Law & Society: Private Law - Financial Law eJournal最新文献

{"title":"Interest in Sharia: Legal Consequences and Penal Aspects in Sharia","authors":"Ismail Y Syed","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3369733","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3369733","url":null,"abstract":"As Sharia law deals with what is lawful and unlawful or permitted and prohibited acts pertaining to all the major aspects of life - and that includes commercial law covering businesses and private transactions, riba or (interest) has been one of the most widely known and discussed subjects. This paper, without going into the core subject of what constitutes interest, will directly engage with the penal aspect of riba in Islam i.e. the penal consequences and what type of punishments it may carry or has been prescribed by Sharia.","PeriodicalId":137765,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Private Law - Financial Law eJournal","volume":"83 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127549967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"PDVSA's Hail Mary: A Chapter 15 Bankruptcy Solution","authors":"R. Gittings, Samantha Hovaniec, Ryan Nichols, M. Taylor, Heather M. Werner","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3161604","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3161604","url":null,"abstract":"A Chapter 15 bankruptcy is the best option for restructuring PDVSA’s debts because it would provide PDVSA with benefits that no other restructuring can offer — it would protect PDVSA’s assets and restructure its debts through one unified process. Venezuela could enact a Chapter 15 solution in four steps: (1) create a Venezuelan public-sector bankruptcy law, (2) comply with Chapter 15’s eligibility requirements, (3) obtain recognition by U.S. courts for PDVSA’s bankruptcy proceeding, and (4) confirm a bankruptcy plan that can be enforced by U.S. courts. The barriers for each step are high, but examples from other countries suggest it is possible a Chapter 15 restructuring would be successful. \u0000Even if PDVSA is unable to confirm a bankruptcy plan, PDVSA would receive significant benefits at each stage in the process. A Chapter 15 proceeding could provide a stay to protect PDVSA’s assets from creditors as well as protect its non-Venezuelan entities, such as CITGO. Additionally, at each stage bankruptcy gives PDVSA leverage over creditors to make a restructuring deal out of court. Because of the unique benefits offered by Chapter 15, it is PDVSA’s Hail Mary — it comes with definite risks, but the potential for a high payoff.","PeriodicalId":137765,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Private Law - Financial Law eJournal","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128864416","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Update on PDVSA US Litigation Trust v. Lukoil Pan Americas, et al.","authors":"R. Cooper, Boaz S. Morag","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3160338","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3160338","url":null,"abstract":"This is an update to the article we published on March 15, 2018 on the lawsuit filed by the PDVSA US Litigation Trust (the “Trust”) in federal court in Miami, Florida on behalf of Venezuela’s state-owned oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (“PDVSA”) against a group of 44 oil trading companies, banks and individuals, alleging that they participated in a 14-year scheme to rig bids, underpay on purchases and overcharge on sales, allegedly resulting in billions of dollars of losses to PDVSA. Our prior article flagged a number of interesting legal and factual questions raised by the suit, such as how the Trust was created, whether it has standing to assert PDVSA’s claims, whether some or all of the claims would be barred by applicable statutes of limitation and adequately assert an injury in the United States, and whether the Trust would be able to obtain the cooperation from PDVSA necessary to respond to discovery requests, among others. The case also may have implications for financial creditors of PDVSA, and even creditors of the Republic of Venezuela, who may be able to lay claim to the economic value of the Trust’s lawsuit or to any recovery, on the theory that the Trust is pursuing the claims for PDVSA’s sole benefit. \u0000The filings in the suit thus far provide insight into some, though certainly not all, of the questions raised by this suit and also introduce new issues of their own. Defendants are pursuing a vigorous challenge to the standing of the Trust to assert PDVSA’s claims under both Venezuelan and New York law, which the Court has agreed to hear as a preliminary issue. The agreement by which the Trust was formed has been filed with the Court and it reveals the role of the Venezuelan government in entering into the Trust agreement on PDVSA’s behalf and the economic interests of the Trust’s lawyers and other professionals versus those of the beneficiary of ultimate recoveries, PDVSA. The defendants’ opposition to the Trust’s motion for a preliminary injunction seeking a seizure of evidence and freeze of assets also has revealed defenses to the federal and state claims asserted in the complaint and confirmed that some of the issues we identified are already arising in the litigation.","PeriodicalId":137765,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Private Law - Financial Law eJournal","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121919723","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Will Regulation Change Cryptocurrency Protocols?","authors":"P. Østbye","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3159479","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3159479","url":null,"abstract":"Cryptocurrencies have entered the economy as alternative money, as speculation objects, and as utility tokens for innovative service-platforms. Cryptocurrencies are increasingly scrutinized by regulators, and the literature on the regulation of cryptocurrencies is emerging. In this paper, it is asked how regulatory efforts may interfere with the core of the cryptocurrencies – their protocols as enforced by the decentralized operators. It is found that regulations are likely to induce protocol changes by interfering with the operators' choices. Regulation may induce the development of regulatory-compliant cryptocurrency protocols, but also protocols specially designed to circumvent regulation.","PeriodicalId":137765,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Private Law - Financial Law eJournal","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128422189","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Why Build a Sandbox on a Beach? An Analysis of Fintech Regulation in New Zealand","authors":"Laurence Ingle","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3156088","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3156088","url":null,"abstract":"Regulatory reforms following the 2008 global financial crisis have introduced a significant regulatory burden in the financial services sector. The regulatory burden has created a compliance barrier, making it difficult for financial technology (fintech) start-ups to test new ideas in a timely manner. One solution to this regulatory barrier is the ‘regulatory sandbox’ approach, which has been adopted in Australia, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom. The regulatory sandbox model differs depending on the existing domestic regulation, but aims to offer standardised concessionary regulation to fintech start-ups while encouraging innovation in the sector. This paper assesses the current legislative environment for fintech in New Zealand and the worth of the regulatory sandbox concept in the New Zealand environment. It concludes that a regulatory sandbox is unnecessary in New Zealand, instead suggesting industry-wide consultation (allowed by already flexible legislation) is a more effective approach to regulating fintech. Regardless, the paper outlines suggests as to how the New Zealand Government can learn from the fintech regulation strategies developed by Australia and the United Kingdom.","PeriodicalId":137765,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Private Law - Financial Law eJournal","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114271078","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Bankruptcy's Lorelei: the Dangerous Allure of Financial Institution Bankruptcy","authors":"Adam J. Levitin","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3120145","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3120145","url":null,"abstract":"The idea of a bankruptcy procedure for large, systemically important financial institutions exercises an irresistible draw for some policymakers and academics. Financial institution bankruptcy promises to be a transparent, law- based process in which resolution of failed financial institutions is navigated in the courts. Financial institutions bankruptcy presents itself as the antithesis of an arbitrary and discretionary bailout regime. It promises to eliminate the moral hazard of too-big-to-fail by ensuring that creditors will incur losses, rather than being bailed out. Financial institutions bankruptcy holds out the possibility of market discipline instead of an extensive bureaucratic regulatory system. \u0000This Essay argues that financial institution bankruptcy is a dangerous siren song that lures with false promises. Instead of instilling market discipline and avoiding the favoritism of bailouts, financial institution bankruptcy is likely to simply result in bailouts in bankruptcy garb. It would encourage bank deregulation without the elimination of moral hazard that produces financial crises. A successful bankruptcy is not possible for a large financial institution absent massive financing for operations while in bankruptcy, and that financing can only reliably be obtained on short notice and in distressed credit markets from one source: the United States government. Government financing of a bankruptcy will inevitably come with strings attached, including favorable treatment for certain creditor groups, resulting in bankruptcies that resemble those of Chrysler and General Motors, which are much decried by proponents of financial institution bankruptcy as having been disguised bailouts. \u0000The central flaw with the idea of financial institutions bankruptcy is that it fails to address the political nature of systemic risk. What makes a financial crisis systemically important is whether its social costs are politically acceptable. When they are not, bailouts will occur in some form; crisis containment inevitably trumps rule of law. Resolution of systemic risk is a political question, and its weight will warp the judicial process. Financial institutions bankruptcy will merely produce bailouts in the guise of bankruptcy while undermining judicial legitimacy and the rule of law.","PeriodicalId":137765,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Private Law - Financial Law eJournal","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129981174","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Continuous Refinement of the Government's Role in the Financial Markets","authors":"K. Sleem","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3091418","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3091418","url":null,"abstract":"A theoretical role for the government in the financial markets consists of: regulation (passive rules), intervention (active discretion), and their personal financing needs. Three of the most important regulatory rules for maintaining a stable economy are: a clear understanding of the fundamental role of the financial intermediary (saving, lending, and risk hedging), the use of interest rate caps, and implementation of an effective profit allocation scheme. To measure the personal use of the financial markets by governments, their presence on foreign exchanges is examined to note discrepancies from the theoretical norm. A government listing guide is provided that details the listing preferences of foreign governments onto stock exchanges. The preferred foreign exchanges for governments are: Frankfurt, Luxembourg, London, and Switzerland.","PeriodicalId":137765,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Private Law - Financial Law eJournal","volume":"78 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126162287","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Corporate Scandals and Regulation","authors":"Luzi Hail, Ahmed Tahoun, Clare H. Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2961535","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2961535","url":null,"abstract":"Are regulatory interventions delayed reactions to market failures or can regulators proactively pre‐empt corporate misbehavior? From a public interest view, we would expect “effective” regulation to ex ante mitigate agency conflicts between corporate insiders and outsiders, and prevent corporate misbehavior from occurring or quickly rectify transgressions. However, regulators are also self‐interested and may be captured, uninformed, or ideological, and become less effective as a result. In this registered report, we develop a historical time series of corporate (accounting) scandals and (accounting) regulations for a panel of 26 countries from 1800 to 2015. An analysis of the lead‐lag relations at both the global and individual country level yields the following insights: (1) Corporate scandals are an antecedent to regulation over long stretches of time, suggesting that regulators are typically less flexible and informed than firms. (2) Regulation is positively related to the incidence of future scandals, suggesting that regulators are not fully effective, that explicit rules are required to identify scandalous corporate actions, or that new regulations have unintended consequences. (3) There exist systematic differences in these lead‐lag relations across countries and over time, suggesting that the effectiveness of regulation is shaped by fundamental country characteristics like market development and legal tradition.","PeriodicalId":137765,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Private Law - Financial Law eJournal","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115037068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Venezuela's Imminent Restructuring and the Role Alter Ego Claims May Play in this Chavismo Saga","authors":"R. Cooper, Boaz S. Morag","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3068455","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3068455","url":null,"abstract":"The clock ticking down for investors holding the outstanding debt of the Republic of Venezuela and its state-owned oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (“PDVSA”), may have just struck zero. On Friday, November 3, President Nicolas Maduro kicked off the much anticipated restructuring of Venezuelan debt by announcing that after it makes a $1.1 billion principal payment on PDVSA bonds due on November 2, that it would commence restructuring negotiations with its creditors. \u0000Although the Government invited creditors to Caracas on November 13 to jump start negotiations, given the failed policies of the Maduro regime, the limitations posed by U.S. government sanctions and the risks creditors would face in accepting new instruments that could be challenged by a future Venezuelan government, the prospects of any type of restructuring being accomplished anytime soon are quite remote. Should Venezuela fail to cure its existing payment defaults or not make payments during the pendency of any restructuring discussions, which seems to be the government’s intent, one can expect Venezuela’s legion of creditors to turn their immediate attention to scouring the globe for assets held in the name of the Republic and those entities, such as PDVSA, alleged to be the “alter egos” of the Republic. \u0000This article discusses the legal framework for pursuing alter ego claims, including the continued efforts by Republic creditor Crystallex International Corporation (“Crystallex”), a Canadian gold-mining corporation, to collect on its $1.4 billion U.S. court judgment against the Republic from the assets of PDVSA, and evaluates the ability of other Republic creditors to pursue a similar strategy. \u0000One thing is clear: Crystallex’s efforts to pursue its alter ego claims against PDVSA will be closely watched by Republic and PDVSA creditors alike.","PeriodicalId":137765,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Private Law - Financial Law eJournal","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130403245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Economics of Credit Rating Agencies","authors":"F. Sangiorgi, Chester Spatt","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3055889","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3055889","url":null,"abstract":"We explore through both an economics and regulatory lens the frictions associated with credit rating agencies in the aftermath of the financial crisis. While ratings and other public signals are an efficient response to scale economies in information production, these also can discourage independent due diligence and be a source of systemic risk. Though Dodd-Frank pulls back on the regulatory use of ratings, it also promotes greater regulation of the rating agencies. We highlight the diverse underlying views towards these competing approaches to reducing systemic risk. Our monograph also discusses the subtle contrasts between credit rating agencies and other types of due diligence providers, such as auditors, analysts and proxy-voting advisors. We discuss the frictions associated with paying for information in the context of credit ratings; while the issuer-pay model has been identified as a major issue because of potential conflict of interests, we argue that it has several advantages over the investor-pay model in promoting market transparency.","PeriodicalId":137765,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Private Law - Financial Law eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129991092","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}