{"title":"Extra-Margins in ACM's Adjusted NMa ‘Mortgage-Rate-Calculation Method’","authors":"M. Dijkstra, M. Schinkel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2298567","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2298567","url":null,"abstract":"We analyse the development since 2004 of our concept of extra-margins on Dutch mortgages (Dijkstra & Schinkel, 2012), based on funding cost estimations in ACM (2013), which are an update of those in NMa (2011). Neither costs related to increased mortgage-specific risks, nor the inclusion of Basel III related recapitalization costs completely explain the high margins on mortgages in the Netherlands. Extra-margins are lower on average than the 0.66 percentage points found using the method of Dijkstra & Schinkel (2012), but are still substantial at 0.38 on average over the period May 2009 to May 2013. A remarkable pattern remains, in which the extra-margin decreased during the NMa’s initial investigation, yet rose sharply again just after the NMa published its conclusion that margins had gone back to normal again. In the past 10 months, the ACM-adjusted extra-margins have reached even higher levels. It is at 0.96 percentage points on average in May 2013, the latest published observation by DNB to date. Margins on mortgages in the Netherlands appear to have remained high, especially since 2012, even when controlled for costs of Basel III and increases in credit risk.","PeriodicalId":122974,"journal":{"name":"Amsterdam Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114974504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Loss Sharing between Non-Negligent Parties","authors":"G. Dari‐Mattiacci, B. Lovat, F. Parisi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1853423","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1853423","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we study the effects and desirability of legal rules that allow the sharing of an accident loss between a non-negligent injurer and his non-negligent victim. In order to identify the virtues and limits of loss-sharing rules, we begin by considering the effect of a loss-sharing regime on parties' incentives. We address an unresolved issue in the literature, exploring whether loss-sharing in equilibrium undermines the parties' primary care incentives. We establish the conditions under which loss-sharing may be desirable and characterize the regime providing the best overall incentives to minimize the social cost of accidents. Our results indicate that loss-sharing may indeed be desirable in a vast range of situations. The results are later extended to consider the effect of parties' uncertainty in a loss-sharing regime and reveal that loss-sharing may at the same time be desirable and unnecessary in real-life accident law.","PeriodicalId":122974,"journal":{"name":"Amsterdam Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series","volume":"239 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133635649","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}