Non-BeingPub Date : 2021-03-18DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198846222.003.0010
A. Segal
{"title":"Something Out of Nothing","authors":"A. Segal","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198846222.003.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198846222.003.0010","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter argues that it’s possible for something to be brought into existence by something that is non-actual. Segal distinguishes his argument from arguments for causation by omission, and draws a comparison between his argument and Zeno causation. Finally, he connects the topic to Jewish mystical traditions.","PeriodicalId":125994,"journal":{"name":"Non-Being","volume":"464 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126194377","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Non-BeingPub Date : 2021-03-18DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198846222.003.0008
Eddy Keming Chen
{"title":"The Cosmic Void","authors":"Eddy Keming Chen","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198846222.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198846222.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"What exists at the fundamental level of reality? On the standard picture, the fundamental reality contains (among other things) fundamental matter, such as particles, fields, or even the quantum state. Non-fundamental facts are explained by facts about fundamental matter, at least in part. In this paper, I introduce a non-standard picture called the “cosmic void” in which the universe is devoid of any fundamental material ontology. Facts about tables and chairs are recovered from a special kind of laws that satisfy strong determinism. All non-fundamental facts are completely explained by nomic facts. I discuss a concrete example of this picture in a strongly deterministic version of the many-worlds theory of quantum mechanics. I discuss some philosophical and scientific challenges to this view, as well as some connections to ontological nihilism.","PeriodicalId":125994,"journal":{"name":"Non-Being","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130499831","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Non-BeingPub Date : 2021-03-18DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198846222.003.0004
Fatema Amijee
{"title":"Something from Nothing","authors":"Fatema Amijee","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198846222.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198846222.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"It strikes many as obvious that negative facts—such as that Justin Trudeau is not a woman—are not fundamental: negative facts must ultimately be explained in terms of positive facts (for instance, that Justin Trudeau is a man). Amijee focuses on a particular class of negative facts: contingent negative existentials (such as that there are no 10ft tall humans). If contingent negative existentials are not fundamental, then they must be explained. But the intuition that contingent negative existentials are explained is in tension with the widely held view that any universal generalization can be explained by its instances together with a totality fact. This is because a totality fact is itself a negative existential, and equivalent to a universal generalization. If the explanation for any contingent negative existential must appeal to another contingent negative existential, then not all contingent negative existentials can be non-fundamental.","PeriodicalId":125994,"journal":{"name":"Non-Being","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130848918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Non-BeingPub Date : 2021-03-18DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198846222.003.0006
Koji Tanaka
{"title":"How Can Buddhists Prove That Non-Existent Things Do Not Exist?","authors":"Koji Tanaka","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198846222.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198846222.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores a Buddhist view that denies the existence of all truths and facts, and how Buddhists have supported this doctrine. Tanaka clarifies the meaning of the doctrine, objections against it, and how Buddhist have engaged and might have engaged with the objections.","PeriodicalId":125994,"journal":{"name":"Non-Being","volume":"136 46","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"113970097","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Non-BeingPub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198846222.003.0009
Roberto Casati, Achille C. Varzi
{"title":"Ballot Ontology","authors":"Roberto Casati, Achille C. Varzi","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198846222.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198846222.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"The US Presidential Election of 2000 was crucially decided in Florida. And, in Florida, the election might have been decided crucially by the question: is a dimple a hole? “Yes, it is”, so dimpled ballots are valid and ought to be counted. “No it isn’t”, and dimpled ballots must be rejected as invalid. If only one knew the answer! Where were the hole experts when we needed them? Eventually the manual recount was stopped by the Supreme Court. But we did learn something. We learned that even the destiny of a Presidential Election, if not more, might ultimately depend on one’s criteria for identifying holes—not their material surroundings, which everyone could detect, but the holes themselves.","PeriodicalId":125994,"journal":{"name":"Non-Being","volume":"79 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115744839","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Non-BeingPub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198846222.003.0003
R. Sorensen
{"title":"Thales’ Riddle of the Night","authors":"R. Sorensen","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198846222.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198846222.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"Which is older: day or night? Thales is said to have answered “Night is the older by one day.” Recent research bridges this mysterious riddle with the first conceptual puzzle published by Lewis Carroll: “Where does the day begin?” Once understood in its context, Thales’s day and night riddle presents an opportunity to view astronomy in a sort of reverse perspective. In addition to stimulating this gestalt switch, the day and night riddle fuels speculation that Thales had an insight into the hidden antiquity of the night (and day) and that he correctly inferred that the night is older than the Earth itself.","PeriodicalId":125994,"journal":{"name":"Non-Being","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131973214","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Non-BeingPub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198846222.003.0011
Tyron Goldschmidt, Samuel Lebens
{"title":"Ex Nihilo Nihil Fit","authors":"Tyron Goldschmidt, Samuel Lebens","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198846222.003.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198846222.003.0011","url":null,"abstract":"Could there have been no concrete beings? Could there have been no contingent beings? If there could have been no such beings, why then are there any? This chapter argues that various modal metaphysics rule out the possibility of there being nothing at all. It concludes that the most prominent pictures of the nature of possibility entail the existence of something, and thus answer the question of why there is something rather than nothing.","PeriodicalId":125994,"journal":{"name":"Non-Being","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123509223","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Non-BeingPub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198846222.003.0007
Bryan Frances
{"title":"How Ordinary Objects Fit into Reality","authors":"Bryan Frances","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198846222.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198846222.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter by Bryan Frances argues against sparse compositional nihilism, the view that there are no composite objects, such as tables and trees. Even granting crucial nihilist assumptions, he argues that composite objects can reduce to simples, showing how a table or tree might exist while not being single things.","PeriodicalId":125994,"journal":{"name":"Non-Being","volume":"125 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122782067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Non-BeingPub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198846222.003.0012
Craig Warmke
{"title":"Ostrich Actualism","authors":"Craig Warmke","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198846222.003.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198846222.003.0012","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter explores the debate over merely possible objects, clarifies the distinction between actualism and possibility, and reconciles actualism with the reality of possibilities and nonexistents. Focusing on late work by Derek Parfit, Warmke proposes and defends an “ostrich actualism” that permits even actualists to quantify over mere possibilities.","PeriodicalId":125994,"journal":{"name":"Non-Being","volume":"31 16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126467969","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Non-BeingPub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198846222.003.0016
Carolina Sartorio
{"title":"Responsibility and the Metaphysics of Omissions","authors":"Carolina Sartorio","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198846222.003.0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198846222.003.0016","url":null,"abstract":"What is the bearing of the metaphysics of omissions on debates about moral responsibility? If it turned out that omissions and absences in general don’t have any causal powers, what would follow about the moral responsibility of agents in certain cases where omissions and absences seem to be involved? This paper examines these and related questions. It will look at the significance of the distinction between views on which omissions and absences can have causal powers. It will examine cases where the moral responsibility of agents seems to involve absences as either causes, effects, or causal intermediaries. It will also examine the bearing of the metaphysics of omissions on views according to which the moral responsibility of agents for their choices depends on the agent’s sensitivity to negative features of the world around them.","PeriodicalId":125994,"journal":{"name":"Non-Being","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131819768","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：