Paper Sessions最新文献

{"title":"An Economic Model of Tiered Spectrum Access","authors":"Nelson Sã, M. Connolly","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2944331","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2944331","url":null,"abstract":"This paper develops a theoretical economic framework with the purpose of evaluating the optimal allocation of frequency space between licensed and unlicensed agents. We explore a dominant firm price leadership model where broader property rights over spectrum may be purchased while a competitive fringe enjoys free common access to a different set of frequencies, though with no assurance of protection against interference. The standard model is extended here in two new directions by simultaneously introducing congestion in production activities and quality differentials in output. Our paper describes the corresponding equilibrium pricing decisions and sets the conditions under which a dominant firm and a competitive fringe may co-exist in the market. The regulator plays a key role in these results by determining the optimal share of frequency space assigned to licensed and unlicensed spectrum access, with a view to maximize either consumer welfare or total economic surplus. This allocation choice is shown to depend on a variety of economic and technical parameters, like market scale, cost differentials between firms, product quality and power caps aimed at reducing interference. These insights are relevant in light of the current plans of the Federal Communications Commission for the development of the 3.5 GHz band, envisioned as a low-powered, multi-tiered hierarchical access system.","PeriodicalId":141238,"journal":{"name":"Paper Sessions","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123499054","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Devil is in the Details: Lessons from the Indian Spectrum Auctions","authors":"Rekha Jain","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2943904","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2943904","url":null,"abstract":"The Indian telecom growth as in other countries, largely driven by mobile, saw its teledensity reach nearly 87% by 2016 over a population base of nearly 1.2 bn. As is the trend globally, spectrum has become a critical resource for further growth in the sector, especially with greater demand for data. In India, the initial slow growth was largely attributed to the Department of Telecommunication’s (DoT) design of auctions and the mismatch of the auction outcomes with the market reality. Limited amount of spectrum made available for mobile services and high population densities created a spectrum crunch. Further, given the potential of growth in the market and telecom policies that encouraged competition led to about 10-14 service providers per state creating a further pressure on spectrum. In addition, difficult exit rules and M&A guidelines reduced the scope for consolidation, creating operational and financial pressure for operators. These factors influenced bidding/acquisition of spectrum. \u0000From 1995-2010, India largely adopted spectrum auctions other than in 2007-08 when it adopted first-come-first-serve (FCFS) policy for 2G. In 2010, it adopted a sophisticated simultaneous multiple round (SMRA) auctions for 3G. Subsequently, a Supreme Court judgment in 2012 canceled all licenses awarded through FCFS and mandated that all spectrum had to be allocated through auctions. Subsequent auction designs have used SMRA for different bands. \u0000The last auction was in 2016. It was a multi-band auction covering 700MHz, 800MHz, 900 MHz, 1800 MHz, 2300 MHz, and 2500 MHz. The 700 MHz band, which is a valued band for 3G and 4G saw no buyers and the 2500 Mhz band which did not have a well developed ecosystem saw significant competition and was allocated. \u0000The above raises issues about the efficacy of auction design. While the DoT accepted SMRA as an efficient and effective auction mechanism, it recognized that the specific design elements such as reserve price, withdrawal rules, stopping rules, minimum bid increments have influenced bid outcomes. These parameters needed to incorporate the context of the auction such as requirements of spectrum for different bidders, expectations about future availability, competitor’s bidding strategies, whether single or multiple bands, etc. \u0000We plan to document the spectrum auction design, bidder strategies and outcomes, for the auction held in 2016. This auction provides a rich backdrop for the study as it was held in an environment where several prior auctions that had poor outcomes in terms of participation, bid amounts and amount of spectrum made available and new regulations regarding spectrum sharing and trading had become operational. The competitive environment had also changed significantly with possibilities of future M&A. \u0000We shall identify the learning from the analysis so as to help with the subsequent auction designs. Such recommendations will also take into account developments in this space in other countries. \u0000","PeriodicalId":141238,"journal":{"name":"Paper Sessions","volume":"202 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124933343","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Empirical Economics of Online Attention","authors":"A. Boik, S. Greenstein, Jeffrey T. Prince","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2807046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2807046","url":null,"abstract":"In several markets, firms compete not for consumer expenditure but instead for consumer attention. We model and characterize how households allocate their scarce attention in arguably the largest market for attention: the Internet. Our characterization of household attention allocation operates along three dimensions: how much attention is allocated, where that attention is allocated, and how that attention is allocated. Using click-stream data for thousands of U.S. households, we assess if and how attention allocation on each dimension changed between 2008 and 2013, a time of large increases in online offerings. We identify vast and expected changes in where households allocate their attention (away from chat and news towards video and social media), and yet we simultaneously identify remarkable stability in how much attention is allocated and how it is allocated. Specifically, we identify (i) persistence in the elasticity of attention according to income and (ii) complete stability in the dispersion of attention across sites and in the intensity of attention within sites. We illustrate how this finding is difficult to reconcile with standard models of optimal attention allocation and suggest alternatives that may be more suitable. We conclude that increasingly valuable offerings change where households go online, but not their general online attention patterns. This conclusion has important implications for competition and welfare in other markets for attention.","PeriodicalId":141238,"journal":{"name":"Paper Sessions","volume":"143 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126875595","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}