{"title":"Trump and the Trade Policy of a Free Society","authors":"Robert W. McGee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2858396","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2858396","url":null,"abstract":"Donald Trump has stated that he is in favor of free trade, but that he wants it to be fair. He has said that, if elected president, he would renegotiate NAFTA and other trade deals that he views as unfair to the American worker. When Ford recently announced that it would move a portion of its manufacturing facilities to Mexico, he stated that the cars made at that Mexican facility would be hit with a 35 percent tariff if Ford tried to sell them in the United States. He has stated on numerous occasions that he would slap a 30 percent tariff on the importation of Chinese products unless the Chinese quit engaging in unfair trade practices. Trump has pointed to the trade deficit the United States runs with several countries as an indication that the United States is getting a raw deal on trade, and he has vowed to reduce the trade deficit.The alleged problems Trump points to are not new. Such problems have been discussed by economists and pundits for more than a hundred years. The solutions Trump proposes also are not new, for the most part. Both the alleged problems and the proposed solutions rely heavily on utilitarian economic analysis. As is often the case, the utilitarian analysis used can be faulty, as Bastiat pointed out in the 1840s. Then there is the fact that all utilitarian analyses are structurally deficient. This paper discusses some of the issues Trump and others have raised, analyzes them from the utilitarian perspective as well as an alternate (and better) perspective, and arrives at some policy recommendations.The paper also includes a bibliography of more than 100 articles about trade, with links that will take the reader to the article.","PeriodicalId":130821,"journal":{"name":"ORG: Ethics in Decision Making (Topic)","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126799737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Wages of Dishonesty: The Supply of Cheating under High-Powered Incentives","authors":"P. Balasubramanian, V. M. Bennett, L. Pierce","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2808606","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2808606","url":null,"abstract":"We use a novel design to identify how dishonesty changes through a broad reward range that, at the high end, exceeds participants’ average daily wages. Using a sample of online Indian workers who earn bonuses based on six simultaneous coin flips, we show that the relationship between dishonesty and financial rewards depends on the incentive range. We find two novel effects as incentives exceed those used in most prior research. First, dishonesty increases and reaches its maximum as rewards increase from $0.50 to $3 per reported head and as earnings reach $15, indicating that rewards can indeed motivate more cheating when large enough. More importantly, we show that dishonesty declines at the highest reward levels (up to $5 per head) as individuals appear to engage in lower magnitudes of dishonesty. We detail how our results could be explained by a reference-dependent utility with internal costs of dishonesty that are convex in the magnitude of the lie, and show survey and simulation-based evidence that support this explanation.","PeriodicalId":130821,"journal":{"name":"ORG: Ethics in Decision Making (Topic)","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125857786","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Commitment to Social Good and Insider Trading","authors":"Feng Gao, Ling Lei Lisic, I. Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2140193","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2140193","url":null,"abstract":"A firm׳s investment in corporate social responsibility (CSR) builds a positive image of caring for social good and imposes additional costs on executives׳ informed trading, which is widely perceived self-serving. We thus expect executives of CSR-conscious firms to be more likely to refrain from informed trading. We find that executives of CSR-conscious firms profit significantly less from insider trades and are less likely to trade prior to future news than executives of non-CSR-conscious firms. The negative association between CSR and insider trading profits is more pronounced when executives׳ personal interests are more aligned with the interests of the firm.","PeriodicalId":130821,"journal":{"name":"ORG: Ethics in Decision Making (Topic)","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116104662","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Collusion and Selective Supervision","authors":"Alberto Motta","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1922412","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1922412","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the role of a policy of inducing in combating collusion within organizations, or in regulatory setups. In a mechanism-design problem involving a principal-supervisor-agent we show the role of endogenous selection of supervisory activity by the principal. One simple example is a mechanism in which the agent bypasses the supervisor and contracts directly with the principal in some states of the world. If collusion between supervisor and agent can occur only after they have decided to participate in the mechanism, this can costlessly eliminate collusion. This result is robust to alternative information structures, collusive behaviors and specification of agent's types. Applications include self-reporting of crimes, tax amnesties, immigration amnesties, work contracts specifying di¤erent degrees of discretion, mechanisms based on recommendation letters, embassies issuing immigration permits, and hiring committees.","PeriodicalId":130821,"journal":{"name":"ORG: Ethics in Decision Making (Topic)","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124413217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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