{"title":"Pay-to-Playlist: The Commerce of Music Streaming","authors":"Christopher Buccafusco, Kristelia A. García","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3793043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3793043","url":null,"abstract":"Payola—sometimes referred to as “pay-for-play”—is the undisclosed payment, or acceptance of payment, in cash or in kind, for promotion of a song, album, or artist. Some form of pay-for-play has existed in the music industry since the 19th century. Most prominently, the term has been used to refer to the practice of record labels paying radio DJs to play certain songs in order to boost their popularity and sales. Since the middle of the 20th century, the FCC has regulated this behavior—ostensibly because of its propensity to harm consumers and competition—by requiring that broadcasters disclose such payments. \u0000 \u0000As streaming music platforms continue to siphon off listeners from analog radio, a new form of payola has emerged. In this new streaming payola, record labels, artists, and managers simply shift their payments from radio to streaming music platforms like Spotify, YouTube, TikTok, and Instagram. Instead of going to DJs, payments go to playlisters or to influencers who can help promote a song by directing audiences toward it. Because online platforms do not fall under the FCC’s jurisdiction, streaming pay-for-play is not currently regulated at the federal level, although some of it may be subject to state advertising disclosure laws. \u0000 \u0000In this Article, we describe the history and regulation of traditional forms of pay-for-play, and explain how streaming practices differ. Our account is based, in substantive part, on a novel series of qualitative interviews with music industry professionals. Our analysis finds the normative case for regulating streaming payola lacking: contrary to conventional wisdom, we show that streaming pay-for-play, whether disclosed or not, likely causes little to no harm to consumers, and it may even help independent artists gain access to a broader audience. Given this state of affairs, regulators should proceed with caution to preserve the potential advantages afforded by streaming payola and to avoid further exacerbating extant inequalities in the music industry.","PeriodicalId":117169,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Advertising (Sub-Topic)","volume":"355 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126690412","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Online Platforms and Digital Advertising Market Study: Observations on the Statement of Scope","authors":"D. Geradin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3537856","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3537856","url":null,"abstract":"I appreciate the opportunity to submit observations on the Statement of Scope (“SOS”) of the Market Study on “Online Platforms and Digital Advertising”. This Market Study is welcome given the importance of digital advertising for online content providers (which I will refer to as “publishers”), as well as the complexity and opacity of digital advertising markets. My research reveals that these markets do not function properly. They are ridden with conflicts of interest, leveraging practices, and their lack of competitiveness allows online platforms to generate supra-competitive rents to the detriment of advertisers, publishers and, ultimately, consumers. Investment in ad tech (i.e., the technologies developed and used by intermediaries between advertisers and publishers) has considerably declined. <br><br>My observations are based on several recent research papers I have authored or co-authored on digital advertising, with a focus on online display advertising, and on the competitive relationship between online platforms and news publishers. They are also informed by earlier papers I wrote on two-sided markets, intermediation platforms, big data, and business models based on the offering of “free” services, which are monetized by selling advertising. The law and economics of online platforms has been one of my main areas of focus in the past decade.","PeriodicalId":117169,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Advertising (Sub-Topic)","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127016393","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Differential Effects of Privacy Protections and Digital Ad Taxes on Publisher and Advertiser Profitability","authors":"Priyanka Sharma, Yidan Sun, Liad Wagman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3503065","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3503065","url":null,"abstract":"We model an asymmetric ad-network duopoly with heterogeneous publishers and advertisers to assess the effects of data and tracking restrictions on profits. Publishers and advertisers vary in their sizes and preferences towards the two ad networks, and networks differ in terms of the revenues they can deliver to publishers and advertisers. We show that new restrictions that hamper networks' ability to deliver revenues lead to the highest percentage profit declines for small publishers and small advertisers, particularly those who contract with the lower-revenue ad network. We demonstrate that our findings are robust to regulations that differentially impact ad networks and to other market settings.","PeriodicalId":117169,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Advertising (Sub-Topic)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128856056","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Duty to Read the Unreadable","authors":"Uri Benoliel, Shmuel I. Becher","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3313837","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3313837","url":null,"abstract":"The duty to read doctrine is a well-recognized building block of U.S. contract law. Under this doctrine, contracting parties are held responsible for the written terms of their contract, whether or not they actually read them. The application of the duty to read is especially interesting in the context of consumer contracts, which consumers generally do not read. Under U.S. law, courts routinely impose this doctrine on consumers. However, the application of this doctrine to consumer contracts is unilateral. While consumers are expected and presumed to read their contracts, suppliers are generally not required to offer readable contracts. This asymmetry creates a serious public policy challenge. Put simply, consumers might be expected to read contracts that are, in fact, rather unreadable. This, in turn, undermines market efficiency and raises fairness concerns. Many scholars have suggested that consumer contracts are indeed written in a way that dissuades consumers from reading them. This Article aims to empirically test whether this concern is justified. The Article focuses on the readability of an important and prevalent type of consumer agreement: the sign-in-wrap contract. Such contracts, which have already been the focal point of many legal battles, are routinely accepted by consumers when signing up for popular websites such as Facebook, Amazon, Uber, and Airbnb. The Article applies well-established linguistic readability tests to the 500 most popular websites in the U.S. that use sign-in-wrap agreements. The results of this Article indicate, inter alia, that the average readability level of these agreements is comparable to the usual score of articles in academic journals, which typically do not target the general public. These disturbing empirical findings hence have significant implications on the design of consumer contract law.","PeriodicalId":117169,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Advertising (Sub-Topic)","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116781227","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Dawn of the Big Data Monopolists","authors":"A. Miller","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2911567","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2911567","url":null,"abstract":"There is a sea change in regulators’ approach to competition and big data. In the past, competition regulators tended to dismiss Big Data as a competitive concern, generally believing Big Data uses to be irrelevant or pro-competitive in digital markets. But in recent years that attitude is changing, and regulators are becoming increasingly concerned over the possible anticompetitive conduct by internet industry leaders from their control over massive amounts of user data and are starting to take action.","PeriodicalId":117169,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Advertising (Sub-Topic)","volume":"220 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132405274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Myth of Free","authors":"J. Newman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2827277","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2827277","url":null,"abstract":"Can today's \"smartest businesses\" really profit by giving away their products for free? The digital revolution brought with it a flood of innovative new products, many of them supposedly offered to consumers free of charge. Silicon Valley emphasizes this dynamic wherever possible, with slogans like \"It's free and always will be\" and \"Listen to free music you love.\"Tech analysts, economists, and legal scholars have created an origin story -- a myth -- meant to explain how these products became \"free\". Once digitization and networking converged (we are told), the marginal costs of production and distribution fell to zero. And, propelled by the magic of market competition, prices soon followed.But that myth is fatally flawed. This Article is the first to formalize and debunk the Myth of Free. The task is urgent: in cases ranging from contract disputes to privacy and antitrust litigation, courts and law-enforcement agencies have already begun to give favorable treatment to firms that purport to offer \"free\" products. By revising Free's origin story, this Article aims to prevent further harm to consumer welfare and the rule of law.","PeriodicalId":117169,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Advertising (Sub-Topic)","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121359828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"False Advertising","authors":"Andrew Rhodes, Chris M. Wilson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2716692","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2716692","url":null,"abstract":"There is widespread evidence that some firms use false advertising to overstate the value of their products. We consider a model in which a policymaker is able to punish such false claims. We characterize an equilibrium where false advertising actively influences rational buyers, and analyze the effects of policy under different welfare objectives. We establish precise conditions where policy optimally permits a positive level of false advertising, and show how these conditions vary intuitively with demand and market parameters. We also consider the implications for product investment and industry self-regulation, and connect our results to the literature on demand curvature.","PeriodicalId":117169,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Advertising (Sub-Topic)","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115177932","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ambush Marketing: A Threat for Sponsors","authors":"Sankalp Jain","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2801655","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2801655","url":null,"abstract":"Ambush marketing is a means of getting the maximum bang for the buck while stealing some of a rival’s thunder. As the costs of becoming official sponsors of a major sports event have mushroomed in recent years, sponsors increasingly have to deal with what has become known as ambush marketing. Ambush marketing as a concept first came to light at the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics. Those Games, which generated a surplus of some US$250 million, were deemed an overwhelming success. They were the first to be funded entirely privately. Prior to this any number of sponsors were allowed to tie themselves to the Olympics on an ‘official’ basis. In 1976, Montreal Olympics there were 628 ‘official’ sponsors.","PeriodicalId":117169,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Advertising (Sub-Topic)","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121488598","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
F. Provost, B. Dalessandro, Rod Hook, Xiaohan Zhang, Alan Murray
{"title":"Audience selection for on-line brand advertising: privacy-friendly social network targeting","authors":"F. Provost, B. Dalessandro, Rod Hook, Xiaohan Zhang, Alan Murray","doi":"10.1145/1557019.1557098","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1557019.1557098","url":null,"abstract":"This paper describes and evaluates privacy-friendly methods for extracting quasi-social networks from browser behavior on user-generated content sites, for the purpose of finding good audiences for brand advertising (as opposed to click maximizing, for example). Targeting social-network neighbors resonates well with advertisers, and on-line browsing behavior data counterintuitively can allow the identification of good audiences anonymously. Besides being one of the first papers to our knowledge on data mining for on-line brand advertising, this paper makes several important contributions. We introduce a framework for evaluating brand audiences, in analogy to predictive-modeling holdout evaluation. We introduce methods for extracting quasi-social networks from data on visitations to social networking pages, without collecting any information on the identities of the browsers or the content of the social-network pages. We introduce measures of brand proximity in the network, and show that audiences with high brand proximity indeed show substantially higher brand affinity. Finally, we provide evidence that the quasi-social network embeds a true social network, which along with results from social theory offers one explanation for the increase in brand affinity of the selected audiences.","PeriodicalId":117169,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Advertising (Sub-Topic)","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130567385","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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