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The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2最新文献

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Is Government Growth Inevitable? 政府增长是不可避免的吗?
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2 Pub Date : 2019-02-28 DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.30
R. Holcombe
{"title":"Is Government Growth Inevitable?","authors":"R. Holcombe","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.30","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.30","url":null,"abstract":"Despite massive worldwide growth of government in the twentieth century, there have been periods in the U.S. and other countries when growth has slowed or reversed. Government growth is not inevitable. Explanations of government growth fall into three major categories. Path-dependent theories emphasize factors that continually push the size of government up, so the current size is in part a function of its past size. Theories about the equilibrium size of government explain why government is big, but not why government grows. If equilibrium conditions change, that can produce government growth. Theories also describe ideological shifts that cause people to want, or at least accept, bigger governments. All these explanations could have an effect on government growth. However, none appears to be persuasive enough to explain all the growth that occurred.","PeriodicalId":146256,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130725740","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Executive Veto Power and Constitutional Design 行政否决权与宪法设计
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2 Pub Date : 2019-02-28 DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.47
Nicholas R. Miller
{"title":"Executive Veto Power and Constitutional Design","authors":"Nicholas R. Miller","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.47","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.47","url":null,"abstract":"A “separation of powers” system provides for an executive and legislature with independent powers. While only the legislature can pass bills, executive approval is commonly required for them to become law. The executive exercises veto power by withholding approval. Executive veto power is simple if the executive can only approve a bill or reject it in its entirety; it is constructive if he can amend a bill in certain ways. It is qualified if the legislature can override a veto; it is unqualified otherwise. Any such system creates a gamelike strategic interaction between the legislature and executive. The chapter provides an expository sketch of a variety of such veto games. The analysis is based on a one-dimensional spatial model given three different behavioral assumptions: sincere behavior by both the legislature and executive, strategic behavior by both, and strategic behavior coupled with the possibility of a credible veto threat by the executive. Several extensions and qualifications are briefly noted.","PeriodicalId":146256,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115052228","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Policy Differences Among Parliamentary and Presidential Systems 议会制和总统制之间的政策差异
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2 Pub Date : 2019-02-28 DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.18
Sebastián Saiegh
{"title":"Policy Differences Among Parliamentary and Presidential Systems","authors":"Sebastián Saiegh","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.18","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines how the organization of power and authority affects policy outcomes. The focus is on: (1) statutory law; (2) public spending; and (3) policy reversals. The empirical evidence suggests that, compared to prime ministers, presidents enjoy lower levels of legislative success. Yet, deadlocks or stalemates are rare events, even in the case of single-party minority governments under presidential democracies. Regarding public spending, the results suggest that one should look at governments’ partisan composition rather than constitutional structures. Government spending over GDP is lower in countries with single-minority governments. This is a common situation under presidentialism. As such, the negative relationship between presidentialism and public spending previously documented in the literature might be spurious. Finally, in terms of the connection between constitutional structures and policy reversals, there is a concrete policy choice: sovereign debt repayment. The analysis reveals that parliamentary democracies are less likely to reschedule their sovereign debts than presidential regimes.","PeriodicalId":146256,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131099584","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Are There Types of Dictatorship? 独裁有哪些类型?
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2 Pub Date : 2019-02-28 DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.13
Ronald Wintrobe
{"title":"Are There Types of Dictatorship?","authors":"Ronald Wintrobe","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.13","url":null,"abstract":"The idea of different kinds of dictatorships can be traced back to Aristotle. In contemporary thinking, three classifications are common: tinpot vs. totalitarian, personal/military/single-party or civilian/military/monarchy, and short vs. long time horizon. This chapter argues that classification is useful if it can be theoretically grounded, the types can be distinguished empirically, and especially if they behave differently. It concludes with an analysis of seemingly “unclassifiable” regimes such as Chinese totalitarian capitalism, Putin’s Russia, and North Korea.","PeriodicalId":146256,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130890896","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
The Politics of International Aid 国际援助的政治
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2 Pub Date : 2019-02-28 DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.35
Hristos Doucouliagos
{"title":"The Politics of International Aid","authors":"Hristos Doucouliagos","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.35","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.35","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter surveys several aspects of the political economy of aid and the political economy of aid research. The first part reviews the politics of aid giving, with a specific focus on the use of aid to buy votes and aid allocated to recipients experiencing violent conflict. The survey then summarizes the literature on aid effectiveness on growth, capital accumulation, health, and education, and on institutions, and the links between aid and conflict. Finally, the survey explores the credibility of aid empirics, exploring issues of publication selection bias, heterogeneity, and statistical power. Direction for future research are outlined.","PeriodicalId":146256,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133496396","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 17
The Significance of Political Parties 政党的意义
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2 Pub Date : 2019-02-28 DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.19
Michael C. Munger
{"title":"The Significance of Political Parties","authors":"Michael C. Munger","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.19","url":null,"abstract":"Political parties have been conceived variously as teams of candidates, of ideological activists, or of groups of voters. Their goals range range from winning office or controlling government to implementing a shared vision of policy. But candidates, activists, and voters often have conflicting goals, and a desire to control government may conflict with a particular conception of “good” policy. This chapter considers how these conflicts play out in parties as organizations. Parties are the means by which democracies present, simplify, and differentiate competing visions of governance. They also may be the most fundamental informal institutions in democracies. Public choice conceives of individuals as pursuing goals, with plans and institutions used to the extent that individual goals are advanced; this is the “parties as effective” argument. Politics, like nature, abhors a vacuum, so organized interests focus their power on the policy process.","PeriodicalId":146256,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2","volume":"111 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122637809","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Politics and the Legal System 政治与法律制度
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2 Pub Date : 2019-02-28 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.6
L. Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, K. Quinn, J. Segal
{"title":"Politics and the Legal System","authors":"L. Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, K. Quinn, J. Segal","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.6","url":null,"abstract":"The title of the chapter, “Politics and the Legal System,” might conjure up images of judges logrolling, credit claiming, vote buying, and redirecting blame—in other words, judges acting as politicians. But the literature on judicial behavior almost never characterizes judges as “politicians in robes.” Rather, it treats “politics,” or more precisely “policy preferences,” as an important motivating force, such that a major goal of all judges is to see the law reflect their preferred policy positions. The authors follow suit, describing the role of policy preferences in studies of judging, as well as the approaches scholars have proposed to measure them. The chapter ends with a discussion of whether policy preferences should remain a focal point of research on judging. Believing that the answer is (an equivocal) no, the authors propose new avenues for research.","PeriodicalId":146256,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114905876","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Politics, Direct Investment, Public Debt Markets, and the Shadow Economy 政治、直接投资、公共债务市场和影子经济
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2 Pub Date : 2019-02-28 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.34
F. Schneider
{"title":"Politics, Direct Investment, Public Debt Markets, and the Shadow Economy","authors":"F. Schneider","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.34","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.34","url":null,"abstract":"The chapter first considers the role of politics on the size of the shadow economy and how it is affected by political institutions. Second, it investigates the role of the informal sector on direct investment and public debt markets in the “official” economy. The informal sector has significant adverse effects on credit ratings, lending costs, and investment decisions. This has policy implications, especially in the context of the ongoing sovereign debt crisis, since it suggests that, if politics succeed in reducing the informal sector of financially challenged countries, this is likely to reduce credit risk concerns, cutting down lending costs, and stimulating investment.","PeriodicalId":146256,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129426311","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Precursors to Public Choice 《公共选择》的前身
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2 Pub Date : 2019-02-28 DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.41
I. McLean
{"title":"Precursors to Public Choice","authors":"I. McLean","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.41","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.41","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter reviews the many appearances, disappearances, and reappearances of axiomatic thought about social choice and elections since the era of ancient Greek democracy. Social choice is linked to the wider public-choice movement because both are theories of agency. Thus, just as the first public-choice theorists include Hobbes, Hume, and Madison, so the first social-choice theorists include Pliny, Llull, and Cusanus. The social-choice theory of agency appears in many strands. The most important of these are binary vs. nonbinary choice; aggregation of judgement vs. aggregation of opinion; and selection of one person vs. selection of many people. The development of social choice required both a public-choice mindset and mathematical skill.","PeriodicalId":146256,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117113970","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Christian History and Public Choice 基督教历史与公共选择
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2 Pub Date : 2019-02-28 DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.38
Mario Ferrero
{"title":"Christian History and Public Choice","authors":"Mario Ferrero","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.38","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.38","url":null,"abstract":"In the last twenty years, Christian history has attracted the effort of a number of economists, challenged by the fact that the mainline churches are among the longest-lasting institutions in world history. This chapter covers the subset of that research that, while part of the broader field of the economics of religion, more nearly falls within the public-choice approach, dividing it into main topics: doctrine and theology, Catholic saint-making, the working of the papacy as an institution, religious orders, and church leadership and governance. It is shown that the essential analytical tools of this research have been the classic public-choice models of collective decision-making, bureaucracy, dictatorship, rent-seeking, and clubs. The conclusion reviews neglected topics and modeling approaches that show potential for further progress.","PeriodicalId":146256,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 2","volume":"98 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114490646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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