{"title":"Innovation and Inequality in a Small World","authors":"Ines Lindner, H. Strulik","doi":"10.1111/iere.12437","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12437","url":null,"abstract":"We present a multicountry theory of economic growth and R&D‐driven technological progress in which countries are connected by a network of knowledge exchange. Technological progress in any country depends on the state of technology in the countries it exchanges knowledge with. The diffusion of knowledge throughout the world explains a period of increasing world inequality, followed by decreasing relative inequality. Knowledge diffusion through a small world network produces an extraordinary diversity of country growth performances, including the overtaking of individual countries and the replacement of the technologically leading country in the course of world development.","PeriodicalId":147998,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: International Economic Review","volume":"244 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"119671760","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Matching Markets with Mixed Ownership: The Case for a Real‐Life Assignment Mechanism","authors":"Pablo Guillén, Onur Kesten","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-2354.2012.00710.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2012.00710.x","url":null,"abstract":"We consider a common indivisible good allocation problem in which agents have both social and private endowments. Popular applications include student assignment to on-campus housing, kidney exchange, and particular school choice problems. In a series of experiments Chen and Sonmez (American Economic Review 92: 1669-1686, 2002) have shown that a popular mechanism from recent theory, the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism, induces a significantly higher participation rate by agents with private endowments and leads to significantly more efficient outcomes than the most commonly used real-life mechanism, the Random Serial Dictatorship with Squatting Rights.We first show that a particular mechanism, the so-called New House 4 (NH4) mechanism, which has been in use at MIT since the 1980s, is in fact outcome-equivalent to a natural adaptation of the well-known Gale-Shapley mechanism of two-sided matching theory. This implies that the NH4 mechanism is the most efficient mechanism within the class of fair and individually rational mechanisms, and that it is essentially the only incentive compatible mechanism satisfying the two properties. We then experimentally compare NH4 and TTC. We find that under NH4, the participation rate is significantly higher than under TTC. We also propose a new efficiency test based on ordinal preference information and show that NH4 also outperforms TTC in terms of efficiency.","PeriodicalId":147998,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: International Economic Review","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117669064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Neutral Technology Shocks and the Dynamics of Labor Input: Results from an Agnostic Identification","authors":"H. Mumtaz, Francesco Zanetti","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00678.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00678.x","url":null,"abstract":"This article studies the dynamic response of labor input to neutral technology shocks. It uses benchmark dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium models enriched with labor market search and matching frictions and investment‐specific technological progress that enables a new, agnostic, identification scheme based on sign restrictions on a structural vector autoregression (SVAR). The estimation supports an increase of labor input in response to neutral technology shocks. This finding is robust across different perturbations of the SVAR model.","PeriodicalId":147998,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: International Economic Review","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"119755499","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Testing the Structure of Conditional Correlations in Multivariate GARCH Models: A Generalized Cross‐Spectrum Approach","authors":"N. McCloud, Yongmiao Hong","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00657.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00657.x","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce a class of generally applicable specification tests for constant and dynamic structures of conditional correlations in multivariate GARCH models. The tests are robust to the presence of time-varying higher-order conditional moments of unknown form and are pure significance tests. The tests can identify linear and nonlinear misspecifications in conditional correlations. Our approach does not necessitate a particular parameter estimation method and distributional assumption on the error process. The asymptotic distribution of the tests is invariant to the uncertainty in parameter estimation. We assess the finite sample performance of our tests using simulated and real data.","PeriodicalId":147998,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: International Economic Review","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117784387","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Experimental Evidence of a Sunk-Cost Paradox: A Study of Pricing Behavior in Bertrand-Edgeworth Duopoly","authors":"Steve Buchheit, Nick Feltovich","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00630.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00630.x","url":null,"abstract":"A well–known implication of microeconomic theory is that sunk costs should have no effect on decision making. We test this hypothesis with a human–subjects experiment. Students recruited from graduate business courses, with an average of over six years of work experience, played the role of firms in a repeated price–setting duopoly game in which both firms had identical capacity constraints and costs, including a sunk cost that varied across experimental sessions over six different values. We find, contrary to the prediction of microeconomic theory, that subjects’ pricing decisions show sizable differences across treatments. The effect of the sunk cost is non–monotonic: as it increases from low to medium levels, average prices decrease, but as it increases from medium to high levels, average prices increase. These effects are not apparent initially, but develop quickly and persist throughout the game. Cachon and Camerer’s (1996) loss avoidance is consistent with both effects, while cost–based pricing predicts only the latter effect, and is inconsistent with the former.","PeriodicalId":147998,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: International Economic Review","volume":"321 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120079811","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Debt Nonneutrality, Policy Interactions, and Macroeconomic Stability","authors":"L. Linnemann, A. Schabert","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-2354.2010.00588.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2010.00588.x","url":null,"abstract":"We study the consequences of non-neutrality of government debt for macroeconomic stabilization policy in an environment where prices are sticky. Assuming transaction services of government bonds, Ricardian equivalence fails because public debt has a negative impact on its marginal rate of return and thus on private savings. Stability of equilibrium sequences requires a stationary evolution of real public debt, which steers inflation expectations and rules out endogenous fluctuations. Under anti-inflationary monetary policy regimes, macroeconomic fluctuations tend to decrease with the share of tax financing, which justifies tight debt constraints. In particular, a balanced budget policy stabilizes the economy under cost-push shocks, such that output and inflation variances can be lower than in a corresponding case where debt is neutral.","PeriodicalId":147998,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: International Economic Review","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"118443916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Effects of Fiscal Shocks on Employment and the Real Wage","authors":"Evi Pappa","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-2354.2008.00528.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2008.00528.x","url":null,"abstract":"We study the transmission of fiscal shocks in the labor market. We employ a structural VAR and base identification on the restrictions that shocks to government consumption, investment, and employment must raise output and deficits. These restrictions hold in both prototype Real Business Cycle (RBC) and New Keynesian models. Shocks to government consumption and investment increase real wages and employment contemporaneously, both at state level and in the aggregate. The dynamics in response to employment shocks are mixed: Increases in government employment raise the real wage and total employment in the aggregate. However, in one third of the states they reduce total employment.","PeriodicalId":147998,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: International Economic Review","volume":"429 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"119372521","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Attracting Skeptical Buyers: Negotiating for Intellectual Property Rights","authors":"James J. Anton, D. Yao","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-2354.2008.00481.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2008.00481.x","url":null,"abstract":"Expropriable disclosures of knowledge to prospective buyers may be necessary to facilitate the sale of intellectual property (IP). In principle, confidentiality agreements can protect disclosures by granting the seller rights to sue for unauthorized use. In practice, sellers often waive confidentiality rights. We provide an incomplete information explanation for the waiver of confidentiality rights that are valuable in complete information settings. Waiving sacrifices the protective value of confidentiality to gain greater buyer participation. Buyer skepticism, which reduces participation, arises endogenously from three elements: asymmetric information regarding seller IP, rent dissipation from competition for IP, and ex post costs from expropriation lawsuits.","PeriodicalId":147998,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: International Economic Review","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"118450118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Semi-nonparametric Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Conditional Moment Restriction Models","authors":"C. Ai","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-2354.2007.00456.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2007.00456.x","url":null,"abstract":"This article studies estimation of a conditional moment restriction model with the seminonparametric maximum likelihood approach proposed by Gallant and Nychka (\"Econometrica\" 55 (March 1987), 363-90). Under some sufficient conditions, we show that the estimator of the finite dimensional parameter θ is asymptotically normally distributed and attains the semiparametric efficiency bound and that the estimator of the density function is consistent under \"L\" 2 norm. Some results on the convergence rate of the estimated density function are derived. An easy to compute covariance matrix for the asymptotic covariance of the θ estimator is presented. Copyright 2007 by the Economics Department Of The University Of Pennsylvania And Osaka University Institute Of Social And Economic Research Association.","PeriodicalId":147998,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: International Economic Review","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"118395934","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Cohabitation, Marriage, and Divorce in a Model of Match Quality","authors":"M. Brien, L. Lillard, Steven Stern","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-2354.2006.00385.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2006.00385.x","url":null,"abstract":"The objective of this research is to further our understanding of how and why individuals enter and leave coresidential relationships. We develop and estimate an economic model of nonmarital cohabitation, marriage, and divorce that is consistent with current data on the formation and dissolution of relationships. Jovanovic's (Journal of Political Economy 87 (1979), 972-90) theoretical matching model is extended to help explain household formation and dissolution behavior. Implications of the model reveal what factors influence the decision to start a relationship, what form this relationship will take, and the relative stability of the various types of unions. The structural parameters of the model are estimated using longitudinal data from a sample of female high school seniors from the United States. New numerical methods are developed to reduce computational costs associated with estimation. The empirical results have interesting interpretations given the structural model. They show that a significant cause of cohabitation is the need to learn about potential partners and to hedge against future bad shocks. The estimated parameters are used to conduct several comparative dynamic experiments. For example, we show that policy experiments changing the cost of divorce have little effect on relationship choices.","PeriodicalId":147998,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: International Economic Review","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120379764","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}