The Last Card最新文献_第2页

Introduction: The American Occupation Of Iraq By 2006 And The Search For A New Strategy Timothy Andrews Sayle And Hal Brands 《2006年美国占领伊拉克和寻找新战略》蒂莫西·安德鲁斯·塞尔和哈尔·布兰兹著

The Last Card Pub Date : 2019-09-15 DOI: 10.7591/9781501715204-002

T. Sayle, H. Brands

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Frontmatter

The Last Card Pub Date : 2019-09-15 DOI: 10.1515/9781501715204-fm

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Together Forward? 在一起?

The Last Card Pub Date : 2019-09-15 DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501715181.003.0004

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Silos and Stovepipes 筒仓和烟囱

The Last Card Pub Date : 2019-09-15 DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501715181.003.0005

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The Bush Administration’s Decision to Surge in Iraq 布什政府向伊拉克增兵的决定

The Last Card Pub Date : 2019-09-15 DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501715181.003.0016

R. Immerman

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Contributors 贡献者

The Last Card Pub Date : 2019-09-15 DOI: 10.1515/9781501715204-023

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16. The President As Policy Entrepreneur: George W. Bush And The 2006 Iraq Strategy Review 16. 作为政策企业家的总统:乔治·w·布什和2006年伊拉克战略评估

The Last Card Pub Date : 2019-09-15 DOI: 10.7591/9781501715204-018

C. Dueck

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Index 指数

The Last Card Pub Date : 2019-09-15 DOI: 10.7591/9781501715204-024

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What Kind of Surge? 什么样的激增?

The Last Card Pub Date : 2019-09-15 DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501715181.003.0009

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This Strategy Is Not Working 这种策略行不通

The Last Card Pub Date : 2019-09-15 DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501715181.003.0003

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