International Journal of Game Theory最新文献

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A threshold model of urban development 城市发展的门槛模型
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
International Journal of Game Theory Pub Date : 2023-05-02 DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00844-5
Alberto Vesperoni, Paul Schweinzer
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引用次数: 1
Discrete Colonel Blotto games with two battlefields 离散上校Blotto游戏与两个战场
4区 经济学
International Journal of Game Theory Pub Date : 2023-04-27 DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00853-4
Dong Liang, Yunlong Wang, Zhigang Cao, Xiaoguang Yang
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引用次数: 1
Nonatomic game with general preferences over returns 一般偏好大于回报的非原子博弈
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
International Journal of Game Theory Pub Date : 2023-04-27 DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00843-6
Jian Yang
{"title":"Nonatomic game with general preferences over returns","authors":"Jian Yang","doi":"10.1007/s00182-023-00843-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-023-00843-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":14155,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Game Theory","volume":"1 1","pages":"1-29"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41687698","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Joint market dominance through exclusionary compatibility 通过排他性兼容性共同主导市场
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
International Journal of Game Theory Pub Date : 2023-04-27 DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00846-3
Jihwan Do
{"title":"Joint market dominance through exclusionary compatibility","authors":"Jihwan Do","doi":"10.1007/s00182-023-00846-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-023-00846-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":14155,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Game Theory","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41562488","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility 优柔寡断机制设计:一条通向可能性的新路径
4区 经济学
International Journal of Game Theory Pub Date : 2023-04-27 DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00849-0
Ville Korpela
{"title":"Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility","authors":"Ville Korpela","doi":"10.1007/s00182-023-00849-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-023-00849-0","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Often preferences in a group of agents are such that any sensible goal must admit a tie between all alternatives. The standard formulation in mechanism design demands that in this case all alternatives must be equilibrium outcomes of the decision making mechanism. However, as far as the idea of an equilibrium is to predict the outcome, we could equally well require that there are no equilibria at all. Although this may seem innocent, it allows the mechanism designer to implement goals that are impossible to enforce with any other implementation concept, like mixed Nash implementation, subgame perfect implementation, or Nash implementation using undominated strategies.","PeriodicalId":14155,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Game Theory","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136120068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Delegation of information acquisition, information asymmetry, and outside option 信息获取委托、信息不对称和外部选择
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
International Journal of Game Theory Pub Date : 2023-04-27 DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00842-7
J. Choi, Kookyoung Han
{"title":"Delegation of information acquisition, information asymmetry, and outside option","authors":"J. Choi, Kookyoung Han","doi":"10.1007/s00182-023-00842-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-023-00842-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":14155,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Game Theory","volume":"52 1","pages":"833 - 860"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45706451","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Comparable axiomatizations of the average tree solution and the Myerson value 平均树解与Myerson值的可比较公理化
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
International Journal of Game Theory Pub Date : 2023-04-27 DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00817-0
Ö. Selçuk, Takamasa Suzuki
{"title":"Comparable axiomatizations of the average tree solution and the Myerson value","authors":"Ö. Selçuk, Takamasa Suzuki","doi":"10.1007/s00182-022-00817-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-022-00817-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":14155,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Game Theory","volume":"52 1","pages":"333 - 362"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41733080","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Potentials and solutions of cooperative games with a fixed player set 具有固定玩家集的合作对策的潜力和解决方案
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
International Journal of Game Theory Pub Date : 2023-04-11 DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00839-2
Takaaki Abe, Satoshi Nakada
{"title":"Potentials and solutions of cooperative games with a fixed player set","authors":"Takaaki Abe, Satoshi Nakada","doi":"10.1007/s00182-023-00839-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-023-00839-2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":14155,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Game Theory","volume":"1 1","pages":"1-18"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46675602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the structure of core solutions of discontinuous general cooperative games 不连续一般合作对策核心解的结构研究
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
International Journal of Game Theory Pub Date : 2023-04-04 DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00856-1
Qi-Qing Song
{"title":"On the structure of core solutions of discontinuous general cooperative games","authors":"Qi-Qing Song","doi":"10.1007/s00182-023-00856-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-023-00856-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":14155,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Game Theory","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46175088","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Strategic transmission of imperfect information: why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult 不完全信息的策略性传递:为什么(没有证据)披露证据是困难的
4区 经济学
International Journal of Game Theory Pub Date : 2023-03-31 DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00848-1
Manuel Foerster
{"title":"Strategic transmission of imperfect information: why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult","authors":"Manuel Foerster","doi":"10.1007/s00182-023-00848-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-023-00848-1","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In our cheap-talk setting, an expert privately observes multiple binary signals, her soft evidence, about a continuous state of the world and then communicates with a decision-maker. While direct transmission of evidence entails communicating the underlying signals, indirect transmission of evidence entails communicating a summary statistic of her evidence. We first establish that fully informative equilibria exist if the conflict of interest is small. Otherwise, direct transmission of evidence is impossible, as withholding one part of the soft evidence in the communication necessarily induces incentives to manipulate the report on the other part. On the contrary, indirect transmission of evidence remains partially informative for intermediate conflicts of interest. Finally, we introduce the possibility of certification. We show that, if the costs of certification are low, the expert can fully reveal her evidence regardless of the conflict of interest.","PeriodicalId":14155,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Game Theory","volume":"74 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135733153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
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