Framed Field Experiments最新文献

{"title":"The influence of cultural framing on play in the trust game: A maasai example","authors":"Lee Cronk","doi":"10.1016/J.EVOLHUMBEHAV.2007.05.006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/J.EVOLHUMBEHAV.2007.05.006","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":134860,"journal":{"name":"Framed Field Experiments","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117908068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The uncertainty effect: When a risky prospect is valued less than its worst possible outcome","authors":"U. Gneezy, J. List, George Wu","doi":"10.1093/QJE/121.4.1283","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/QJE/121.4.1283","url":null,"abstract":"Expected utility theory, prospect theory, and most other models of risky choice are based on the fundamental premise that individuals choose among risky prospects by balancing the value of the possible consequences. These models, therefore, require that the value of a risky prospect lie between the value of that prospect's highest and lowest outcome. Although this requirement seems essential for any theory of risky decision-making, we document a violation of this condition in which individuals value a risky prospect less than its worst possible realization. This demonstration, which we term the uncertainty effect, draws from more than 1000 experimental participants, and includes hypothetical and real pricing and choice tasks, as well as field experiments in real markets with financial incentives. Our results suggest that there are choice situations in which decision-makers discount lotteries for uncertainty in a manner that cannot be accommodated by standard models of risky choice.","PeriodicalId":134860,"journal":{"name":"Framed Field Experiments","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125790743","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"WHAT EXPLAINS HADZA FOOD SHARING","authors":"F. Marlowe","doi":"10.1016/S0190-1281(04)23003-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/S0190-1281(04)23003-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":134860,"journal":{"name":"Framed Field Experiments","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132840071","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Empathic Responsiveness: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment on Giving to Welfare Recipients","authors":"Christina Fong","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.556389","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.556389","url":null,"abstract":"This paper reports a surprising finding from an experiment on giving to welfare recipients. The experiment tests how offers of money in n-donor dictator games are affected by 1) donors' humanitarian and egalitarian values and 2) direct information about the recipients' work-preferences. People who are self-reported humanitarians and egalitarians have giving that is highly elastic with respect to the apparent worthiness of the recipient. Among high scoring humanitarian-egalitarians, the median offer to a recipient who appeared industrious was $5.00, while the median offer to a recipient who appeared lazy was only $1.00. Among low scoring humanitarian-egalitarians, the median offer was $1.00 in both conditions. I refer to this combination of altruism and equity/reciprocity as empathic responsiveness. This finding can be rationalized by a model of inequity aversion.","PeriodicalId":134860,"journal":{"name":"Framed Field Experiments","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130643607","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Do explicit warnings eliminate the hypothetical bias in elicitation procedures? Evidence from field auctions for sportscards","authors":"J. List","doi":"10.1257/AER.91.5.1498","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/AER.91.5.1498","url":null,"abstract":"The goal of environmental policy is to protect the well-being of humans and the ecosystems vital to human existence. Because benefit-cost analyses are now required at the federal level, and increasingly at the state level, much attention has been paid to the development of practical, credible approaches for estimating the benefits and costs of environmental programs. Although policy makers have a good handle on measuring the explicit costs associated with increased environmental protection, at present several disparate approaches are utilized to measure economic values of environmental goods and services. Arguably the most contentious of these approaches is the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM), which allows the researcher to measure the total value of the commodity in question (see Peter A. Diamond and Jerry A. Hausman's [1994] critical review). Chief amongst these concems is whether hypothetical bias is inherent in CVM responses. Some recently published studies provide evidence that suggests important differences exist between responses from real and hypothetical valuation questions.1 Recognizing this shortcoming, researchers have adopted both ex ante and ex post techniques to overcome hypothetical bias. Although these attempts have not been completely successful in dealing with hypothetical bias, Ronald G. Cummings and Laura 0. Taylor (1999) present evidence from laboratory experiments that indicates hypothetical bias can be overcome by an appropriate ex ante design they refer to as a \"cheap talk\" scheme.2 The underlying premise behind Cummings and Taylor's design is that by making hypothetical bias an integral part of the contingent value questionnaire, the researcher can induce truthtelling. Their cheap talk experiments validated this conjecture, as hypothetical bias was effectively eliminated in open referenda for three public goods. The goal of this study is to take the cheap talk design to a well-functioning marketplace and auction off sportscards. Besides providing a field validity test, I also explore the generality of Cummings and Taylor's findings by examining whether experience with the good in question affects hypothetical bias through inclusion of both card dealers and nondealers in the field auctions. The theory of value formation suggests that experienced bidders may not be easily swayed by the cheap talk design as they have a well-structured preference ordering for the good in question and should therefore rely on few, if any, external signals when formulating their value.","PeriodicalId":134860,"journal":{"name":"Framed Field Experiments","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122081494","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Using field experiments to test equivalence between auction formats: Magic on the internet","authors":"David Lucking-Reiley","doi":"10.1257/AER.89.5.1063","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/AER.89.5.1063","url":null,"abstract":"William Vickrey's predicted equivalences between first-price sealed-bid and Dutch auctions, and between second-price sealed-bid and English auctions, are tested using field experiments that auctioned off collectible trading cards over the Internet. The results indicate that the Dutch auction produces 30-percent higher revenues than the first-price auction format, a violation of the theoretical prediction and a reversal of previous laboratory results, and that the English and second-price formats produce roughly equivalent revenues.","PeriodicalId":134860,"journal":{"name":"Framed Field Experiments","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116840925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Response-induced reversals of preference in gambling: An extended replication in las vegas","authors":"S. Lichtenstein, P. Slovic","doi":"10.1017/CBO9780511618031.005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511618031.005","url":null,"abstract":"The present report describes an expanded replication of the previous experiments in a nonlaboratory real-play setting unique to the experimental literature on decision processes - a casino in downtown Las Vegas.","PeriodicalId":134860,"journal":{"name":"Framed Field Experiments","volume":"281 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1973-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117191943","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Experimental evidence on the endogenous entry of bidders in internet auctions","authors":"David H. Reiley","doi":"10.1007/0-387-24243-0_5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-24243-0_5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":134860,"journal":{"name":"Framed Field Experiments","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123887769","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Psychological experiments on the internet","authors":"M. Birnbaum","doi":"10.1016/b978-0-12-099980-4.x5000-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-12-099980-4.x5000-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":134860,"journal":{"name":"Framed Field Experiments","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127169210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Dictators and ultimatums in an egalitarian society of hunter-gatherers, the hadza of tanzania","authors":"F. Marlowe","doi":"10.1093/0199262055.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/0199262055.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":134860,"journal":{"name":"Framed Field Experiments","volume":"82 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121895210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}