{"title":"Character, ‘Propensities’, and the (Mis)use of Statistics in Criminal Trials 1","authors":"R. Duff, S. Marshall","doi":"10.4324/9780429283123-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429283123-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":144867,"journal":{"name":"The Social Epistemology of Legal Trials","volume":"146 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124293723","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Eyewitness Testimony, the Misinformation Effect and Reasonable Doubt","authors":"C. Bennett","doi":"10.4324/9780429283123-chapter2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429283123-chapter2","url":null,"abstract":"In a recent paper, Katherine Puddifoot has argued that jurors should be given information about the misinformation effect in order to preserve the useful role that eyewitness testimony can sometimes play in criminal trials, while mitigating the distortions to which the misinformation effect might give rise. Whereas, I will argue that her strategy, while promising, does not go far enough. Because it involves agreeing that the misinformation effect will foreseeably distort some eyewitness testimony, Puddifoot's strategy cannot answer the charge that, given the high standard of proof in criminal trials (beyond reasonable doubt), it would be better to disallow convictions in all cases in which eyewitness testimony is central or decisive. To consider whether such disallowing would be an appropriate, proportionate course of action, I will claim, we need to get clearer about issues concerning the appropriate standard of proof in criminal trials, and about the values in play that should help us interpret that standard.","PeriodicalId":144867,"journal":{"name":"The Social Epistemology of Legal Trials","volume":"316 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124483292","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On Testifying and Giving Evidence","authors":"Stephen Wright","doi":"10.4324/9780429283123-chapter3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429283123-chapter3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":144867,"journal":{"name":"The Social Epistemology of Legal Trials","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132161648","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Against the Odds: The Case for a Modal Understanding of Due Care","authors":"Jeffrey S. Helmreich, D. Pritchard","doi":"10.4324/9780429283123-chapter9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429283123-chapter9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":144867,"journal":{"name":"The Social Epistemology of Legal Trials","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123851167","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Credibility Deficits, Memory Errors and the Criminal Trial","authors":"Katherine Puddifoot","doi":"10.4324/9780429283123-chapter1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429283123-chapter1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":144867,"journal":{"name":"The Social Epistemology of Legal Trials","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122782992","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Criminal Trials for Preventive Deprivations of Liberty 1","authors":"Hadassa Noorda","doi":"10.4324/9780429283123-chapter10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429283123-chapter10","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":144867,"journal":{"name":"The Social Epistemology of Legal Trials","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134245842","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Justified Belief and Just Conviction","authors":"C. Littlejohn","doi":"10.4324/9780429283123-chapter7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429283123-chapter7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":144867,"journal":{"name":"The Social Epistemology of Legal Trials","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127545268","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Explaining the Justificatory Asymmetry between Statistical and Individualized Evidence","authors":"Renée Jorgensen Bolinger","doi":"10.4324/9780429283123-chapter4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429283123-chapter4","url":null,"abstract":": In some cases, there appears to be an asymmetry in the evidential value of statistical and more individualized evidence. For example, while I may accept that Alex is guilty based on eyewitness testimony that is 80% likely to be accurate, it does not seem permissible to do so based on the fact that 80% of a group that Alex is a member of are guilty. In this paper I suggest that rather than reflecting a deep defect in statistical evidence, this asymmetry might arise from a general constraint on rational inquiry. Plausibly the degree of evidential support needed to justify taking a proposition to be true depends on the stakes of error. While relying on statistical evidence plausibly raises the stakes by introducing new kinds of risk to members of the reference class, paradigmatically ‘individualized’ evidence—evidence tracing back to A’s voluntary behavior—can lower the stakes. The net result explains the apparent evidential asymmetry without positing a deep difference in the brute justificatory power of different types of evidence.","PeriodicalId":144867,"journal":{"name":"The Social Epistemology of Legal Trials","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121574608","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Social Epistemology of Legal Trials","authors":"Zachary Hoskins","doi":"10.4324/9780429283123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429283123","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":144867,"journal":{"name":"The Social Epistemology of Legal Trials","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130595013","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}