{"title":"Characterizing distribution rules for cost sharing games","authors":"R. Gopalakrishnan, Jason R. Marden, A. Wierman","doi":"10.7907/AWE2-H976.","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7907/AWE2-H976.","url":null,"abstract":"We consider the problem of designing the distribution rule used to share “welfare” (cost or revenue) among individually strategic agents. There are many distribution rules known to guarantee the existence of a (pure Nash) equilibrium in this setting, e.g., the Shapley value and its weighted variants; however a characterization of the space of distribution rules that yield the existence of a Nash equilibrium is unknown. Our work provides a step towards such a characterization. We prove that when the welfare function is strictly submodular, a budget-balanced distribution rule guarantees equilibrium existence for all games (i.e., all possible sets of resources, agent action sets, etc.) if and only if it is a weighted Shapley value.","PeriodicalId":112856,"journal":{"name":"International Conference on NETwork Games, Control and Optimization (NetGCooP 2011)","volume":"68 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120918060","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}