{"title":"What's New About the New Normal: The Evolving Market for New Lawyers in the 21st Century","authors":"Bernard A. Burk","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2309497","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2309497","url":null,"abstract":"Everyone agrees that job prospects for many new law graduates have been poor for the last several years; there is rather less consensus on whether, when, how, or why that may change as the economy recovers from the Great Recession. This Article analyzes historical and current trends in the job market for new lawyers in an effort to predict how that market may evolve. The Article derives quantitative measurements of the proportion of law graduates over the last thirty years who have obtained initial employment for which law school serves as rational substantive preparation (“Law Jobs”). In comparing entry-level hiring patterns since 2008 with those in earlier periods, a significant development emerges: While other sectors of the market for new lawyers have changed only modestly during the Great Recession, one sector — the larger private law firms colloquially known as “BigLaw” — has contracted proportionally six times as much as all the others. Entering BigLaw classes overall are now roughly one-third smaller than they were seven years ago. And though BigLaw hiring has historically accounted for only 10% to 20% of each graduating class, it is responsible for over half the entry-level Law Jobs lost since 2008. While some observers predict a return to business as usual as the economy recovers, this Article is skeptical of that account. The Article identifies significant structural changes in the way that the services BigLaw has traditionally provided are being produced, staffed, and priced that diminish BigLaw’s need for junior lawyers, both immediately and in the longer term. These observations suggest that entry-level BigLaw hiring, and thus the market for new lawyers overall, will remain depressed below pre-recession levels well after demand improves to or beyond pre-recession levels. At the same time, even though entry-level demand may remain static, new lawyers’ job prospects may nevertheless improve as the con-traction in the legal academy now underway reduces the number of new graduates competing for work.","PeriodicalId":129013,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Law eJournal","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123215570","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Boundaries of Difference in Law: A Critique of Radical Incommensurability","authors":"A. Connolly","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2282912","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2282912","url":null,"abstract":"Occasionally, in pursuing their adjudicative duties over the course of a legal hearing, judges are called upon to acquire new concepts – that is, concepts which they did not possess at the commencement of the hearing. In performing their judicial role they are required to learn new things and, as a result, conceptualise the world in a way which differs from the way they conceived of things before the hearing commenced. Some theorists have argued that either as a general matter or as a matter specific to judicial practice and the legal context, judges are, with some degree of necessity, incapacitated from acquiring certain kinds of concepts. Such concepts include those possessed by the members of culturally different minority groups. Drawing on contemporary trends in analytic and naturalistic philosophy of mind, this paper explores the extent to which a judge might be incapacitated from acquiring new concepts over the course of a legal hearing and identifies those factors which condition the success or failure of that process.","PeriodicalId":129013,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Law eJournal","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122101670","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Universal System of Collective Security Based on the Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary on Article 2(6) UN Charter","authors":"S. Talmon","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1962660","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1962660","url":null,"abstract":"It is not only the acts of States, whether members of the UN or not, which may give rise to threats to international peace and security. The actions of non-State actors such as regional governmental organizations, national liberation movements, rebel groups and terrorist organizations may equally affect or endanger international peace and security. A system of collective security, as envisaged by the UN Charter, thus cannot operate successfully without embracing all sources of threats to the peace, irrespective of whether they originate from within the UN membership or from outside. The paper demonstrates that Art 2(6) of the UN Charter with its limited scope of application does not allow the UN to adequately address threats to international peace and security from outside the Organization. It has therefore been superseded by a customary international law based universal system of collective security which is based upon the relevant Charter provisions but does not derive its legal force from the Charter as a treaty. This universal, that is, generally applicable system of collective security goes beyond a general obligation incumbent upon all international actors not to conduct themselves in a way that constitutes a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. It rather subjects all relevant international actors to the authority of the UN, and in particular the SC, with regard to measures necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.","PeriodicalId":129013,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Law eJournal","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116877305","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Analysis of the True and Fair View Concept: An Islamic Perspective","authors":"Abang Salihin, A. H. Fatima, A. A. Ousama","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1962266","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1962266","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this paper is to critically examine the applicability of the concept of 'True and Fair View' (TFV) from an Islamic perspective. It then explores the position and roles of TFV in the Islamic accounting context. The sources of data consist of the shari'ah fundamentals from the Islamic legal sources, in addition to relevant accounting standards and regulations. The paper found that the TFV concept is not contrary to Islamic shari'ah and that TFV plays certain roles in Islamic accounting. Thus, the paper suggests that the Islamic standard setters retain the term as it is not against Islamic shari'ah and it will help avoid confusion among users of financial statements. With this, the TFV concept should continue to be used in Islamic accounting until a more appropriate phrase is coined. The paper can be considered among the first papers that analyse the TFV concept from an Islamic perspective.","PeriodicalId":129013,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Law eJournal","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126759547","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Australia’s New National Partnership Agreement on Legal Assistance","authors":"M. Noone","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2259297","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2259297","url":null,"abstract":"On 2 July 2010, the new Australian National Partnership Agreement on Legal Assistance Services (NPA) commenced. The agreement between the federal and state governments was promoted by government as a break from the past. The key features of the Agreement include an increased focus on early intervention and prevention services and encouraging greater collaboration among legal and other service providers. In this article I outline the current legal aid system, give some context to the agreement and the detail aspects of the NPA. I then survey what changes (if any) have occurred in the Australian legal aid system during the first twelve months of the Agreement. In this context I canvas the tensions between early intervention (often alternative dispute resolution), prevention services (community legal education) and traditional legal aid casework. I conclude with some observations about matters that require research and ongoing evaluation if those concerned with access to justice, both proponents of ADR and legal aid lawyers, wish to further their objectives. Most importantly, in recognition of the complex and paradoxical nature of access to justice developments, these evaluations must be rigorous and contextualized.","PeriodicalId":129013,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Law eJournal","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128928573","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Truth and the Law","authors":"J. Spigelman","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1855798","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1855798","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of legal proceedings is to identify the true factual circumstances of any matter in dispute. This principle is of fundamental significance for the administration of justice and the maintenance of public confidence in the legal system. Recognising the central significance of truth necessitates the narrow statement of exceptions or qualifications to the fact-finding process, which should be confined to circumstances in which the search for truth conflicts with other public values, including the principle of a fair trial. This paper compares and contrasts civil law and common law jurisdictions with respect to truth seeking. In particular, this paper highlights that even in jurisdictions expressly devoted to finding the truth, exclusionary rules and practices continue to circumscribe the material available to the tribunal of fact. Contrary to widespread belief, analogues to the common law exclusion of illegally obtained evidence, legal professional privilege, and hearsay, exist in civil law countries. Further, the absence of party-led fact-finding in such countries, particularly, the severe restrictions on the compulsory disclosure of documents, significantly attenuates the capacity of parties to bring all relevant materials to the court’s attention. This paper also discusses the frailty of human memory, particularly, the psychological research on the limitations of eyewitness and identification evidence. While an impediment to truth seeking, improved understanding of the scientific research may improve the fact-finding process.","PeriodicalId":129013,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Law eJournal","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133363552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Social Stigma, Heuristics and Criminal Law","authors":"Laarni C. Escresa, A. Palestini","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1820023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1820023","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores under what conditions social stigma exists as an additional sanction in criminal law from a behavioral law and economics perspective. A distinction is made between the court as an institution specialized at discovering and assigning blame and the rest of the society that relies on judgment heuristics in assigning the informal sanction. When the court finds that an individual has violated a particular legal standard, the rest of the society updates their information about the particular personality predisposition of the individual and assigns to him the predispositional type of the set of violators. It is shown that a criminal conviction carries an additional social stigma depending on the legal standard, the population variance, and the beliefs of the society. This happens in a separating equilibrium where the best strategy of each type confirms the beliefs of the rest of society with regards to the set of individual violators. Within this range, it is also shown that the substitutability between the fine and the probability of conviction also depends on the variance which is different from what the Becker model predicts. Thus, while it is the rest of the society that imposes the social sanction, the social planner can influence it indirectly. It shows that the complementarity between law and informal sanction lies on making the act observable to the rest of society and influencing the society's belief function.","PeriodicalId":129013,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Law eJournal","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114295603","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Equity, Common Law and its Appliance in India: A Study","authors":"V. Jain","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1645411","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1645411","url":null,"abstract":"The scope of this paper is trace the history and development of equity and also its current relevance primarily for Indian legal system. It seeks to specifically determine the reasons if any, for the failure of the common law courts in bringing about social change and suggests certain important methods of overcoming the impediments.","PeriodicalId":129013,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Law eJournal","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122665947","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Universal Exceptionalism in International Law","authors":"A. Bradford, E. Posner","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1551355","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1551355","url":null,"abstract":"A trope of international law scholarship is that the United States is an “exceptionalist” nation, one that takes a distinctive (frequently hostile, unilateralist, or hypocritical) stance toward international law. However, all major powers are similarly “exceptionalist,” in the sense that they take distinctive approaches to international law that reflect their values and interests. We illustrate these arguments with discussions of China, the European Union, and the United States. Charges of international-law exceptionalism betray an undefended assumption that one particular view of international law (for scholars, usually the European view) is universally valid.","PeriodicalId":129013,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Law eJournal","volume":"47 11","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120982279","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"G. W. F. Hegel","authors":"A. Tripathi","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1541363","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1541363","url":null,"abstract":"This paper seeks to present the well known philosopher G.W.F. HEGEL, who is related to the Historical Law School. He said that at the level of morality a right and wrong is nothing else, but it is matter of individual conscience. He describes his philosophy with the three concepts of will, freedom and rights and he described that what is free will? the paper presents the relevance of his philosophy with the help of Indian Contract Law and the cases that is decided by the courts with the application of his philosophy i.e. the ‘Philosophy of Rights’. In Atlas v Kafko, the court held that it is case of the undue influence and by it the consent is not a free consent. It is not contract and the appeal was rejected by the court. Relevance in world is introduced in India with the help of Indian Contract Law and by the cases in which the Hegelian philosophy has been mentioned. As the Hegel talked about the contract, the Indian legal system has also mentioned about the contract law and Hegelian theory has importance not only with the Indian legal system but in English legal system also. Hegel has mentioned ‘consent’ to the contract especially ‘free consent’; it has great importance in both Indian contract Law and English Legal System. The English legal system has given a lot of emphasis on the consent in terms of contract to save the individuality. In Atlas v Kafko , carrier A agreed to carry B’s certain goods at a certain rate, which was calculated by A on the basis that x cartons of B’s goods could be carried per load. Finding that the calculation was wrong and knowing that B’s survival in the business depended on the goods reaching an important customer, Woolworth Plc, A told B that A would not carry B’s goods to W unless B paid twice rate. B was unable to find an alternative carrier within time and promised to pay the new rate. But later B refused to pay the difference money. A’s action to recover that sum failed because B had agreed to pay under compulsion and under protest. The court held that it is a case of undue influence.","PeriodicalId":129013,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Law eJournal","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127812491","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}