Proceedings of the 15th Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security最新文献

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Automatic Discovery and Synthesis of Checksum Algorithms from Binary Data Samples 从二进制数据样本中自动发现和合成校验和算法
Lauren Labell, Jared Chandler, Kathleen Fisher
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引用次数: 0
Short Paper: Modular Black-box Runtime Verification of Security Protocols 短文:安全协议的模块化黑盒运行时验证
Kevin Morio, Dennis Jackson, Marco Vassena, R. Künnemann
{"title":"Short Paper: Modular Black-box Runtime Verification of Security Protocols","authors":"Kevin Morio, Dennis Jackson, Marco Vassena, R. Künnemann","doi":"10.1145/3411506.3417596","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3411506.3417596","url":null,"abstract":"Verification techniques have been applied to the design of secure protocols for decades. However, relatively few efforts have been made to ensure that verified designs are also implemented securely. Static code verification techniques offer one way to bridge the verification gap between design and implementation, but require substantial expertise and manual labor to realize in practice. In this short paper, we propose black-box runtime verification as an alternative approach to extend the security guarantees of protocol designs to their implementations. Instead of instrumenting the complete protocol implementation, our approach only requires instrumenting common cryptographic libraries and network interfaces with a runtime monitor that is automatically synthesized from the protocol specification. This lightweight technique allows the effort for instrumentation to be shared among different protocols and ensures security with presumably minimal performance overhead.","PeriodicalId":110751,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 15th Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security","volume":"93 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117002893","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
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