ERN: Monopoly最新文献

{"title":"Bertrand Competition under Network Externalities","authors":"Masaki Aoyagi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2932582","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2932582","url":null,"abstract":"Two sellers engage in price competition to attract buyers located on a network. The value of the good of either seller to any buyer depends on the number of neighbors on the network who consume the same good. For a generic specification of consumption externalities, we show that an equilibrium price equals the marginal cost if and only if the buyer network is complete or cyclic. When the externalities are approximately linear in the size of consumption, we identify the classes of networks in which one of the sellers monopolizes the market, or the two sellers segment the market.","PeriodicalId":142139,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Monopoly","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124769020","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Consumer Privacy in Oligopolistic Markets: Winners, Losers, and Welfare","authors":"Curtis R. Taylor, Liad Wagman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2583453","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2583453","url":null,"abstract":"Motivated by the unprecedented availability of consumer information on the Internet, we characterize the winners and losers from potential privacy regulation in the context of four commonly-used oligopoly models: a linear city model, a circular city model, a vertical differentiation model, and a multi-unit symmetric demand model. We show that while there are winners and losers as a result of privacy enforcement, the parties who stand to benefit and the parties who stand to lose, as well as whether social welfare is enhanced or diminished, largely depends on the specific economic setting under consideration.","PeriodicalId":142139,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Monopoly","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129336852","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Applications of Price Gap and Adjustment Weights in Analyzing a Natural Monopoly with a Linear Decreasing Marginal Cost Function","authors":"Naresh C. Mallick","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2431538","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2431538","url":null,"abstract":"A natural monopoly can meet the market demand alone cheaply than several firms together can. A natural monopoly enjoys the economies of scale of production, marginal cost decreases at least in the range of market demand for its product. Assuming a decreasing linear marginal cost function, this paper derives all the competitive, regulatory, and monopoly equilibrium formulae of a natural monopoly model using the price gap and adjustment weights. If also offers welfare analysis and all possible comparisons. It also derives a formula for the minimum compensation that should be made to the natural monopoly to offer the competitive output. Any results of this paper can be applied independently.","PeriodicalId":142139,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Monopoly","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125855381","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Структурные Сдвиги в Российской Экономике: Сравнительный Анализ Динамики Основных Показателей (Structure Shifts in Russian Economy: Comparative Analysis of Dynamics of Basic Indicators)","authors":"O. Izryadnova","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2430580","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2430580","url":null,"abstract":"Increasing competition forms a new model of economical growth and suggests a simultaneous solution of strategic problems and improving of business climate and elevation of investment attractiveness.","PeriodicalId":142139,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Monopoly","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134053356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Going Beyond Duopoly: Connectivity Breakdowns Under Receiving Party Pays","authors":"Steffen Hoernig","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2441126","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2441126","url":null,"abstract":"We show that the prediction of strategic connectivity breakdowns under a receiving-party-pays system and discrimination between on- and off-net prices does not hold up once more than two mobile networks are considered. Indeed, if there are at least three competing networks and enough utility is obtained from receiving calls, no strategic connectivity breakdowns occur. Private negotiations over access charges then achieve the efficient outcome. Bill & keep (zero access charges) and free outgoing and incoming calls are efficient if and only marginal costs of calls are zero.","PeriodicalId":142139,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Monopoly","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114214204","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Price Competition in Sequential Multi-Product Oligopolies","authors":"A. Federgruen, Ming Hu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2437032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2437032","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze a general model in which, at each echelon of the supply process, an arbitrary number of firms compete, offering one or multiple products to some or all of the firms at the next or possibly subsequent echelons or directly to the end consumer. At each echelon, the offered products are differentiated and the firms belonging to this echelon engage in price competition. The model assumes a general set of piece-wise linear consumer demand functions for all products (potentially) brought to the consumer market, where each product's demand volume may depend on the retail prices charged for all products; consumers' preferences over the various product/retailer combinations are general and asymmetric. Similarly the cost rates incurred by the firms at the most upstream echelon are general as well. We initially study a two-echelon sequential oligopoly with competing suppliers, each selling multiple products indirectly through a pool of multiple competing retailers or directly to end consumers. In some cases, a supplier may choose to sell some or all of its products simultaneously via its direct sales channel and indirectly via some or all of the retailers. We characterize the equilibrium behavior under linear price-only contracts. In the second stage, given wholesale prices and prices of direct sales channels selected in the first stage, all retailers simultaneously decide on their retail prices to maximize their total profits among all products of all suppliers they choose to do business with. In the first stage, the suppliers anticipate the retailers' responses and all suppliers simultaneously maximize their total pro ts from all channels direct or indirect channels by selecting the wholesale prices and direct sales channel prices. We show that in this two-stage competition model, a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium always exists. Multiple subgame perfect equilibria may arise but, if so, all equilibria are equivalent in the sense of generating unique demands and profits for all firms. We subsequently generalize our results to supply chain models with an arbitrary set of echelons, and show how all equilibrium performance measures can be computed with an efficient recursive scheme. The model may, also be used to evaluate the impact of various structural changes in the supply chain network.","PeriodicalId":142139,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Monopoly","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133700688","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Very Simple Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics","authors":"J. Abbring, Jeffrey R. Campbell, J. Tilly, N. Yang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2631509","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2631509","url":null,"abstract":"This paper develops an econometric model of industry dynamics for concentrated markets that can be estimated very quickly from market-level panel data on the number of producers and consumers using a nested fixed-point algorithm. We show that the model has an essentially unique symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium that can be calculated from the fixed points of a finite sequence of low-dimensional contraction mappings. Our nested fixed point procedure extends Rust's (1987) to account for the observable implications of mixed strategies on survival. We illustrate the model's empirical application with ten years of County Business Patterns data from the Motion Picture Theaters industry in 573 Micropolitan Statistical Areas. The results are suggestive of fierce competition between theaters in the market for film exhibition rights.","PeriodicalId":142139,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Monopoly","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126794128","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Product Diversity, Demand Structures and Optimal Taxation","authors":"V. Lewis, R. Winkler","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2381524","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2381524","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies optimal taxation in a general equilibrium model with endogenous entry. We compare the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) model to three alternative demand structures: oligopolistic competition in prices, oligopolistic competition in quantities, and translog preferences. Our economy is characterized by two distortions: a labor distortion due to the misalignment of markups on goods and leisure, and an entry distortion due to the misalignment of the consumer surplus effect and the profit destruction effect of entry. The two distortions interact in determining the wedge between the market-driven and optimal level of product diversity. We show how optimal labor and entry taxes depend upon the prevailing demand structure, the nature and size of entry costs, and the degree of substitutability between goods.","PeriodicalId":142139,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Monopoly","volume":"73 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114388737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Theory of Consumer Referral: Revisited","authors":"Maria N. Arbatskaya, Hideo Konishi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2345288","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2345288","url":null,"abstract":"Jun and Kim (2008) consider the optimal pricing and referral strategy of a monopoly that uses a consumer communication network to spread product information. They show that for any finite referral chain, the optimal policy involves a referral fee that provides strictly positive referral incentives and effective price discrimination among consumers based on their positions in the chain. We revisit this problem to strengthen Jun and Kim's results by weakening their referral condition. Moreover, we characterize the first-best policy when individual-specific referral fees are available and show that it is qualitatively similar to the second-best solution of Jun and Kim (2008).","PeriodicalId":142139,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Monopoly","volume":"117 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124085750","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Value of Category Captainship in the Presence of Manufacturer Competition","authors":"Mumin Kurtulus, Alper Nakkas, Sezer Ulku","doi":"10.1111/POMS.12062","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/POMS.12062","url":null,"abstract":"This research investigates the value of category captainship (a management practice in which a retailer relies on a manufacturer for recommendations regarding strategic category management decisions) in retail supply chains. We consider a setting where the scope of category management is limited to assortment decisions and demand enhancing activities. We assume that the retailer selects a category captain among multiple competing manufacturers with privately known capabilities for driving category traffic. First, we consider a benchmark scenario where the retailer is responsible for category management. Then, we consider the category captainship scenario where the retailer selects one of the manufacturers as a captain to manage the category. We find that captainship is more likely to emerge in categories where the cost of managing variety, the retail margins, and the competition for captainship are moderate and the captain is more capable of driving traffic compared to the retailer. In such categories the collaboration between the retailer and the captain ensures sufficient surplus for both parties. Finally, we show that captainship can also benefit the non-captain manufacturers.","PeriodicalId":142139,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Monopoly","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131759895","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}