{"title":"A systematic procedure for finding Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in Incomplete Information Games","authors":"Félix Muñoz-García","doi":"10.1515/1935-5041.1049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/1935-5041.1049","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides a non-technical introduction to a procedure to find Perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBEs) in incomplete information games. Despite the rapidly expanding literature on industrial organization that uses PBE as its main solution concept, most undergraduate and graduate textbooks still present a relatively theoretical introduction to PBEs. This paper offers a systematic five-step procedure that helps students find all pure-strategy PBEs in incomplete information games. Furthermore, it illustrates a step-by-step application of this procedure to a signaling game, using a worked-out example.","PeriodicalId":134769,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Organization Education","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133732022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Why Don't You Two Get a Room? A Puzzle and Pricing Model of Extra Services in Hotels","authors":"D. Damianov, S. Sanders","doi":"10.1515/1935-5041.1035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/1935-5041.1035","url":null,"abstract":"This case study focuses on the following �rational riddle� raised in a recent popular economics book: Hotels in Britain usually charge per guest while hotels in the US typically charge per room. What is the reason for this difference? We propose a pricing model for extra services which points to one possible explanation.","PeriodicalId":134769,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Organization Education","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131400846","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Patrick G. Maggitti, R. Coff, Donald E. Hatfield, Walter J. Ferrier
{"title":"Dynamics of Competitive Rivalry","authors":"Patrick G. Maggitti, R. Coff, Donald E. Hatfield, Walter J. Ferrier","doi":"10.1515/1935-5041.1039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/1935-5041.1039","url":null,"abstract":"This energetic lecture consist of a paper fight and another exercise to provide background, methodology, and findings from research that has empirically examined competitive dynamics. Foundational to this stream of research are several literatures including game theory and the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm. Unlike these literatures, however, research in competitive dynamics directly measures and analyzes firm action and rival action using a methodology of examining competitive actions identified through a structured content analysis of newspapers and trade magazines for firms in an industry. This robust methodology has enabled better understanding of competitive dynamics and the outcomes of this rivalry. It also has very practical implications. Thus, students also do an exercise in which they analyze actual competitive data between Coke and Pepsi to illustrate differences in their competitive behavior and the strengths and weaknesses of each of their approaches.","PeriodicalId":134769,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Organization Education","volume":"255 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124202071","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the Teaching of Price Discrimination in Block Pricing: A Refinement","authors":"Cao Bolong","doi":"10.1515/1935-5041.1040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/1935-5041.1040","url":null,"abstract":"In many textbooks, an important assumption difference between the standard picture for block pricing and the intuitive discussions on this pricing scheme is often ignored. This practice leads the students to misunderstand this picture as an illustration for price discrimination against heterogeneous buyers. In this article, I analyze how some textbook narratives can lead to this misinterpretation. Then, I provide a simple example that shows how block pricing discriminates buyers with heterogeneous demands. A real life example as applied to the transportation rates of natural gas for block pricing is also provided and discussed.","PeriodicalId":134769,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Organization Education","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129280764","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Impact of Asset Specificity on Inter-firm Transaction Structure: A Case Study","authors":"A. Reza","doi":"10.1515/1935-5041.1038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/1935-5041.1038","url":null,"abstract":"This article reports on the results of a case study that examines the characteristics of the transaction between a plastic producer firm and its supplier of steel injection mold in order to explore the possible effects of asset specificity on the firm�s choice of the transaction structure. The main findings indicate that once the dependence of the firm on the supplier and the ensuing vulnerability induced by the high specificity of the inter-firm trade is remedied by trust, the comparative advantages of the existing and well-functioning inter-firm relationship provide a sufficiently strong rationale of preferring it as the most adequate and satisfactory structure for the transaction.","PeriodicalId":134769,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Organization Education","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123467537","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Using Experiments to Illustrate the Role of Network Externalities in Technology Adoption and Industry Evolution","authors":"W. Wheatley","doi":"10.1515/1935-5041.1048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/1935-5041.1048","url":null,"abstract":"This experiment helps students to understand the importance of network externalities in technology adoption and the evolution of industries. Students observe the roles of lock-in and critical mass in technology adoption, understand how pricing affects adoption, and see welfare implications of network externalities. Given examples of network effects in firm and government action (e.g., the advanced television systems committee, antitrust litigation for the credit/debit card industry, and private strategy in newer DVD technologies (HD DVD vs. Blue-Ray)), this experiment fits courses that wish to illustrate these ideas and provides a starting point for a more detailed study of network externalities","PeriodicalId":134769,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Organization Education","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133467376","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Intuitive and Divinity Criterion: Interpretation and Step-by-Step Examples","authors":"Félix Muñoz-García, Ana Espínola‐Arredondo","doi":"10.2202/1935-5041.1024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-5041.1024","url":null,"abstract":"The paper presents an intuitive explanation of the Cho and Kreps’ (1987) Intuitive Criterion, and the Banks and Sobel’s (1987) Divinity Criterion (also referred as D1-Criterion). We provide multiple examples in which students can understand, step-by-step, the two main phases involved in these refinement criteria. Furthermore, we present economic settings in which the Cho and Kreps’ (1987) Intuitive Criterion does not restrict the set of equilibria, while the Banks and Sobel’s (1987) Divinity Criterion help refine the set of admissible separating equilibria in signaling games.","PeriodicalId":134769,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Organization Education","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127055407","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Intentional and Evolutionary Visions of U.S. Antitrust Law","authors":"S. Kumarappan","doi":"10.2202/1935-5041.1027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-5041.1027","url":null,"abstract":"This teaching module shows how U.S. antitrust laws are affected by 'intentional' and 'evolutionary' visions of socio-economic market processes. The extent of government's role is studied to review whether the U.S. antitrust laws should be strengthened, reformed or repealed. The focus of Chicago (and Austrian) school is discussed: 'antitrust laws should promote and enhance the trio of -- consumer welfare, competition process, and dynamic (productive and allocative) efficiency.’The role of U.S. antitrust laws in a globalized world and the need for universal law are mentioned. The economic reasons used to rule in U.S. antitrust enforcement since the 1890s are provided in a tabular format for easy use in the classrooms. Teaching tips are provided on how to use the material in classroom discussion and assessments.","PeriodicalId":134769,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Organization Education","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129400364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Understanding the M-form Hypothesis","authors":"Matthew J. Holian","doi":"10.2202/1935-5041.1031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-5041.1031","url":null,"abstract":"This lecture describes the M-form Hypothesis (due to Chandler, 1962 and Williamson, 1975), with a mathematical model and examples.","PeriodicalId":134769,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Organization Education","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126146870","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Third-Degree Price Discrimination","authors":"Qihong Liu, Konstantinos Serfes","doi":"10.2202/1935-5041.1030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-5041.1030","url":null,"abstract":"This lecture deals with third-degree price discrimination in both monopolistic and oligopolistic markets. The classical monopoly paradigm serves as a benchmark. Next, we move to an oligopoly setting, first with best-response symmetry, then with best-response asymmetry. We end with behavior-based price discrimination. This lecture targets advanced undergraduate and graduate students.","PeriodicalId":134769,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Organization Education","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131678587","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}