{"title":"Financial Contracting as Behavior Towards Risk","authors":"Robert E. Krainer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2425274","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2425274","url":null,"abstract":"This paper describes a business cycle model where financial contracting with interrelated covenants is the mechanism by which bondholders and stockholders confront the risks associated with future production-investment decisions and financing decisions of the firm and in the process resolves a conflict of interest problem between them. In resolving this conflict of interest problem the interrelated covenants in the financial contract shape the financial facts of business cycles. The model set-up includes two agents (bondholders and stockholders), two decisions (production-investment decisions and financing decisions), and two equilibrium conditions (market equals economic book value for both bonds and stocks). In this 2x2x2 set-up the manager of the representative firm should always make production-investment decisions that conform to the risk aversion of stockholders and then use financing decisions to offset any effect of a change in operating risk on the market valuation of bonds. Preliminary evidence from the U.S. nonfinancial corporate sector does not reject the predictions of the model.","PeriodicalId":133808,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Other Law & Society: Private Law - Financial Law (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114955403","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Has the Second Circuit (Unwittingly) Breathed Life into the Nostrils of Imperial Chinese Government Bonds?","authors":"G. Gulati","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2340299","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2340299","url":null,"abstract":"The attached letter from one Horatio D. Gadfly will form the basis of the term project for my class at the Duke Law School in the spring semester of 2014. The course is entitled “International Debt Transactions”. Holders of long-defaulted bonds issued by the Chinese Imperial Government and Tsarist Russian Government have faced two insurmountable obstacles to the enforcement of those instruments in U.S. courts: (i) Federal courts had previously ruled that the “absolute” theory of sovereign immunity which prevailed in the United States until 1952 applied to debt obligations issued by foreign governments prior to that time. (Under the absolute theory of sovereign immunity, foreign states could not be sued in U.S. courts without their consent.) (ii) The statute of limitations (six years for contract cases in New York) will have long since expired on those old bonds. A Supreme Court case decided in 2004 (Austria v. Altmann) reversed the old rule about applying absolute sovereign immunity to claims arising prior to 1952. Under the Supreme Court’s new approach, a federal judge should apply the U.S. sovereign immunity rules prevailing at the time an action is commenced, not the rules that existed when the debt was issued. As for the statute of limitations, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in 2012 that a debt instrument containing a financial covenant (in that case, a promise to maintain the equal ranking of bonds) is breached each time the issuer makes a payment to other creditors in violation of the covenant. The decision may imply that the statute of limitations is commenced afresh for the enforcement (by specific performance or injunction) of the financial covenant in the old bonds each time a payment under new instruments is made in violation of the covenant. See NML v. Argentina. Taken together, these two decisions could possibly, just possibly, breathe life into the nostrils of some sovereign bonds that have for 60 years been esteemed principally for their aesthetic, as opposed to their financial, characteristics. At the very least, magnifying glasses will be trained on framed sovereign bonds hanging in foyers, physician waiting rooms and bathrooms around the country.","PeriodicalId":133808,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Other Law & Society: Private Law - Financial Law (Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122672581","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Sovereign Debt Litigation: Decoding NML Final Arguments against the Republic of Argentina and Why Litigating so Hard May Be Counter-Effective to Plaintiffs' Goals When the Defaulting Debt is Large","authors":"Eugenio A. Bruno","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2255962","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2255962","url":null,"abstract":"This paper discusses the recent brief filed in the famous case NML v The Republic of Argentina which takes place before the federal tribunals of the New York, and how such filing may affect the resolution of the litigation, probably forcing Argentina to default. This paper also discusses the relationship between payment proposals by sovereigns in default and the outcome of the restructurings given how the sovereigns approach the defaulting situation. We take the main arguments of NML and analyses them in lieu of Argentina's political and financial situation as well as certain contractual limitations that prevents it to better the terms of the payment proposal it made on March 29, 2013. Finally, we include certain remarks about the future developments under this case.","PeriodicalId":133808,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Other Law & Society: Private Law - Financial Law (Topic)","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127080054","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"No Exit? Withdrawal Rights and the Law of Corporate Reorganizations","authors":"D. Baird, A. Casey","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1987622","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1987622","url":null,"abstract":"Bankruptcy scholarship is largely a debate about the comparative merits of a mandatory regime on one hand and bankruptcy by free design on the other. By the standard account, the current law of corporate reorganization is mandatory. Various rules that cannot be avoided ensure that investors’ actions are limited and they do not exercise their rights against specialized assets in a way that destroys the value of a business as a whole. These rules solve collective action problems and reduce the risk of bargaining failure. But there are costs to a mandatory regime. In particular, investors cannot design their rights to achieve optimal monitoring as they could in a system of bankruptcy by free design. In this paper, we suggest that the academic debate has missed a fundamental feature of the law. Bankruptcy operates on legal entities, not on firms in the economic sense. For this reason, sophisticated investors do not face a mandatory regime at all. The ability of investors to place assets in separate entities gives them the ability to create specific withdrawal rights in the event the firm encounters financial distress. There is nothing mandatory about rules like the automatic stay when assets can be partitioned off into legal entities that are beyond the reach of the bankruptcy judge. Thus, by partitioning assets of one economic enterprise into different legal entities, investors can create a tailored bankruptcy regime. In this way, legal entities serve as building blocks that can be combined to create specific and varied but transparent investor withdrawal rights. This regime of tailored bankruptcy has been unrecognized and underappreciated and may be preferable to both mandatory and free design regimes. By allowing a limited number of investors to opt out of bankruptcy in a particular, discrete, and visible way, investors as a group may be able to both limit the risk of bargaining failure and at the same time enjoy the disciplining effect that a withdrawal right brings with it.","PeriodicalId":133808,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Other Law & Society: Private Law - Financial Law (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130342323","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Housing Meltdown: Why Did it Happen in the United States?","authors":"Luci Ellis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1307629","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1307629","url":null,"abstract":"The crisis enveloping global financial markets since August 2007 was triggered by actual and prospective credit losses on US mortgages. Was the United States just unlucky to have been the first to experience a housing crisis? Or was it inherently more susceptible to one? I examine the limited international evidence available, to ask how the boom-bust cycle in the US housing market differed from elsewhere and what the underlying institutional drivers of these differences were. Compared with other countries, the United States seems to have: built up a larger overhang of excess housing supply; experienced a greater easing in mortgage lending standards; and ended up with a household sector more vulnerable to falling housing prices. Some of these outcomes seem to have been driven by tax, legal and regulatory systems that encouraged households to increase their leverage and permitted lenders to enable that development. Given the institutional background, it may have been that the US housing boom was always more likely to end badly than the booms elsewhere.","PeriodicalId":133808,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Other Law & Society: Private Law - Financial Law (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128687620","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reflections on Trends and Evolutions in the Law of Monetary Obligations in European Private Law","authors":"Noah Vardi","doi":"10.54648/eulr2007018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eulr2007018","url":null,"abstract":"The law concerning monetary obligations within the legal systems of the European Union is undergoing a series of changes. This is especially true for the law of those member states which have adopted the single currency as the final stage of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Historically, the regulation of payments, the law governing monetary obligations and the rules in case of delay or breach (with particular reference to payment of interests) have always been part of the national systems of private/civil law. Most legal systems of the civil law tradition have regulated these provisions in their civil or commercial codes, and the main source for the discipline of the obligations involving the payment of a sum of money was therefore the national law. This is no longer the case and the process of change and its consequences can be examined under different perspectives.","PeriodicalId":133808,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Other Law & Society: Private Law - Financial Law (Topic)","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134390215","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Morningstar Fiduciary Grades: A Critical Analysis","authors":"Melanie L. Fein","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1662490","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1662490","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the “Fiduciary Grade for Mutual Funds” developed and released by Morningstar, Inc. In particular, it examines the utility of the Fiduciary Grades as a tool for bank trust departments and other corporate fiduciaries that invest fiduciary assets in mutual funds. This paper concludes that the Fiduciary Grades are a flawed investment tool because they do not encompass all of the relevant factors an investor should consider when investing in mutual funds, apply questionable standards, and are not a substitute for the exercise of fiduciary discretion with respect to an individual fiduciary account. The Fiduciary Grades have a limited focus and are not a reliable indicator of a mutual fund’s compliance record, quality of fund management, or suitability as a fiduciary investment. Unquestioning reliance on the Fiduciary Grades could result in misguided investment decisions.","PeriodicalId":133808,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Other Law & Society: Private Law - Financial Law (Topic)","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115460668","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Nabil A. Saleh, Unlawful Gain and Legitimate Profit in Islamic Law: Riba, Gharar and Islamic Banking","authors":"S. Hasanuzzaman","doi":"10.4197/ISLEC.3-1.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4197/ISLEC.3-1.7","url":null,"abstract":"We begin by giving a summary of the main points. The book is chiefly concerned with prohibitory rules unanimously acknowledged in principle by all Muslims i.e. riba (unlawful advantage by way of excess or deferment) and gharar (uncertainty, risk and speculation). It is also concerned with interest-free banking and mudarabah (commenda partnership). The subject of the book is law not economics.","PeriodicalId":133808,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Other Law & Society: Private Law - Financial Law (Topic)","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126674720","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Memorandum on the Asset Management Industry","authors":"J. Crawford","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2884377","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2884377","url":null,"abstract":"This memo aims to support the Volcker Alliance’s project on financial regulatory reform by providing a comprehensive account of the asset management industry in the United States: its structure, participants, and activities; how it is regulated; how it has evolved in recent years, particularly since the financial crisis; and potential risks to financial stability arising out of the industry.","PeriodicalId":133808,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Other Law & Society: Private Law - Financial Law (Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122267933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}