{"title":"Economic Freedom and Philanthropy","authors":"J. Jackson, S. Beaulier","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3889560","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3889560","url":null,"abstract":"The correlations between economic freedom and human capabilities (e.g., income, health, education, happiness) are robust and well-documented. Using panel data for US charitable donations from itemized tax returns and the Economic Freedom of North America (EFNA) Index, we examine the state-level correlation between economic freedom and philanthropy in America. Contrary to common discourse, which points to economic freedom as a source of cultural and civic erosion, we find a strong correlation between economic freedom and charitable giving.","PeriodicalId":131613,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Public Goods (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126318400","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Subjective Beliefs in International Agreements","authors":"Sungwoo Im, D. Iris, Hyeonggyun Ko","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3688872","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3688872","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we study the impact of countries’ subjective beliefs, i.e., pessimism and optimism, on international agreements to provide global public goods. Under symmetric beliefs, we find that while pessimism (optimism) could decrease (increase) signatories’ efforts, it can also increase (decrease) the coalition size. Under asymmetric beliefs, optimists entering the coalition may crowd out the more pessimistic countries. If a stable coalition exists, then while optimists are willing to participate even at rather small coalition sizes, the participation of more pessimistic types requires the coalition size to be larger. A stable coalition would consist of the most optimists and possibly some other types.","PeriodicalId":131613,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Public Goods (Topic)","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117178427","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Large Games with Heterogeneous Players","authors":"Ricardo Serrano-Padial","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3541957","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3541957","url":null,"abstract":"We study large games played by heterogeneous agents whose payoffs depend on the aggregate action and provide novel equilibrium selection and comparative statics results. We prove the equivalence between the global games selection and potential maximization in games with strategic complementarities, and characterize the selected equilibrium as the solution to maximizing the ex-ante expected payoffs of a player with pessimistic beliefs. To obtain our results we uncover two key properties. First, we show that potential games exhibit quasilinear payoffs, which include as examples Cournot competition, public goods and externalities, search models and coordination games. Second, we show that beliefs in the global game satisfy a generalized Laplacian property, which links average beliefs about the aggregate action to the uniform distribution. Our comparative statics results rely on average rather than pointwise conditions on payoffs and can be used to analyze both parameter changes and the impact of heterogeneity.","PeriodicalId":131613,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Public Goods (Topic)","volume":"74 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115929689","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Public Goods Equilibria Under Closed - and Open - List Proportional Representation","authors":"D. Kselman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3478087","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3478087","url":null,"abstract":"Building on past research, this paper develops a game theoretic model to study the provision of public goods under Closed- and Open-List Proportional Representation. The core results suggest that legislators will provide voters with higher levels of public goods in OLPR than in CLPR systems. However, two intervening variables condition the institutional comparison: the district magnitude and electoral volatility. Firstly, public goods effort increases with district magnitude in OLPR systems, but tends to decrease with district magnitude in CLPR systems. Indeed, when magnitude is M = 2, CLPR and OLPR are often indistinguishable. Furthermore, the distinction between the two systems will weaken when electoral volatility is low, since in such circumstances neither system generates high levels of public goods effort. In addition to their relevance for political-economy, the paper's results provide game theoretic foundations for a series of theoretical conjectures found in Carey and Shugart's (1995) seminal study of electoral institutions and legislative personalism.","PeriodicalId":131613,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Public Goods (Topic)","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126648490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Envy-Free Pricing for Impure Public Good","authors":"Takuya Obara, Shuichi Tsugawa, Shunsuke Managi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3299783","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3299783","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we study optimal public good provision with congestion and user fees to exclude some agents under lump-sum tax/transfer, constrained by the condition of reduction of envy. We adopt the λ envy-free constraint proposed by Diamantaras and Thomson (1990), and employ the exclusion technique used in Hellwig (2005), i.e., the policymaker decides the level of provision and user fee paid by people accessing a public good, as well as a uniform level of tax/transfer. We characterize the optimal public sector pricing rule that depends on utilitarian distributive concerns and envy reduction concerns, which are in conflict with each other. We show that if the social welfare function is strictly increasing and strictly concave and the government is not concerned with reducing envy, the user fee is greater than the marginal congestion cost. Additionally, we show that if the government reflects the notion of equality of opportunity under the reduction of envy, the user fee is lower than the marginal congestion cost. These results imply that the two fairness concerns are countervailing with regard to the surcharge fee.","PeriodicalId":131613,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Public Goods (Topic)","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129005168","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Wenna Wang, R. van den Brink, Hao Sun, Genjiu Xu, Zhengxing Zou
{"title":"The Alpha-Constant-Sum Games","authors":"Wenna Wang, R. van den Brink, Hao Sun, Genjiu Xu, Zhengxing Zou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3353136","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3353136","url":null,"abstract":"Given any alpha in [0,1], an alpha-constant-sum game on a finite set of players, N, is a function that assigns a real number to any coalition S (being a subset of the player set N), such that the sum of the worth of the coalition S and the worth of its complementary coalition NS is alpha times of the worth of the grand coalition N. This class contains the constant-sum games of Khmelnitskaya (2003) (for alpha = 1) and games of threats of Kohlberg and Neyman (2018) (for alpha = 0) as special cases. An alpha-constant-sum game may not be a classical TU cooperative game as it may fail to satisfy the condition that the worth of the empty set is 0, except when alpha = 1. In this paper, we will build a value theory for the class of alpha-constant-sum games, and mainly introduce the alpha-quasi-Shapley value. We characterize this value by classical axiomatizations for TU games. We show that axiomatizations of the equal division value do not work on these classes of alpha-constant-sum games.","PeriodicalId":131613,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Public Goods (Topic)","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126402139","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Normative Perception of Power Abuse","authors":"L. Hoeft, Wladislaw Mill, A. Vostroknutov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3350484","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3350484","url":null,"abstract":"We study how the powerful perceive power abuse, and how negative experience related to it influences the appropriateness judgments of the powerless. We create an environment conducive to unfair exploitation in a repeated Public Goods game where one player (punisher) is given a further ability to costlessly subtract money from others (victims). Punishers who abuse their power rationalize their behavior by believing that free-riding, while forcing others to contribute, is not inappropriate. More importantly, victims of such abuse also start to believe that punishers’ free-riding and punishment are justifiable. Our findings demonstrate the capacity of humans to exculpate abusive behavior.","PeriodicalId":131613,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Public Goods (Topic)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130938300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Liberal Radicalism: A Flexible Design For Philanthropic Matching Funds","authors":"Vitalik Buterin, Zoë Hitzig","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3243656","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3243656","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a design for philanthropic or publicly-funded seeding to allow (near) optimal provision of a decentralized, self-organizing ecosystem of public goods. The concept extends ideas from Quadratic Voting to a funding mechanism for endogenous community formation. Citizens make public goods contributions to projects of value to them. The amount received by the project is (proportional to) the square of the sum of the square roots of contributions received. Under the \"standard model\" this yields first best public goods provision. Variations can limit the cost, help protect against collusion and aid coordination. We discuss applications to campaign finance, open source software ecosystems, news media finance and urban public projects. More broadly, we relate our mechanism to political theory, discussing how this solution to the public goods problem may furnish neutral and non-authoritarian rules for society that nonetheless support collective organization.","PeriodicalId":131613,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Public Goods (Topic)","volume":"47 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114116702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Entrepreneurship Policy and Firm Performance Chile’s CORFO Seed Capital Program","authors":"Lucas Navarro","doi":"10.4067/S0718-52862018000200301","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4067/S0718-52862018000200301","url":null,"abstract":"This paper uses administrative data from projects for which an application was made to CORFO’s (Chile’s main development agency) Seed Capital Program (SCP) during the 2008-12 period. This paper analyzes the likely impact of the program-which is a subsidy provided to new, innovative firms-on Start, Growth, and Survival. The projects are supported by sponsors in the application process. Results of our analysis indicate that, controlling for observed characteristics, projects that received the subsidy had a 9.5 percentage point higher probability of starting to sell. Among created firms, subsidized (Treated) firms showed a 17 percentage point higher probability of significant Growth (in sales) and a similar effect on Survival. The analysis also examined a change in the program rules in 2011, whereby sponsors were paid based on performance instead of fixed fees, as it was before 2011. For projects affected by the policy change, results indicate no overall association of the program with the probability of Start and a positive correlation with Growth and Survival. These results could be a consequence of sponsors making better project selections for funding. The change in rules would suggest that the program contributes more to the Growth and Survival of new firms than to their Start, which would take place anyway. The data available for this study did not make it possible to fully control for potential selection biases, and thus the results may overestimate the impact of the program. This calls to suggest to improve data collection standards to help identify the true effect of this type of program.","PeriodicalId":131613,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Public Goods (Topic)","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114945024","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Scale Up in Public Economics","authors":"O. Kopsidas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3501363","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3501363","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of the paper is to present a modified model of an internalizing external costs caused by the operation of a manufacturing unit in conjunction with the new reality created. The environment is characterized as a public good. Public goods are goods that provide benefits for society as a whole or part of it, usually regardless of whether the individual people are willing to pay to have these benefits. All entities, whether individuals or businesses or public agencies, have some financial resources with which they seek to achieve specific objectives (e.g. profit maximization). To achieve a specific objective, usually there are many alternatives and possibilities. To be effective, i.e. to utilize the existing resources in the best manner possible, should be selected that the solution maximizes the desired outcome or minimizes the required sacrifices.","PeriodicalId":131613,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Public Goods (Topic)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127693315","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}