Artefactual Field Experiments最新文献

{"title":"Detecting Drivers of Behavior at an Early Age: Evidence from a Longitudinal Field Experiment","authors":"M. Castillo, J. List, Ragan Petrie, A. Samek","doi":"10.3386/w28288","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w28288","url":null,"abstract":"We use field experiments with nearly 900 children to investigate how skills developed at ages 3-5 drive later-life outcomes. We find that skills map onto three distinct factors - cognitive skills, executive functions, and economic preferences. Returning to the children up to 7 years later, we find that executive functions, but not cognitive skills, predict the likelihood of receiving disciplinary referrals. Economic preferences have an independent effect: children who displayed impatience at ages 3-5 were more likely to receive disciplinary referrals. Random assignment to a parenting program reduced disciplinary referrals. This effect was not mediated by skills or preferences.","PeriodicalId":134671,"journal":{"name":"Artefactual Field Experiments","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124902357","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Divided Loyalties or Conditional Cooperation? An Experimental Study of Contributions to Multiple Public Goods","authors":"M. McCarter, A. Samek, Roman M. Sheremeta","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2221696","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2221696","url":null,"abstract":"It is common in organizational life to be simultaneously involved in multiple collective actions. These collective actions may be modeled using public good dilemmas. The developing social dilemma literature has two perspectives – the “divided loyalties” and “conditional cooperation” perspectives – that give opposite predictions about how individuals will behave when they simultaneously play two identical public good games. The current paper creates consensus between these social dilemma perspectives by examining cooperative behavior of participants interacting in two public good games with either different or the same group members. In each round, individuals have a common budget constraint across the two games. In support of the conditional cooperator’s perspective of social dilemmas, we find that playing two games with different, rather than same, group members increases overall contributions. Over the course of the experiment, participants playing two games with different group members shift their contributions significantly more often toward more cooperative public good games than participants playing with the same group members.","PeriodicalId":134671,"journal":{"name":"Artefactual Field Experiments","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121077524","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Social preferences: Some thoughts from the field","authors":"J. List","doi":"10.1146/ANNUREV.ECONOMICS.050708.142958","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1146/ANNUREV.ECONOMICS.050708.142958","url":null,"abstract":"This review steps back from the burgeoning economics literature on measuring social preferences and considers more carefully the empirical evidence from the lab and the field. I place the claims from the ardent supporters of the literature into three bins: one for claims that are supported by the data upon closer scrutiny, one for claims that are not supported by the data upon closer scrutiny, and one for claims that may or may not be true. The third set of claims highlights important theoretical and empirical investigations that need to be done to further our understanding of the nature and import of social preferences.","PeriodicalId":134671,"journal":{"name":"Artefactual Field Experiments","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124679591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Exploring the Impact of Financial Incentives on Stereotype Threat: Evidence from a Pilot Study","authors":"Roland G. Fryer, S. Levitt, J. List","doi":"10.1257/AER.98.2.370","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/AER.98.2.370","url":null,"abstract":"Motivated in part by large and persistent gender gaps in labor market outcomes (e.g., Claudia Goldin 1994; Joseph G. Altonji and Rebecca M. Blank 1998), a large body of experimental research has been devoted to understanding gender differences in behavior and responses to stimuli. An influential finding in experimental psychology is the presence of stereotype threat: making gender salient induces large gender gaps in performance on math tests (Steven J. Spencer, Claude M. Steele, and Diane M. Quinn 1999). For instance, when Spencer et al. (1999) informed subjects that women tended to underperform men on the math test they were about to take, women’s test scores dropped by 50 percent or more compared to a similar math test in which subjects were not informed of previous gender differences. In this latter treatment, men and women perform similarly. Stereotype threat research typically is carried out in the absence of financial rewards for performance. In this paper, we report the results of a pilot experimental study examining gender differences","PeriodicalId":134671,"journal":{"name":"Artefactual Field Experiments","volume":"133 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133472424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"FIELD EXPERIMENTS AND CONTROL","authors":"G. Harrison","doi":"10.1016/S0193-2306(04)10002-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/S0193-2306(04)10002-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":134671,"journal":{"name":"Artefactual Field Experiments","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114614047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Examining the Role of Social Isolation on Stated Preferences","authors":"R. Berrens, A. Bohara, Joe Kerkvliet, J. List","doi":"10.1257/0002828041464614","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828041464614","url":null,"abstract":"Benefit-cost analysis remains the central paradigm used throughout the public sector. A necessary condition underlying efficient benefitcost analysis is an accurate estimate of the total value of the nonmarketed good or service in question. While economists have long measured the benefits of private goods routinely bought and sold in the marketplace, a much more difficult task faces the practitioner interested in estimating the total benefits of increased air and water quality, for example. In such cases, policy makers rely on stated preference methods (contingent markets) to provide signals of value. Recently there has been a lively debate about whether, and to what extent, “hypothetical bias” permeates benefit estimation in contingent markets. This debate has proliferated among academics and practitioners over the past several decades, and continues to find its way into public disputes of damage assessment, development decisions, and discussions of optimal regulatory standards. This study extends the debate in a new direction by taking advantage of a unique opportunity we were provided at the University of Central Florida (UCF), where we were approached to spearhead a capital campaign at UCF to fund a new Center for Environmental Policy Analysis (CEPA). The experimental design, which includes valuation decisions from nearly 300 subjects randomly placed into one of six treatment cells, permits an examination of the comparative static effects of varying social isolation while holding the other important facets of the valuation instrument constant. Our baseline treatments ask two different groups of respondents to vote Yes or No on contributing $20 to provide start-up capital for CEPA (one treatment hypothetical and one treatment actual). In these two baseline treatments, similar to many practical methods of contingent valuation (CV) exercises that are carried out in practice (e.g., in-person, mail, or telephone), it is important to recognize that only the experimenter can observe each individual’s response. In the third and fourth treatments, denoted Randomized Response, we again ask a hypothetical or actual question concerning a $20 contribution, but we relax the degree of social pressure by using a randomized response format, which via delinking the observed and voting response ensures the subject that her stated preferences are unidentifiable. These particular treatments resemble use of an anonymous ballot box approach to obtain individual values. Our final two treatments, labeled Peer Group, considerably decrease subject anonymity by randomly choosing 10 people to stand up and inform the group of their voting decision. These treatments bear resemblance to contingent surveys performed with small groups (or poorly controlled Web-based surveys). The experimental results are interesting. Consonant with some previous studies, we observe signs of hypothetical bias. More importantly, we find that the difference between hypothetical and actual voting","PeriodicalId":134671,"journal":{"name":"Artefactual Field Experiments","volume":"99 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124552789","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Market integration, reciprocity and fairness in rural papua new guinea: Results from a two-village ultimatum game study","authors":"D. Tracer","doi":"10.1093/0199262055.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/0199262055.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"In order to test the proposition that performance in bargaining experiments is significantly affected by degree of monetarization, market integration, and relative westernization, a one-shot Ultimatum Game was conducted during the months of June and July 1998 in two villages in a rural region of Papua New Guinea: Anguganak (where the people speak Au) and Bogasip (where they speak Gnau). Although the villages are located in close proximity to one another and are relatively homogeneous culturally, and both subsist using a mixture of foraging and horticulture and have an elaborate system of exchange relationships, they are distinguished by their average degree of exposure to and integration in a cash-based economy, as well as their degree of education (both are greater in Anguganak). The different sections of the chapter provide: an ethnographic account of the two villages; a description of the experimental methods employed; a presentation and analysis of the results in terms of various indicators of wealth and market integration; and a discussion of the implications of the results. The level of offers made in the Ultimatum Game data combined for Anguganak and Bogasip were between those in western industrialized populations and the Machiguenga of Peru. There was some indication that variability in the level of market integration between the two village populations may have influenced the results, although they appeared to be equally influenced by local beliefs on reciprocity, generosity, and indebtedness, and an unfamiliarity with impersonal transactions.","PeriodicalId":134671,"journal":{"name":"Artefactual Field Experiments","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125003260","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Rethinking local commons dilemmas: Lessons from experimental economics in the field","authors":"J. Cárdenas","doi":"10.4337/9781781950388.00018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781781950388.00018","url":null,"abstract":"A rather recent development in economics is the formal study of how human groups device ways of governing the coordination of actions that produce externalities without the need of a Leviathan with perfect information and costless ways of enforcing rules, or without the need to individualize the property rights over the resource to allow the invisible hand to coordinate choices and results. Social Capital is one of the terms proposed by leading authors like Putnam (1993) to explain those means (e.g. norms or rules) that groups use to govern themselves. SelfGovernance Institutions has been an alternative notion proposed by others like Ostrom (1990). Or a synonymous, Community Governance (Bowles, 1999) which also conveys the same notion. In general, economic analysis is now recognizing that individuals may put in place self-governed material and non-material incentives, which induce changes in behavior from self-oriented actions to group-oriented ones, which may produce outcomes that are collectively Pareto superior than those resulting from the purely selfish and short-sighted behavior of individuals. Usually these institutional arrangements achieve the result of correcting the failures of externalities without the intervention of an external agent or the rearrangement of property rights.","PeriodicalId":134671,"journal":{"name":"Artefactual Field Experiments","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124029345","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Garp for kids: On the development of rational choice behavior","authors":"T. Berry, William T. Harbaugh, Kate Krause","doi":"10.1257/AER.91.5.1539","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/AER.91.5.1539","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we examine the extent to which consumption choices by 7 and 11-year-old children and college undergraduates satisfy the axioms of revealed preference. We find that choices by even the 7-year-olds are considerably more likely to obey revealed preference axioms than would be true if they were choosing randomly. 11-year-olds do better still, while college students do no better than 11-year-old children. We also find that mathematical ability is not correlated with choosing rationally. We argue that this evidence suggests that the ability to choose rationally is not innate, but that it does develop quickly.","PeriodicalId":134671,"journal":{"name":"Artefactual Field Experiments","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124079424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Does culture matter in economic behavior? Ultimatum game bargaining among the machiguenga","authors":"J. Henrich","doi":"10.1257/AER.90.4.973","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/AER.90.4.973","url":null,"abstract":"This article addresses the assumptions that humans everywhere deploy the same cognitive machinery for making economic decisions and, consequently, will respond similarly when faced with comparable economic circumstances. These assumptions are addressed with experimental evidence from the Peruvian Amazon.","PeriodicalId":134671,"journal":{"name":"Artefactual Field Experiments","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123813799","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}