{"title":"Architecture of the reconnaissance intrusion detection system (RIDS)","authors":"Zheng Zhang, C. Manikopoulos","doi":"10.1109/IAW.2004.1437816","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/IAW.2004.1437816","url":null,"abstract":"This paper describes the architecture and provides early test results of the reconnaissance intrusion detection system (RIDS) prototype. RIDS is a session oriented, statistical tool, that relies on training to mold the parameters of its algorithms, capable of detecting even distributed stealthy reconnaissance attacks. It consists of two main functional modules or stages: the reconnaissance activity profiler (RAP), followed by the reconnaissance alert correlation (RAC), along with a security console. RAP is a session-oriented module capable of detecting stealthy scanning and probing attacks, while RAC is an alert-correlation module that fuses the RAP alerts into attack scenarios and discovers the distributed stealthy attack scenarios, RIDS has been evaluated against two data sets: (a) the DARPA'98 data, and (b) 3 weeks of experimental data generated using the CONEX testbed, running at average Ethernet speeds. RIDS has demonstrably achieved remarkable success; the false positive, false negative and misclassification rates found are low, less than 0.1%, for most reconnaissance attacks; they rise to about 6% for distributed highly stealthy attacks; the latter is a most challenging type of attack, which has been difficult to detect effectively until now. Thus, the RIDS system promises to provide an early warning by detecting the reconnaissance first phase of an impending attack, even if it is very stealthy and distributed.","PeriodicalId":141403,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings from the Fifth Annual IEEE SMC Information Assurance Workshop, 2004.","volume":"90 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116271169","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A biometric authentication approach for high security ad-hoc networks","authors":"Qinghan Xiao","doi":"10.1109/IAW.2004.1437824","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/IAW.2004.1437824","url":null,"abstract":"With the rapid development of wireless technology, various mobile devices have been developed for military and civilian applications. Defense research and development has shown increasing interest in ad-hoc networks because a military has to be mobile. Peer-to-peer is a good architecture for mobile communication in coalition operations. Since there is no need for a dedicated server, users can dynamically route information through the network to anywhere at any time. However, this architecture brings a new challenge in user authentication, which is normally carried out in an authentication server that is absent in ad-hoc networks. In this paper, a biometric authentication model is presented to enhance information security in ad-hoc networks. Using this model, a peer is authenticated with biometrics when joining an existing group even without the presence of an authentication server.","PeriodicalId":141403,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings from the Fifth Annual IEEE SMC Information Assurance Workshop, 2004.","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115879721","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Attack attribution in non-cooperative networks","authors":"D. Cohen, K. Narayanaswamy","doi":"10.1109/IAW.2004.1437851","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/IAW.2004.1437851","url":null,"abstract":"This paper reports on preliminary research concepts in attack attribution that have been developed in Cs3's project being conducted for advanced research and development activity (ARDA). The ARDA BAA identified 4 levels of attribution: level 1: attribution to the specific hosts involved in the attack; level 2: attribution to the primary controlling host; level 3: attribution to the actual human actor; level 4: attribution to an organization with the specific intent to attack. Cs3's research specifically focuses on attribution in situations where universal cooperation is not available for the attribution effort. This paper describes research concepts that show promise in resolving the level 1 attribution problem. The name of the project is Systematically Tracking Attackers through Routing Data, Events, and Communication Knowledge (STARDECK).","PeriodicalId":141403,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings from the Fifth Annual IEEE SMC Information Assurance Workshop, 2004.","volume":"90 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131732517","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Adding the fourth \"R\" [CERT's model for computer security strategies]","authors":"B. Endicott-Popovsky, D. Frincke","doi":"10.1109/IAW.2004.1437854","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/IAW.2004.1437854","url":null,"abstract":"In the emerging discipline of survivability, defined as the \"ability of a system to fulfil its mission, in a timely manner, in the presence of attacks, failures and accidents\", the CERT Coordination Center has implicitly institutionalized the concept of a never-ending, escalating computer security arms race. While previous point solutions - such as PKIs, VPNs and firewalls - focused on blocking attacks, survivability reflects the inevitability of experiencing attacks and the need to recover quickly. CERT's 3 R model - resistance, recognition, and recovery - describes survivability strategies. Increasing intruder accountability by increasing legal consequences will inhibit the escalation of the hacker arms race. This is reflected in CERT's model for computer security strategies by adding a 4th R, redress, to CERT's 3R model.","PeriodicalId":141403,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings from the Fifth Annual IEEE SMC Information Assurance Workshop, 2004.","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124322913","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Recursive data mining for masquerade detection and author identification","authors":"B. Szymanski, Yongqiang Zhang","doi":"10.1109/IAW.2004.1437848","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/IAW.2004.1437848","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, a novel recursive data mining method based on the simple but powerful model of cognition called a conceptor is introduced and applied to computer security. The method recursively mines a string of symbols by finding frequent patterns, encoding them with unique symbols and rewriting the string using this new coding. We apply this technique to two related but important problems in computer security: (i) masquerade detection to prevent a security attack in which an intruder impersonates a legitimate user to gain access to the resources, and (ii) author identification, in which anonymous or disputed computer session needs to be attributed to one of a set of potential authors. Many methods based on automata theory, hidden Markov models, Bayesian models or even matching algorithms from bioinformatics have been proposed to solve the masquerading detection problem but less work has been done on the author identification. We used recursive data mining to characterize the structure and high-level symbols in user signatures and the monitored sessions. We used one-class SVM to measure the similarity of these two characterizations. We applied weighting prediction scheme to author identification. On the SEA dataset that we used in our experiments, the results were very promising.","PeriodicalId":141403,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings from the Fifth Annual IEEE SMC Information Assurance Workshop, 2004.","volume":"106 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124973186","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Measuring IT security - a method based on common criteria's security functional requirements","authors":"A. Hunstad, J. Hallberg, R. Andersson","doi":"10.1109/IAW.2004.1437821","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/IAW.2004.1437821","url":null,"abstract":"A networked defense, and the networked information society, requires both trustworthy information systems and that users and societies trust these systems. Since the trustworthiness of systems depends on the level of IT security, the ability to assess the IT security ability is vital. Currently, there are no efficient methods for establishing the level of IT security in information systems. The main results described in this paper are: a set of security functions needed in systems, based on the security functional requirements of the Common Criteria (CC, 1999) and a method using the set of security functions to assess the securability of components in distributed information systems. Work in progress focuses on system-wide evaluations.","PeriodicalId":141403,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings from the Fifth Annual IEEE SMC Information Assurance Workshop, 2004.","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127879373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Evolution of Inline Network Encryptors toward the High Assurance Internet Protocol Interoperability Specifications (HAIPIS)","authors":"J.B. Widby, R. Río, D. Fulton, C. Dunn","doi":"10.1109/IAW.2004.1437813","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/IAW.2004.1437813","url":null,"abstract":"The National Security Agency (NSA) has established new High Assurance Internet Protocol Interoperability Specifications (HAIPIS) that requires different vendor's Inline Network Encryption (INE) devices to be interoperable at a higher level of intelligence. The end result will force the standardization of different encryption algorithms produced by different vendors. The US Army Battle Command Battle Laboratory - Gordon (BCBL(G)) has been entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring that new INEs meet HAIPIS as well as function within the Army's doctrinal concepts and deployment strategies. The BCBL(G) is one of the Army's premier facilities for operational assessments and operational experimentation for new INE devices. The BCBL(G) applies a unique blend of engineers, scientists and analysts to demonstrate, validate and verify INE hardware and software functions. The BCBL(G) provides the ability to rapidly evaluate vendor proposed telecommunication technologies that must be immediately leveraged to the Warfighter in order to maintain information security and tactical information superiority. The history of Army INE development is rich with lessons to be learned. The future of Army INE development is full of new challenges. This paper documents some of the lessons learned and outlines new challenges.","PeriodicalId":141403,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings from the Fifth Annual IEEE SMC Information Assurance Workshop, 2004.","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133848890","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Honeypot forensics","authors":"F. Raynal, Y. Berthier, P. Biondi, D. Kaminsky","doi":"10.1109/iaw.2004.1437793","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/iaw.2004.1437793","url":null,"abstract":"The deployment of low-interaction honeypots used mainly as deception tools has become more and more common these days. Another interesting but more resource and time consuming playground is made available thanks to high interaction honeypots where a blackhat can connect to the system and download, install and execute his own tools in a less constrained environment. Once caught in the honeypot, the blackhat leaves many fingerprints behind: network (information gathering scans, IRC chats, mail, etc) and system activity (what he did on the system, which tools he used, etc). The aim of honeypot forensics is to identify these fingerprints as part of the evidence gathering process. We present a methodology that will help the analyst to achieve this goal. The first step is to analyze the honeypot's ingress and egress network traffic. The second one is to look at the actions performed by the blackhat and the tools he used on the honeypot. The next step is to correlate these data: network and system events are joined to identify common events or patterns, and also to highlight unexplained items and focus on them.","PeriodicalId":141403,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings from the Fifth Annual IEEE SMC Information Assurance Workshop, 2004.","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128564595","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}