Chicago Booth: Michael P. Polsky Center for Entrepreneurship Research Paper Series最新文献_第2页

Is the U.S. Capital Market Losing its Competitive Edge? 美国资本市场正在失去竞争优势吗?

Chicago Booth: Michael P. Polsky Center for Entrepreneurship Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2007-11-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.1028701

Luigi Zingales

引用次数: 112

Factors that Determine the Reputation of Private Equity Managers in Developing Markets 发展中市场中决定私募股权经理声誉的因素

Chicago Booth: Michael P. Polsky Center for Entrepreneurship Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2007-07-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.673841

Marina Balboa, Jose Martí

引用次数: 100

Venture Capitalists as Principals: Contracting, Screening, and Monitoring 风险资本家作为委托人:签约、筛选和监督

Chicago Booth: Michael P. Polsky Center for Entrepreneurship Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2001-04-01 DOI: 10.1257/AER.91.2.426

S. Kaplan, P. Strömberg

{"title":"Venture Capitalists as Principals: Contracting, Screening, and Monitoring","authors":"S. Kaplan, P. Strömberg","doi":"10.1257/AER.91.2.426","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/AER.91.2.426","url":null,"abstract":"Theoretical work on the principal-agent problem in financial contracting focuses on the conflicts of interest between an agent / entrepreneur with a venture that needs financing, and a principal / investor providing funds for the venture. Theory has identified three primary ways that the investor / principal can mitigate these conflicts - structuring financial contracts, pre-investment screening, and post-investment monitoring and advising. In this paper, we describe recent empirical work and its relation to theory for one prominent class of principals venture capitalists (VCs). The empirical studies indicate that VCs attempt to mitigate principal-agent conflicts in the three ways suggested by theory. The evidence also shows that contracting, screening, and monitoring are closely interrelated. In screening, the VCs identify areas where they can add value through monitoring and support. In contracting, the VCs allocate rights in order to facilitate monitoring and minimize the impact of identified risks. Also, the equity allocated to VCs provides incentives to engage in costly support activities that increase upside values, rather than just minimizing potential losses. There is room for future empirical research to study these activities in greater detail for VCs, for other intermediaries such as banks, and within firms.","PeriodicalId":124392,"journal":{"name":"Chicago Booth: Michael P. Polsky Center for Entrepreneurship Research Paper Series","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126537655","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 634

A Clinical Exploration of Value Creation and Destruction in Acquisitions: Organization Design, Incentives, and Internal Capital Markets 收购中价值创造与破坏的临床探索:组织设计、激励和内部资本市场

Chicago Booth: Michael P. Polsky Center for Entrepreneurship Research Paper Series Pub Date : 1997-04-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.10995

S. Kaplan, Mark Mitchell, Karen H. Wruck

{"title":"A Clinical Exploration of Value Creation and Destruction in Acquisitions: Organization Design, Incentives, and Internal Capital Markets","authors":"S. Kaplan, Mark Mitchell, Karen H. Wruck","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.10995","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.10995","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents clinically-based studies of two acquisitions that received very different stock market reactions at announcement one positive and one negative. Despite the differing market reactions, we find that ultimately neither acquisition created value overall. In exploring the reasons for the acquisition outcomes, we rely primarily on interviews with managers and on internally generated performance data. We compare the results of these analyses to those from analyses of post-acquisition operating and stock price performance traditionally applied to large samples. We draw two primary conclusions. (1) Our findings highlight the difficulty of implementing a successful acquisition strategy and of running an effective internal capital market. Post-acquisition difficulties resulted because: (a) managers of the\" acquiring company did not deeply understand the target company at the time of the acquisition; (b) the acquirer imposed an inappropriate organizational design on the target as part of the post-acquisition integration process; and (c) inappropriate management incentives existed at both the top management and division levels. (2) Measures of operating performance used in large sample studies are weakly correlated with actual post-acquisition operating performance.\"","PeriodicalId":124392,"journal":{"name":"Chicago Booth: Michael P. Polsky Center for Entrepreneurship Research Paper Series","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1997-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130744684","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 56