doi":"10.1145/571637.571638","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/571637.571638","url":null,"abstract":"COCA is a fault-tolerant and secure online certification authority that has been built and deployed both in a local area network and in the Internet. Extremely weak assumptions characterize environments in which COCA's protocols execute correctly: no assumption is made about execution speed and message delivery delays; channels are expected to exhibit only intermittent reliability; and with 3t + 1 COCA servers up to t may be faulty or compromised. COCA is the first system to integrate a Byzantine quorum system (used to achieve availability) with proactive recovery (used to defend against mobile adversaries which attack, compromise, and control one replica for a limited period of time before moving on to another). In addition to tackling problems associated with combining fault-tolerance and security, new proactive recovery protocols had to be developed. Experimental results give a quantitative evaluation for the cost and effectiveness of the protocols.","PeriodicalId":149495,"journal":{"name":"Foundations of Intrusion Tolerant Systems, 2003 [Organically Assured and Survivable Information Systems]","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126882421","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Chris Wright, Crispin Cowan, Stephen Dale Smalley, James Morris, Greg Kroah-Hartman
{"title":"Linux security modules: general security support for the linux kernel","authors":"Chris Wright, Crispin Cowan, Stephen Dale Smalley, James Morris, Greg Kroah-Hartman","doi":"10.1109/FITS.2003.1264934","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/FITS.2003.1264934","url":null,"abstract":"The access control mechanisms of existing mainstream operating systems are inadequate to provide strong system security. Enhanced access control mechanisms have failed to win acceptance into mainstream operating systems due in part to a lack of consensus within the security community on the right solution. Since general-purpose operating systems must satisfy a wide range of user requirements, any access control mechanism integrated into such a system must be capable of supporting many different access control models. The Linux Security Modules (LSM) project has developed a lightweight, general purpose, access control framework for the mainstream Linux kernel that enables many different access control models to be implemented as loadable kernel modules. A number of existing enhanced access control implementations, including Linux capabilities, Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux), and Domain and Type Enforcement (DTE), have already been adapted to use the LSM framework. This paper presents the design and implementation of LSM and discusses the challenges in providing a truly general solution that minimally impacts the Linux kernel.","PeriodicalId":149495,"journal":{"name":"Foundations of Intrusion Tolerant Systems, 2003 [Organically Assured and Survivable Information Systems]","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132525445","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Formal specification and verification of a group membership protocol for an intrusion-tolerant group communication system","authors":"H. Ramasamy, M. Cukier, W. Sanders","doi":"10.1109/FITS.2003.1264937","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/FITS.2003.1264937","url":null,"abstract":"We describe a group membership protocol that is part of an intrusion-tolerant group communication system, and present an effort to use formal tools to model and validate our protocol. We describe in detail the most difficult part of the validation exercise, which was the determination of the right level of abstraction of the protocol for formally specifying the protocol. The validation exercise not only formally showed that the protocol satisfies its correctness claims, but also provided information that will help us make the protocol more efficient without violating correctness.","PeriodicalId":149495,"journal":{"name":"Foundations of Intrusion Tolerant Systems, 2003 [Organically Assured and Survivable Information Systems]","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116555726","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Type-preserving compilation of featherweight java","authors":"C. League, Zhong Shao, Valery Trifonov","doi":"10.1109/FITS.2003.1264927","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/FITS.2003.1264927","url":null,"abstract":"We present an efficient encoding of core Java constructs in a simple, implementable typed intermediate language. The encoding, after type erasure, has the same operational behavior as a standard implementation using vtables and self-application for method invocation. Classes inherit super-class methods with no overhead. We support mutually recursive classes while preserving separate compilation. Our strategy extends naturally to a significant subset of Java, including interfaces and privacy. The formal translation using Featherweight Java allows comprehensible type-preservation proofs and serves as a starting point for extending the translation to new features. Our work provides a foundation for supporting certifying compilation of Java-like class-based languages in a type-theoretic framework.","PeriodicalId":149495,"journal":{"name":"Foundations of Intrusion Tolerant Systems, 2003 [Organically Assured and Survivable Information Systems]","volume":"128 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114450234","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Zhong Shao, Bratin Saha, Valery Trifonov, N. Papaspyrou
{"title":"A type system for certi .ed binaries","authors":"Zhong Shao, Bratin Saha, Valery Trifonov, N. Papaspyrou","doi":"10.1145/503272.503293","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/503272.503293","url":null,"abstract":"A certified binary is a value together with a proof that the value satisfies a given specification. Existing compilers that generate certified code have focused on simple memory and control-flow safety rather than more advanced properties. In this paper, we present a general framework for explicitly representing complex propositions and proofs in typed intermediate and assembly languages. The new framework allows us to reason about certified programs that involve effects while still maintaining decidable typechecking. We show how to integrate an entire proof system (the calculus of inductive constructions) into a compiler intermediate language and how the intermediate language can undergo complex transformations (CPS and closure conversion) while preserving proofs represented in the type system. Our work provides a foundation for the process of automatically generating certified binaries in a typetheoretic framework.","PeriodicalId":149495,"journal":{"name":"Foundations of Intrusion Tolerant Systems, 2003 [Organically Assured and Survivable Information Systems]","volume":"360 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134482222","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
S. Zdancewic, Lantian Zheng, Nathaniel Nystrom, A. Myers
{"title":"Untrusted hosts and confidentiality: secure program partitioning","authors":"S. Zdancewic, Lantian Zheng, Nathaniel Nystrom, A. Myers","doi":"10.1109/FITS.2003.1264931","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/FITS.2003.1264931","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents secure program partitioning, a language-based technique for protecting confidential data during computation in distributed systems containing mutually untrusted hosts. Confidentiality and integrity policies can be expressed by annotating programs with security types that constrain information flow; these programs can then be partitioned automatically to run securely on heterogeneously trusted hosts. The resulting communicating subprograms collectively implement the original program, yet the system as a whole satisfies the security requirements of participating principals without requiring a universally trusted host machine. The experience in applying this methodology and the performance of the resulting distributed code suggest that this is a promising way to obtain secure distributed computation.","PeriodicalId":149495,"journal":{"name":"Foundations of Intrusion Tolerant Systems, 2003 [Organically Assured and Survivable Information Systems]","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114633229","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Survival by defense-enabling","authors":"P. Pal, F. Webber, R. Schantz","doi":"10.1109/FITS.2003.1264938","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/FITS.2003.1264938","url":null,"abstract":"Attack survival, which means the ability to provide some level of service despite an ongoing attack by tolerating its impact, is an important objective of security research. In this paper we present a new approach to survivability and intrusion tolerance. Our approach, which we call \"survival by defense\" is based on the observation that many applications can be given increased resistance to malicious attack even though the environment in which they run is untrustworthy. This paper describes the concept of \"survival by defense\" in general and explains the assumptions on which it depends. We will also explain the goals of survival by defense and how they can be achieved.","PeriodicalId":149495,"journal":{"name":"Foundations of Intrusion Tolerant Systems, 2003 [Organically Assured and Survivable Information Systems]","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127974785","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Design and evaluation of a wide-area event notification service","authors":"Antonio Carzaniga, David S. Rosenblum, A. Wolf","doi":"10.1109/FITS.2003.1264940","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/FITS.2003.1264940","url":null,"abstract":"The components of a loosely coupled system are typically designed to operate by generating and responding to asynchronous events. An event notification service is an application-independent infrastructure that supports the construction of event-based systems, whereby generators of events publish event notifications to the infrastructure and consumers of events subscribe with the infrastructure to receive relevant notifications. The two primary services that should be provided to components by the infrastructure are notification selection (i. e., determining which notifications match which subscriptions) and notification delivery (i.e., routing matching notifications from publishers to subscribers). Numerous event notification services have been developed for local-area networks, generally based on a centralized server to select and deliver event notifications. Therefore, they suffer from an inherent inability to scale to wide-area networks, such as the Internet, where the number and physical distribution of the service's clients can quickly overwhelm a centralized solution. The critical challenge in the setting of a wide-area network is to maximize the expressiveness in the selection mechanism without sacrificing scalability in the delivery mechanism. This paper presents SIENA, an event notification service that we have designed and implemented to exhibit both expressiveness and scalability. We describe the service's interface to applications, the algorithms used by networks of servers to select and deliver event notifications, and the strategies used to optimize performance. We also present results of simulation studies that examine the scalability and performance of the service.","PeriodicalId":149495,"journal":{"name":"Foundations of Intrusion Tolerant Systems, 2003 [Organically Assured and Survivable Information Systems]","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123115110","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
J. Strunk, G. Goodson, Michael L. Scheinholtz, Craig A. N. Soules, G. Ganger
{"title":"Self-securing storage: protecting data in compromised systems","authors":"J. Strunk, G. Goodson, Michael L. Scheinholtz, Craig A. N. Soules, G. Ganger","doi":"10.1109/FITS.2003.1264933","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/FITS.2003.1264933","url":null,"abstract":"Self-securing storage prevents intruders from undetectably tampering with or permanently deleting stored data. To accomplish this, self-securing storage devices internally audit all requests and keep old versions of data for a window of time, regardless of the commands received from potentially compromised host operating systems. Within the window, system administrators have this valuable information for intrusion diagnosis and recovery. Our implementation, called S4, combines log-structuring with journal-based metadata to minimize the performance costs of comprehensive versioning. Experiments show that self-securing storage devices can deliver performance that is comparable with conventional storage systems. In addition, analyses indicate that several weeks worth of all versions can reasonably be kept on state-of-the-art disks, especially when differencing and compression technologies are employed.","PeriodicalId":149495,"journal":{"name":"Foundations of Intrusion Tolerant Systems, 2003 [Organically Assured and Survivable Information Systems]","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128131781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}