{"title":"Hairier than Putnam Thought","authors":"S. Read, C. Wright","doi":"10.1093/ANALYS/45.1.56","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ANALYS/45.1.56","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter is a short note, co-written with Stephen Read, reacting to Hilary Putnam’s observation in his ‘Vagueness and Alternative Logic’ that intuitionistic logic would block the transition from the negation of the usual universally quantified conditional form of major premise for a Sorites to the assertion of a sharp boundary to the target predicate in the series concerned, and would thus allow the paradox to be reconceived as a straightforward reductio of its major premise. It is pointed out that a Sorites need not employ that form of major premise but can instead proceed, in intuitionistic logic, from the negation of the existential claim that the series in question contains a sharp boundary and that, while an intuitionistically suspect double negation elimination step would still be needed to enforce the unpalatable conclusion that the predicate in question indeed has a sharp boundary, nothing like the semantic motivation that the Intuitionists have favoured in mathematics for a restriction on double negation elimination can be operative in this context.","PeriodicalId":139542,"journal":{"name":"The Riddle of Vagueness","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131925194","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Language-Mastery and the Sorites Paradox","authors":"C. Wright","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780199277339.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199277339.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter, originally written for Gareth Evans’s and John McDowell’s edited anthology of papers, Truth and Meaning, on the philosophical issues raised by Davidsonian truth-theoretic semantics for natural language, reprises the key arguments of Chapter 1, but with a more explicit focus on the question: what is the nature of linguistic competence? Can it, at least at the most basic level, be viewed as consisting in propositional knowledge of, and a consequent ability to follow, semantic and syntactic rules? The suggestion is that the Davidsonian programme is implicitly invested in a positive answer to that question, and that one lesson of the Sorites is to make that answer seriously doubtful, mandating a ‘more purely behaviouristic’ conception of basic linguistic competence.","PeriodicalId":139542,"journal":{"name":"The Riddle of Vagueness","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114054528","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Vagueness","authors":"C. Wright","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780199277339.003.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199277339.003.0010","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter centres on what it terms the Vagueness Trilemma: that what may impress as the only three possible types of view about what vagueness is—namely, that it is a matter of semantic indeterminacy, that it originates in rebus, and the epistemicist idea that it is a matter of our ineluctable ignorance about fully determinate matters— are each open to serious, indeed arguably fatal, objections. The chapter is organized about the possible attitudes to three interrelated, nodal theses. Bivalence—are borderline statements bivalent? Third possibility—do they possess some third alethic status—lack of truth value or some third truth value? And Verdict Exclusion: is knowledge of truth value precluded in borderline cases? It is argued that there are five consistent combinations of acceptance and non-acceptance of the three nodal issues, and that an attitude of agnosticism to all three, and a consequent broadly intuitionistic attitude to vagueness, is the way out of the Trilemma.","PeriodicalId":139542,"journal":{"name":"The Riddle of Vagueness","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134461659","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rosenkranz on Quandary, Vagueness, and Intuitionism","authors":"C. Wright","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780199277339.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199277339.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"Sven Rosenkranz (‘Wright on Vagueness and Agnosticism’, Mind, 112/447, pp. 449–463) provides a searching critique of the central line of argument in ‘On Being in a Quandary’ (this volume, Chapter 7) towards a broadly intuitionistic conception of the nature and logic of vagueness. The three sections of Chapter 8 respectively outline the essence of Rosenkranz’s criticism, propose a modification of the argument of ‘On Being in a Quandary’ that can resist it, and then suggest a different, more economical route to the proposed intuitionistic distinctions for vague statements.","PeriodicalId":139542,"journal":{"name":"The Riddle of Vagueness","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130064145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On Being in a Quandary","authors":"C. Wright","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780199277339.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199277339.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter addresses three problems: the problem of formulating a coherent relativism, the Sorites paradox, and a seldom noticed difficulty in the best intuitionistic case for the revision of classical logic. A response to the latter is proposed which, generalized, contributes towards the solution of the other two. The key to this response is a generalized conception of indeterminacy as a specific kind of intellectual bafflement—Quandary. Intuitionistic revisions of classical logic are merited wherever a subject matter is conceived both as liable to generate Quandary and as subject to a broad form of evidential constraint. So motivated, the distinctions enshrined in intuitionistic logic provide both for a satisfying resolution of the Sorites paradox and a coherent outlet for relativistic views about, for example, matters of taste and morals. An important corollary of the discussion is that an epistemic conception of vagueness can be prised apart from the strong metaphysical realism with which its principal supporters have associated it, and acknowledged to harbour an independent insight.","PeriodicalId":139542,"journal":{"name":"The Riddle of Vagueness","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128472031","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Appendix to Chapter 14","authors":"C. Wright","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780199277339.003.0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199277339.003.0016","url":null,"abstract":"In the Forced March Sorites, there is no deductive path to a formal contradiction. Rather, a hapless subject is required to return a verdict in point of F-ness about each successive element in a soritical series for F. Competence requires the appropriate verdicts concerning the clear cases at the poles. Hence, since the verdicts required at the poles are different, the subject must at some point give some kind of differential responses to an adjacent pair of elements between which—for so the series is constructed—she can discern no relevant difference. Since it is a form of incompetence to purport to discriminate cases between which one discerns no relevant difference, it appears to follow that consistently competent use of F throughout the series is metaphysically impossible. It is argued that the intuitionist conception of vagueness provides the means to explain nicely why a differential response need not implicate discrimination.","PeriodicalId":139542,"journal":{"name":"The Riddle of Vagueness","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114307548","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"‘Wang’s Paradox’","authors":"C. Wright","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780199277339.003.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199277339.003.0012","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter, specially written for the 2007 Schilp volume in his honour, revisits Sir Michael Dummett’s seminal contribution to the debates about vagueness in his ipsonymous 1975 paper. The chapter again rejects both the conception of vagueness as any kind of semantic incompleteness and Epistemicism, and critiques Dummett’s own suggestion of Incoherentism, returning again to the governing view and the question of the sense, if any, in which vague expressions should be thought of as governed by semantic rules. The Sorites for phenomenal predicates, ‘looks red’ and its ilk, receives special focus. It is argued that the correct response is that the competent use of these and other vague expressions is, in a certain sense, unprincipled: their vagueness is a phenomenon of reactive judgement unsupported by reasons. This conception enforces Agnosticism about Bivalence and a consequent repudiation of the validity of double negation elimination.","PeriodicalId":139542,"journal":{"name":"The Riddle of Vagueness","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130457982","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Vagueness-Related Partial Belief and the Constitution of Borderline Cases","authors":"C. Wright","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780199277339.003.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199277339.003.0011","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter, specially written for a Philosophy and Phenomenological Research book symposium on the Stephen Schiffer’s The Things We Mean, is focused on Schiffer’s proposal there concerning the most central and important question about vagueness: namely, what, specifically, something’s being a borderline case of a vague expression consists in. Schiffer argues for a new kind of approach, according to which vagueness is constitutively a psychological phenomenon, grounded in a supposedly distinctive propositional attitude taken by practitioners of vague discourse: vagueness-related partial belief (VPB), contrasting in ways Schiffer details with standard partial belief (SPB). Two principal problems are raised for this proposal. First, on Schiffer’s account, VPB looks to be characteristic of a wider range of kinds of indeterminacy besides the targeted soritical vagueness. Second, there is an awkward dilemma arising over whether or why a thinker could not, as a matter of psychological contingency, adopt a VPB towards a precise proposition.","PeriodicalId":139542,"journal":{"name":"The Riddle of Vagueness","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121031294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Intuitionism and the Sorites Paradox","authors":"C. Wright","doi":"10.1017/9781316683064.006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316683064.006","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter revisits and further develops all the principle themes and concepts of the preceding chapters. Epistemicism about vagueness postulates a realm of distinctions drawn by basic vague concepts that transcend our capacity to know them. Its treatment of their subject matter is thus broadly comparable to the Platonist philosophy of mathematics. An intuitionist philosophy of vagueness, as do many philosophies of the semantics and metaphysics of vague expressions, finds this idea merely superstitious and rejects it. The vagueness-intuitionist, however, credits the epistemicist with a crucial insight: that vagueness is indeed a cognitive, rather than a semantic, phenomenon—something that is not a consequence of some kind of indeterminacy, or open-endedness in the semantics of vague expressions but rather resides in our brute inability to bring, for example, yellow and orange right up against one another, so to speak, so as to mark a sharp and stable boundary. A solution to the Sorites paradox is developed that is consonant with this basic idea but, by motivating a background logic that observes (broadly) intuitionistic restrictions on the proof theory for negation, allows us to treat the paradoxical reasoning as a simple reductio of its major premise, without the unwelcome implication, sustained by classical logic, of sharp cut-offs.","PeriodicalId":139542,"journal":{"name":"The Riddle of Vagueness","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121950064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the Characterization of Borderline Cases","authors":"C. Wright","doi":"10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199684939.003.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199684939.003.0011","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter was originally written for Gary Ostertag’s edition of the festschrift for Stephen Schiffer, Meanings and Other Things (Oxford University Press, 2016). It centres on Schiffer’s treatment of the characterization problem: the problem of saying what being a borderline case of a concept expressed by a vague expression consists in. While broadly sympathetic to Schiffer’s approach, the chapter takes issue with two aspects of it. Schiffer endorses Verdict Exclusion: the doctrine that a ‘polar verdict’ about a borderline case cannot be an expression of knowledge. This endorsement comes at too high a cost: among other things, it conflicts with the entitlement intuition—the intuition that there will be no point in a Sorites sequence at which it is mandatory to return neither of the polar verdicts. The chapter argues for agnosticism about Verdict Exclusion (‘Liberalism’). It also rejects Schiffer’s idea that a special genre of partial belief—vagueness-related partial belief—plays an essential role in characterizing the possession conditions for vague concepts.","PeriodicalId":139542,"journal":{"name":"The Riddle of Vagueness","volume":"109 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122067289","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}