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1987 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy最新文献

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Using Formal Verification Techniques to Analyze Encryption Protocols 使用形式化验证技术分析加密协议
1987 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Pub Date : 1987-04-27 DOI: 10.1109/SP.1987.10005
R. Kemmerer
{"title":"Using Formal Verification Techniques to Analyze Encryption Protocols","authors":"R. Kemmerer","doi":"10.1109/SP.1987.10005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.1987.10005","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents an approach to analyzing Encryption protocols using machine aided formal verification techniques. The desirable properties that a protocol is to preserve are expressed as state invariants and the theorems that need to be proved to guarantee that the cryptographic facility satisfies the invariants are automatically generated by the verification system. A formal specification of an example system is presented, and a weakness that was revealed by testing the formal specification is discussed.","PeriodicalId":123213,"journal":{"name":"1987 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"134 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1987-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122346547","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 24
Graph Homomorphisms and the Design of Secure Computer Systems 图同态与安全计算机系统的设计
1987 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Pub Date : 1987-04-27 DOI: 10.1109/SP.1987.10025
L. Moser
{"title":"Graph Homomorphisms and the Design of Secure Computer Systems","authors":"L. Moser","doi":"10.1109/SP.1987.10025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.1987.10025","url":null,"abstract":"In designing and analyzing the structure and security of a large scale computer program or system, one is often interested in how it is constructed out of pieces or in the flow of information through it. The concepts of dependency, connectivity, and reparability which arise in security verification are handled well by graph theory. As is shown in this paper, graph homomorphism are particularly useful for describing the hierarchical/modular design of a system and for demonstrating the security of information flow.","PeriodicalId":123213,"journal":{"name":"1987 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1987-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116844672","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Data Dependencies and Inference Control in Multilevel Relational Database Systems 多层关系数据库系统中的数据依赖与推理控制
1987 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Pub Date : 1987-04-27 DOI: 10.1109/SP.1987.10004
T. Su, G. Özsoyoglu
{"title":"Data Dependencies and Inference Control in Multilevel Relational Database Systems","authors":"T. Su, G. Özsoyoglu","doi":"10.1109/SP.1987.10004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.1987.10004","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the inference problems due to functional dependencies (FD) and multi-valued dependencies (hND) in a multilevel relational database (MDB) with attribute and record classification schemes, respectively. For FDs, we show that, to prevent compromise, the security levels of attributes must be assigned by using the knowledge of functional dependencies. Under the assumption that all the attributes in the database have been assigned classification levels according to real world requirements, we first determine the set of functional dependencies to be taken into account. Then, we prove that changing the minimum number of attribute levels to prevent compromise is an NP-complete problem. However, assuming that the number of functional dependencies involved in inference is low, we give an exact algorithm to adjust the minimum number of attribute levels so that no compromise due to functional dependencies occurs. For NfVDs, we give a necessary and sufficient condition for compromise due to a single MVD, and then propose an algorithm to prevent single MVD inferences.","PeriodicalId":123213,"journal":{"name":"1987 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1987-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128223697","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 42
A Comparison of Commercial and Military Computer Security Policies 商用和军用计算机安全策略的比较
1987 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Pub Date : 1987-04-27 DOI: 10.1109/SP.1987.10001
D. Clark, D. Wilson
{"title":"A Comparison of Commercial and Military Computer Security Policies","authors":"D. Clark, D. Wilson","doi":"10.1109/SP.1987.10001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.1987.10001","url":null,"abstract":"Most discussions of computer security focus on control of disclosure. In Particular, the U.S. Department of Defense has developed a set of criteria for computer mechanisms to provide control of classified information. However, for that core of data processing concerned with business operation and control of assets, the primary security concern is data integrity. This paper presents a policy for data integrity based on commercial data processing practices, and compares the mechanisms needed for this policy with the mechanisms needed to enforce the lattice model for information security. We argue that a lattice model is not sufficient to characterize integrity policies, and that distinct mechanisms are needed to Control disclosure and to provide integrity.","PeriodicalId":123213,"journal":{"name":"1987 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1987-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116674984","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1338
A Multilevel Relational Data Model 多层关系数据模型
1987 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Pub Date : 1987-04-27 DOI: 10.1109/SP.1987.10023
D. Denning, T. Lunt, R. Schell, M. Heckman, W. Shockley
{"title":"A Multilevel Relational Data Model","authors":"D. Denning, T. Lunt, R. Schell, M. Heckman, W. Shockley","doi":"10.1109/SP.1987.10023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.1987.10023","url":null,"abstract":"A multilevel relational data model that meets the basic operational requirements for a multilevel database system is described. The model is an extension of the standard relational model, and consists of multilevel relations, which contain classification attributes as well as data attributes; multilevel relational integrity rules, which extend the integrity constraints of the relational model in order to pro vide consistency for data at different access classes, including data that becomes \"polyinstantiated,\" a decomposition method for mapping all multilevel real relations into standard (single-level) base relations; and multilevel relational operators, which perform the functions of their counterparts in the standard relational model, while also labeling derived tuples with access classes. The model is defined in terms of the standard relational model, but lends itself to a design and implementation that offers a high level of assurance for mandatory security.","PeriodicalId":123213,"journal":{"name":"1987 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1987-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114912411","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 202
A Formal Method for the Identification of Covert Storage Channels in Source Code 一种识别隐蔽存储信道的形式化方法
1987 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Pub Date : 1987-04-27 DOI: 10.1109/SP.1987.10014
Chii-Ren Tsai, V. Gligor, C. Chandersekaran
{"title":"A Formal Method for the Identification of Covert Storage Channels in Source Code","authors":"Chii-Ren Tsai, V. Gligor, C. Chandersekaran","doi":"10.1109/SP.1987.10014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.1987.10014","url":null,"abstract":"A formal method for the identification of covert storage channels is presented and its application to the source code of the Secure Xenix* kernel is illustrated. The method is based on the identification of all visible/alterable kernel variables by using information flow analysis of language code (e.g., C language code). The method also requires that, after the sharing relationships among the kernel primitives and the visible/ alterable variables are determined, the non-discretionary access rules implemented by each primitive be applied to identify the covert storage channels. The method can be generalized to other implementation languages, and has the following advantages: (1) it leads to the discovery of all storage channels in kernel implementations, (2) it helps determine whether the non-discretionary access rules are implemented correctly, and (3) it can be automated. An additional important aspect of applying this method to a kernel interface is the discovery of all kernel variables that are modified directly or indirectly through that interface. The analysis of the modification scenarios provides the necessary conditions for all kernel penetration. This implies that, in any kernel that enforces both a non-discretionary security and an integrity policy, penetration instances are the dual of covert storage channels instances.","PeriodicalId":123213,"journal":{"name":"1987 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1987-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128681588","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 62
ABYSS: ATrusted Architecture for Software Protection 深渊:软件保护的可信架构
1987 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Pub Date : 1987-04-27 DOI: 10.1109/SP.1987.10021
Steve R. White, L. Comerford
{"title":"ABYSS: ATrusted Architecture for Software Protection","authors":"Steve R. White, L. Comerford","doi":"10.1109/SP.1987.10021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.1987.10021","url":null,"abstract":"ABYSS (A Basic Yorktown Security System) is an architecture for the trusted execution of application software. It supports a uniform security service across the. range of computing systems. The use of ABYSS discussed in this paper is oriented towards solving the software protection problem, especially in the lower end of the market. Both current and planned software distribution channels are supportable by the architecture, and the system is nearly transparent to legitimate users. A novel use-once authorization mechanism, called a token, is introduced as a solution to the problem of providing authorizations without direct communication. Software vendors may use the system to obtain technical enforcement of virtually any terms and conditions of the sale of their software, including such things as rental software. Software may be transferred between systems, and backed up to guard against loss in case of failure. We discuss the problem of protecting software on these systems, and offer guidelines to its solution. ABYSS is shown to be a general security base, in which many security applications may execute.","PeriodicalId":123213,"journal":{"name":"1987 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1987-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130300956","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 61
Visa Scheme for Inter-Organization Network Security 组织间网络安全签证计划
1987 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Pub Date : 1987-04-27 DOI: 10.1109/SP.1987.10002
D. Estrin, G. Tsudik
{"title":"Visa Scheme for Inter-Organization Network Security","authors":"D. Estrin, G. Tsudik","doi":"10.1109/SP.1987.10002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.1987.10002","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we describe a visa scheme for implementing access control in Inter-Organization Network (ION) gateways. The purpose of the scheme is to allow an organization to modify and trust only them internal system that require ION access all other internal system can not communicate with the outside. Control is distributed among the ION participants so that each may make its own design tradeoffs between performance and trust.","PeriodicalId":123213,"journal":{"name":"1987 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1987-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117250723","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 19
Checking Classification Constraints for Consistency and Completeness 检查分类约束的一致性和完整性
1987 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Pub Date : 1987-04-27 DOI: 10.1109/SP.1987.10000
S. Akl, D. Denning
{"title":"Checking Classification Constraints for Consistency and Completeness","authors":"S. Akl, D. Denning","doi":"10.1109/SP.1987.10000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.1987.10000","url":null,"abstract":"Classification constraints are rules for assigning access classes to data when they are entered into a database. In order that a given set of constraints specify meaningful classes, they should be consistent, that is, not define conflicting classes for the same data; and complete, that is, assign a class to all data. This paper gives algorithms for checking the consistency and completeness of a set of classification constraints defined on a database schema. The techniques use computational geometry to compute intersecting regions in a multidimensional space, where each region is defined by a classification constraint or integrity constraint.","PeriodicalId":123213,"journal":{"name":"1987 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1987-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127214235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 21
Reasoning About Security Models 关于安全模型的推理
1987 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Pub Date : 1987-04-27 DOI: 10.1109/SP.1987.10020
J. McLean
{"title":"Reasoning About Security Models","authors":"J. McLean","doi":"10.1109/SP.1987.10020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.1987.10020","url":null,"abstract":"A method for evaluating security models is developed and applied to the model of Bell and LaPadula. The method shows the inadequacy of the Bell and LaPadula model, in particular, and the impossibility of any adequate definition of a secure system based solely on the notion of a secure state. The implications for the fruitfulness of seeking a global definition of a secure system and for the state of foundational research in computer security, in general, is discussed.","PeriodicalId":123213,"journal":{"name":"1987 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"25 32","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1987-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120836154","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 95
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