{"title":"Security and privacy for body cameras used in law enforcement","authors":"Yufeng Wang, Waqas Latif, C. C. Tan, Yifan Zhang","doi":"10.1109/CNS.2015.7346826","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CNS.2015.7346826","url":null,"abstract":"The move towards deploying body cameras for law enforcement personnel makes the security and privacy of these body cameras a pressing problem. Body cameras record police interactions with the public, mainly to provide evidence of potential malicious police actions. However, since these body cameras are deployed and maintained by the police departments themselves, there is lack of trust in the integrity of the footage. Furthermore, the pervasive use of body cameras increases the surveillance of general public, causing a loss of privacy. This paper presents a system that protects the integrity of the body camera videos, as well as protect public privacy. Our approach integrates computer vision techniques onto a resource constrained body camera system, and our evaluation indicates that our approach is feasible to be applied on body cameras.","PeriodicalId":146763,"journal":{"name":"2015 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS)","volume":"129 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121361977","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"All your cluster-grids are belong to us: Monitoring the (in)security of infrastructure monitoring systems","authors":"Andrei Costin","doi":"10.1109/CNS.2015.7346868","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CNS.2015.7346868","url":null,"abstract":"Monitoring of the high-performance computing systems and their components, such as clusters, grids and federations of clusters, is performed using monitoring systems for servers and networks, or Network Monitoring Systems (NMS). These monitoring tools assist system administrators in assessing and improving the health of their infrastructure. A successful attack on the infrastructure monitoring tools grants the attacker elevated power over the monitoring tasks, and eventually over some management functionality of the interface or over hosts running those interfaces. Additionally, detailed and accurate fingerprinting and reconnaissance of a target infrastructure is possible when such interfaces are publicly exposed. A successful reconnaissance allows an attacker to craft an efficient secondstage attacks, such as targeted, mimicry and blended attacks. We provide in this paper a comprehensive security analysis of some of the most popular infrastructure monitoring tools for grids, clusters and High-Performance Computing (HPC) systems. We also provide insights based on the infrastructure data openly exposed over the Internet. The wide use of some of the most popular infrastructure monitoring tools makes this data exposure possible. For example, we found such monitoring interfaces to expose infrastructure details of systems inside many high-profile organizations, including two top national laboratories for nuclear research and one top Internet non-profit foundation. We also present our findings on a plethora of web vulnerabilities in the entire version-span of such monitoring tools, and discuss at a high-level the possible attacks. The results of our research allow us to “monitor” an “alarming” mismanagement reality of grid infrastructure. The aim of this work is to raise the awareness about this novel risk to cloud infrastructure.","PeriodicalId":146763,"journal":{"name":"2015 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS)","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126622981","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Small lies, lots of damage: a partition attack on link-state routing protocols","authors":"R. Cohen, Raziel Hess-Green, Gabi Nakibly","doi":"10.1109/CNS.2015.7346851","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CNS.2015.7346851","url":null,"abstract":"The Internet consists of a large number of interconnected heterogeneous ASs (Autonomous Systems), each owned and administered by an autonomous organization. Traffic in each AS is forwarded by routers that maintain a coherent picture of the network topology using an intra-AS routing protocol. The most popular intra-AS routing protocols are link-state protocols, such as OSPF and IS-IS. An attacker who compromises a single AS router can send false routing advertisements. In the most simple and practical variant of the attack, the attacker falsifies only its own routing advertisements and not those of other routers. However, such an attack is widely considered to have limited effectiveness, because only a small part of the topology is falsified. In this paper we disprove this conception, by presenting and analyzing a new attack, referred to as a “partition attack,” which can cause extensive damage throughout the AS by causing routers to have an incoherent view of the AS topology. We investigate the computational complexity of the attack and show its effectiveness using extensive simulations. An important property of this attack is that it cannot be prevented even if LSAs are digitally signed.","PeriodicalId":146763,"journal":{"name":"2015 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126826925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Some dangers from 2G networks legacy support and a possible mitigation","authors":"Dare Abodunrin, Y. Miché, S. Holtmanns","doi":"10.1109/CNS.2015.7346872","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CNS.2015.7346872","url":null,"abstract":"We present in this short study, some of the well-known problems with the current legacy support for 2G cellular networks, and the security and authentication problems this poses, as demonstrated in recent document leaks about spying from US embassies [1]. We have conducted focused radio measurements in the Helsinki Metropolitan area on these security problems and present some of the findings here. Also, we propose some mitigation methods for the most likely scenarios that arise in supporting legacy 2G systems in modern operator networks.","PeriodicalId":146763,"journal":{"name":"2015 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS)","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122682616","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Optimal tradeoff of secure PUF-based authentication","authors":"Kittipong Kittichokechai, G. Caire","doi":"10.1109/CNS.2015.7346814","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CNS.2015.7346814","url":null,"abstract":"We consider a problem of secure PUF-based authentication under a privacy constraint on the PUF responses. Given a randomly chosen challenge, an adversary who has access to the (publicly) stored helper data and side information correlated with the challenge-response pairs may try to mimic the corresponding PUF response in order to get authenticated. We characterize the optimal tradeoff between rate of the compressed helper data, information leakage rate of the PUF response at the adversary, and the adversary's maximum false acceptance probability exponent. The result captures a tradeoff between authentication performance and security aspects of PUF-based authentication such as authentication security and unpredictability of PUF when used in authentication applications.","PeriodicalId":146763,"journal":{"name":"2015 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS)","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116868758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
P. Luo, R. Torres, Zhi-Li Zhang, Sabyasachi Saha, Sung-ju Lee, A. Nucci, M. Mellia
{"title":"Leveraging client-side DNS failure patterns to identify malicious behaviors","authors":"P. Luo, R. Torres, Zhi-Li Zhang, Sabyasachi Saha, Sung-ju Lee, A. Nucci, M. Mellia","doi":"10.1109/CNS.2015.7346852","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CNS.2015.7346852","url":null,"abstract":"DNS has been increasingly abused by adversaries for cyber-attacks. Recent research has leveraged DNS failures (i.e. DNS queries that result in a Non-Existent-Domain response from the server) to identify malware activities, especially domain-flux botnets that generate many random domains as a rendezvous technique for command-&-control. Using ISP network traces, we conduct a systematic analysis of DNS failure characteristics, with the goal of uncovering how attackers exploit DNS for malicious activities. In addition to DNS failures generated by domain-flux bots, we discover many diverse and stealthy failure patterns that have received little attention. Based on these findings, we present a framework that detects diverse clusters of suspicious domain names that cause DNS failures, by considering multiple types of syntactic as well as temporal patterns. Our evolutionary learning framework evaluates the clusters produced over time to eliminate spurious cases while retaining sustaining (i.e., highly suspicious) clusters. One of the advantages of our framework is in analyzing DNS failures on per-client basis and not hinging on the existence of multiple clients infected by the same malware. Our evaluation on a large ISP network trace shows that our framework detects at least 97% of the clients with suspicious DNS behaviors, with over 81% precision.","PeriodicalId":146763,"journal":{"name":"2015 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS)","volume":"101 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129532472","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hammer and anvil: The threat of a cross-layer jamming-aided data control attack in multihop wireless networks","authors":"Liyang Zhang, T. Melodia","doi":"10.1109/CNS.2015.7346847","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CNS.2015.7346847","url":null,"abstract":"This paper considers potential risks to data security in multi-hop infrastructureless wireless networks where cross-layer routing protocols are used. We show that an adversary, as long as it controls a few of the nodes, and with the help of a few assisting jammers, can extend control over a significant portion of the data in the network even with very simple strategies and limited resources, by creating a so-called “wormhole” even without off-band links. We refer to this jamming-assisted data control threat as hammer and anvil attack. We model a prototype of the hammer and anvil attack in a wireless sensor network scenario with distributed cross-layer routing protocols. We show through extensive performance evaluation that the attack poses a serious threat to the resulting data security, and we provide observations that can be helpful in fine-tuning the attack, as well as in designing defense mechanisms against it.","PeriodicalId":146763,"journal":{"name":"2015 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129667476","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"mTor: A multipath Tor routing beyond bandwidth throttling","authors":"Lei Yang, Fengjun Li","doi":"10.1109/CNS.2015.7346860","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CNS.2015.7346860","url":null,"abstract":"One of the main obstacles that impede further expansion of Tor, the most popular anonymous communication system, is its large performance variance. The problem becomes worse when bandwidth-intensive applications, such as video streaming, contend with latency-sensitive applications, such as web browsing, for the scarce resources. Most of the existing solutions involve circuit-scheduling techniques to prioritize interactive traffic over bulk traffic or to completely throttle traffic of bandwidth-intensive applications. However, these approaches not only rely on accurate detection of traffic types but also adopt detection strategies that are easy to game. In this paper, we propose a different approach by exploring new capabilities of Tor to support bulk data transfers without degrading the performance of interactive traffic. Based on our observations that a large portion of low-bandwidth relays are under-utilized, we develop a multi-path Tor (mTor) routing algorithm to cater to bandwidth-intensive applications by constructing multiple circuits across low-bandwidth Tor relays. We present a self-adaptive “pulling” scheduling technique to dynamically allocate cells across multiple circuits, and an active congestion detection scheme to prevent slow circuits from becoming a bottleneck of the entire tunnel. Based on the results from experiments on the live Tor network and simulations over the Shadow simulator [1], we conclude that mTor not only achieves a desirable performance for bandwidth-intensive applications by utilizing multiple low-bandwidth relays, but also benefits latency-sensitive applications by reducing the load on high-bandwidth relays.","PeriodicalId":146763,"journal":{"name":"2015 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS)","volume":"198 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130316780","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Filtering IP source spoofing using feasible path reverse path forwarding with SDN","authors":"Kevin Benton, L. Camp, T. Kelley, D. M. Swany","doi":"10.1109/CNS.2015.7346909","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CNS.2015.7346909","url":null,"abstract":"Source IP spoofing is still an endemic challenge despite best practices documents being published more than 13 years ago that would prevent it if all ISPs abided by them. We argue that these approaches failed to gain widespread adoption due to fundamental incentive misalignment. We then propose an SDN-based solution designed to be placed at Internet exchange points by ISPs with the incentives to filter spoofed traffic. This solution doesn't replace existing routers and it runs on low-cost, high-speed OpenFlow switches with graceful failure strategies to make adoption simple.","PeriodicalId":146763,"journal":{"name":"2015 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS)","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123368595","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Inter-flow consistency: A novel SDN update abstraction for supporting inter-flow constraints","authors":"Weijie Liu, R. Bobba, Sibin Mohan, R. Campbell","doi":"10.1109/CNS.2015.7346859","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CNS.2015.7346859","url":null,"abstract":"Software Defined Networks (SDNs) have opened up a new era for networking by decoupling the control and data planes. With a centralized controller, the process of updating networks becomes much more convenient when compared to traditional networks. However, even with SDNs, transitional network states during network updates may still cause problems. Such states may result in a breakdown of isolation guarantees or other critical constraints and this could lead to incorrect behavior or even security vulnerabilities. In this paper, we propose a novel abstraction for network updates, inter-flow consistency, that can account for relationships and constraints among different flows during updates. We present a generic inter-flow consistency constraint, version isolation, and a special case, spatial isolation. We propose update scheduling algorithms based on dependency graphs and a data structure that captures dependencies among different update operations & network elements. We also implemented a prototype system on a Mininet OpenFlow network and Ryu SDN controller to evaluate our approach. Experimental results show that our approach is able to enforce inter-flow consistency constraints with reasonable overheads and that overheads for version isolation are higher than for spatial isolation. Furthermore, when only spatial isolation constraints are in use, overheads on update times for flows that have no isolation constraints are very small (around 1%).","PeriodicalId":146763,"journal":{"name":"2015 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS)","volume":"96 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126277637","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}