Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Free Will and Responsibility最新文献

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“It was all a cruel angel’s thesis from the start”: Folk intuitions about Zygote cases do not support the Zygote argument “这一切从一开始就是一个残酷的天使的论点”:民间对受精卵案例的直觉并不支持受精卵的论点
Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Free Will and Responsibility Pub Date : 2021-11-15 DOI: 10.31234/osf.io/tq4k2
Florian Cova
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引用次数: 1
Direct and derivative moral responsibility: An overlooked distinction in experimental philosophy 直接和衍生的道德责任:实验哲学中被忽视的区别
Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Free Will and Responsibility Pub Date : 2020-03-18 DOI: 10.31234/osf.io/bz38e
P. Willemsen
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引用次数: 1
The Blame Efficiency Hypothesis: An Evolutionary Framework to Resolve Rationalist and Intuitionist Theories of Moral Condemnation 责任效率假说:解决理性主义和直觉主义道德谴责理论的进化框架
Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Free Will and Responsibility Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.5040/9781350188112.ch-002
Cory J. Clark
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引用次数: 2
Victim Omissions: How Doing Nothing Affects Judgments of Cause and Blame 受害者的疏忽:什么都不做如何影响因果判断
Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Free Will and Responsibility Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.5040/9781350188112.ch-009
Laura Niemi, P. Henne
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引用次数: 0
Moral Responsibility without (Some Kinds of) Freedom 没有(某些)自由的道德责任
Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Free Will and Responsibility Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.5040/9781350188112.ch-005
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
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引用次数: 0
Folk Jurisprudence and Judgments about Free Will and Responsibility 民间法理学与自由意志与责任判断
Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Free Will and Responsibility Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.5040/9781350188112.ch-006
Thomas Nadelhoffer, A. Monroe
{"title":"Folk Jurisprudence and Judgments about Free Will and Responsibility","authors":"Thomas Nadelhoffer, A. Monroe","doi":"10.5040/9781350188112.ch-006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350188112.ch-006","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":113652,"journal":{"name":"Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Free Will and Responsibility","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123652421","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Experimental Philosophy of Free Will and Moral Responsibility: An Introduction 自由意志与道德责任的实验哲学导论
Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Free Will and Responsibility Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.5040/9781350188112.ch-00i
Thomas Nadelhoffer, A. Monroe
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引用次数: 0
Free Will and Skilled Decision Theory 自由意志和熟练决策理论
Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Free Will and Responsibility Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.5040/9781350188112.ch-010
Adam Feltz, Braden Tanner, Gwen Hoang, Jenna Holt, Asif Muhammad
{"title":"Free Will and Skilled Decision Theory","authors":"Adam Feltz, Braden Tanner, Gwen Hoang, Jenna Holt, Asif Muhammad","doi":"10.5040/9781350188112.ch-010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350188112.ch-010","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":113652,"journal":{"name":"Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Free Will and Responsibility","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132645223","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Mental State Control and Responsibility 精神状态控制与责任
Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Free Will and Responsibility Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.5040/9781350188112.ch-003
Corey J. Cusimano, Geoffrey P. Goodwin
{"title":"Mental State Control and Responsibility","authors":"Corey J. Cusimano, Geoffrey P. Goodwin","doi":"10.5040/9781350188112.ch-003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350188112.ch-003","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":113652,"journal":{"name":"Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Free Will and Responsibility","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116875328","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Belief in Free Will Relates to Attributions of Intentionality and Judgments of Responsibility 自由意志信仰与意向性归因和责任判断有关
Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Free Will and Responsibility Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.5040/9781350188112.ch-001
O. Genschow, M. Brass
{"title":"Belief in Free Will Relates to Attributions of Intentionality and Judgments of Responsibility","authors":"O. Genschow, M. Brass","doi":"10.5040/9781350188112.ch-001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350188112.ch-001","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":113652,"journal":{"name":"Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Free Will and Responsibility","volume":"120 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114983671","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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