Comparative Political Economy: Social Welfare Policy eJournal最新文献

{"title":"Designing Unemployment Insurance Systems in Developing Countries: Moral Hazard vs Liquidity Constraints in Chile","authors":"K. Sehnbruch","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3607058","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3607058","url":null,"abstract":"One of the most complex social policy issues that developing countries commonly face is the question of how they can protect the unemployed. However, the analysis of unemployment insurance (UI) in developing economies with large informal sectors is in its infancy, with few papers providing solid empirical evidence. This paper makes several contributions to the development literature: first, it applies Chetty’s 2008 landmark work on UI to a developing country (Chile) and shows that the moral hazard effects expected by policy makers, who designed the system are minimal, while liquidity effects were entirely neglected. By means of an RDD, it analyses the Chilean UI system using a large sample of administrative data, which allows for an extremely precise analysis of how the system is working, thus providing invaluable empirical lessons for other developing countries. <br><br>Second, this paper shows that it is not enough merely to quantify an effect such as moral hazard, but to understand its causes and implications. An extended unemployment period stemming from moral hazard has extremely different welfare implications than one stemming from a liquidity effect and should therefore result in different policy recommendations. <br><br>Third, our results also highlight that the Chilean UI system is regressive overall, as it protects workers with higher income levels and more stable jobs much more than it protects vulnerable workers, who are also much more likely to become unemployed. <br><br>Fourth, this paper shows that it is essential that developing countries should take into account the specific labor market and macroeconomic context when designing social policies as the incentives embedded in such a policy may not be enough to compensate for the limitations that arise from the structure of a labor market.<br><br>This research thus has implications for many developing countries, which may also be considering the implementation of some form of UI and/or the partial or complete replacement of existing severance pay legislation with continuous contributions to individual savings accounts, as recommended by the international development institutions. Furthermore, even high-income developing countries, such as Chile, cannot rely on unemployment insurance alone when it comes to protecting workers from the fallout of an economic crisis or rapid changes in the labor market that generate unemployment. Any UI system must also be linked to other social protection mechanisms to provide complimentary benefits to workers with precarious jobs.<br>","PeriodicalId":10619,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Social Welfare Policy eJournal","volume":"147 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76694368","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Relaxing Household Liquidity Constraints through Social Security","authors":"S. Catherine, Max Miller, Natasha Sarin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3593054","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3593054","url":null,"abstract":"More than a quarter of working-age households in the United States do not have sufficient savings to cover their expenditures after a month of unemployment. Recent proposals suggest giving workers early access to a small portion of their future Social Security benefits to finance their consumption during the COVID-19 pandemic. We empirically analyze their impact. Relying on data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, we build a measure of households' expected time to cash shortfall based on the incidence of COVID-induced unemployment. We show that access to 1% of future benefits allows 75% of households to maintain their current consumption for three months in case of unemployment. We then compare the efficacy of access to Social Security benefits to already legislated approaches, including early access to retirement accounts, stimulus relief checks, and expanded unemployment insurance.","PeriodicalId":10619,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Social Welfare Policy eJournal","volume":"31 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76149291","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Unemployment Insurance, Recalls and Experience Rating","authors":"Julien Albertini, Xavier Fairise, Anthony Terriau","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3589296","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3589296","url":null,"abstract":"In the US, almost half of unemployment spells end through recall. In this paper, we show that the probability of being recalled is much higher among unemployment benefit recipients than nonrecipients. We argue that a large part of the observed difference in recall shares is accounted for by the design of the unemployment insurance financing scheme characterized by an experience rating system. We develop a search and matching model with different unemployment insurance status, endogenous separations, recalls and new hires. We quantify what would have been the labor market under alternative financing scheme. In the absence of the experience rating, the hiring and separations would have been higher in the long run and more volatile. Experience rating system contributes significantly to the difference in recalls between the recipients and the nonrecipients.","PeriodicalId":10619,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Social Welfare Policy eJournal","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89116415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Long-term Outlook for the German Statutory Pension System","authors":"Matthias Schön","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3581216","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3581216","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents long term projections of the German pension system that are based on a general equilibrium model with overlapping generations (OLG). This framework takes into account the two way feedback of both micro and macroeconomic relationships, meaning that households, for example, react to changes in the statutory pension system, such as the retirement age or the replacement rate. Changes in households' behaviour, in turn, impact on macroeconomic developments and public finances. One approach to parametrically reform the pension system would be linking (indexing) the retirement age systematically to increasing life expectancy. The model shows that the resulting increase in employment would also bolster social security contributions and taxes. Moreover, with a rising retirement age and the associated longer periods of work, pension entitlements would increase.","PeriodicalId":10619,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Social Welfare Policy eJournal","volume":"33 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74305007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Rationality Test in the Housing Market: Project-level Evidence from China","authors":"Yifan Chen, Jianhua Gang, Zongxin Qian, Jinfan Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3090129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3090129","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the rationality of the residential housing market. We adopt a proprietary dataset covering China’s first-tier cities from 2009 to 2016 that consists of project-level rents and repeated selling prices and identify investors’ “underreaction” phenomenon to the cash flow news. With the benefit of this project-level dataset, we demonstrate that research in this field suffers serious aggregation bias for omitting the heterogeneity in dynamic interactions among micro- and macro-level variables. Aggregation leads to a wrong conclusion that investors’ reaction to cash flow news is nearly rational or they slightly overreact. We therefore argue that research on the pricing behavior in the residential housing market has to be conducted at a disaggregated level.","PeriodicalId":10619,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Social Welfare Policy eJournal","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82228014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Is the Social Safety Net a Long-Term Investment? Large-Scale Evidence from the Food Stamps Program","authors":"M. Bailey, H. Hoynes, Maya Rossin-Slater, Reed Walker","doi":"10.3386/w26942","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w26942","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We use novel, large-scale data on 17.5 million Americans to study how a policy-driven increase in economic resources affects children's long-term outcomes. Using the 2000 Census and 2001–13 American Community Survey linked to the Social Security Administration's NUMIDENT, we leverage the county-level rollout of the Food Stamps program between 1961 and 1975. We find that children with access to greater economic resources before age five have better outcomes as adults. The treatment-on-the-treated effects show a 6% of a standard deviation improvement in human capital, 3% of a standard deviation increase in economic self-sufficiency, 8% of a standard deviation increase in the quality of neighbourhood of residence, a 1.2-year increase in life expectancy, and a 0.5 percentage-point decrease in likelihood of being incarcerated. These estimates suggest that Food Stamps’ transfer of resources to families is a highly cost-effective investment in young children, yielding a marginal value of public funds of approximately sixty-two.","PeriodicalId":10619,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Social Welfare Policy eJournal","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78105927","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Post-Coronavirus World: 7 Points of Discussion for a New Political Economy","authors":"Usman W. Chohan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3557738","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3557738","url":null,"abstract":"The Coronavirus outbreak of 2019-20 has left governments, markets, and civil society reeling through disruptions and damage that shall heal at differing intervals and to differing degrees around the world. The post-Coronavirus economy and polity may, however, be designed and structured based on lessons drawn from the outbreak, as well as on international reactions to the hardships that ensued in its wake. This paper raises 7 points of discussion for international policymakers as the outbreak subsides, aiming to generate a debate around greater post-corona value creation for the public.","PeriodicalId":10619,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Social Welfare Policy eJournal","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88657479","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Can Big Data Cure Risk Selection in Healthcare Capitation Programs? A Game Theoretical Analysis","authors":"Zhaowei She, T. Ayer, Daniel Montanera","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3556992","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3556992","url":null,"abstract":"Early empirical evidence indicates that Medicare Advantage (MA), the largest capitation payment program in the U.S. healthcare market, unintentionally incentivizes health plans to cherry pick profitable patient types, which is referred to as \"risk selection\". Motivated by this observation, we study the root causes of risk selection in the MA market design and potential strategies to eliminate risk selection. The existing literature primarily attributes the observed risk selection in MA market to data limitations and low explanatory power (e.g. low R^2) of the current risk adjustment design in the MA market. With the availability of big data and advancements in machine learning (ML) techniques, risk selection due to imperfect risk adjustment is expected to gradually disappear from the MA market. However, our study shows that big data and ML alone cannot cure risk selection in the MA capitation program. More specifically, we show that even if the current MA risk adjustment design becomes informationally perfect (e.g. R^2=1) through availability of big data and advanced ML algorithms, health plans still have incentives to conduct risk selection through strategically subsidizing some subgroups of patients using capitation payments collected from other subgroups, which we call \"risk selection induced by cross subsidization\". Furthermore, we develop and present selection-proof capitation mechanisms to eliminate this type of risk selection behavior from the MA market. Our findings further indicate that through some small modifications to the existing Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) mechanism, risk selection of this kind could be eliminated from the MA market.","PeriodicalId":10619,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Social Welfare Policy eJournal","volume":"95 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80498043","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Opposisjonsstyre: Stortingsvedtak Om Styrkingen Av Ideelle Virksomheter I Velferdssamfunnet (Opposition Rule: Parliament Decisions on the Strengthening of Non-Profit Organizations in the Welfare Society)","authors":"Hans Morten Haugen","doi":"10.18261/issn.2464-3076-2020-01-02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18261/issn.2464-3076-2020-01-02","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Norwegian abstract:</b> Norges to minoritetsregjeringer i perioden 2013–2019 har blitt utfordret av opposisjonen innenfor velferdstjenester og anbud, men kritikken har ikke vært rettet mot ideelle aktører. Ti anmodningsvedtak i perioden 2016–2018 er fattet i Stortinget for å styrke ideelle aktører, og regjeringspartiene har støttet fem av disse. Regjeringen har også blitt mer proaktiv, blant annet gjennom forslag om forskrift for anbud kun for ideelle organisasjoner. Samtlige partier har etterlyst et måltall og en plan for å øke de ideelles andel av de samlede helse- og omsorgstjenestene. Artikkelen foreslår to nye begreper for å beskrive hvordan opposisjonsstyre kan utøves: påleggende, der regjeringen presses av opposisjonen til å treffe nye tiltak, og påvirkende, der regjeringen endrer forståelse av og prioriteringer innenfor et sakskompleks.<br><br><b>English abstract:</b> Norway’s two minority governments from 2013–2019 have been challenged by the opposition in the field of welfare services and tenders, but the criticism has not been directed towards non-profit organizations. Ten decisions by the Storting were made in 2016–2018 based on opposition proposals, to strengthen non-profit actors, and the government parties have voted for five of these. The government has also become more proactive, inter alia by proposing a regulation that allows reserving tenders for non-profit organizations. All parties called for a target and a plan to increase the non-profit organizations’ share of the total health and care services. The article proposes two new concepts to describe how opposition rule is exercised: imposing – where the government is pressured by the opposition to take new measures – and influencing – where the government changes understanding and priorities within a case complex.","PeriodicalId":10619,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Social Welfare Policy eJournal","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83593059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"HUD Section 811 PRA Project Rental Assistance Program Phase II Evaluation Final Report Implementation and Short-Term Outcomes","authors":"Melisa Vandawalker, Ian Bruenig, Samuel R. Dastrup, Sara Galantowicz, Gretchen Locke, A. Nichols","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3615819","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3615819","url":null,"abstract":"The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)’s Section 811 Project Rental Assistance (PRA) Program provides rental housing assistance to nonelderly people with disabilities. In this second phase of its evaluation of the PRA program, HUD sought to determine the impact of the program on residents’ housing tenancy and use of home and community-based services, characteristics of properties and neighborhoods where assisted residents live, and residents’ healthcare diagnoses and utilization. In order to assess the program’s effectiveness, the study compared short-term outcomes of the PRA program against outcomes for residents in the Section 811 Capital Advance/Project Rental Assistance Contract program (referred to as PRAC in this report), outcomes for people with disabilities in other HUD rental assistance programs, and outcomes for a group of similar people who receive Medicaid but are not assisted by HUD programs.<br><br>The evaluation found that the PRA program assists people who are different from people with disabilities in HUD’s other housing assistance programs in their demographic characteristics, the types and sizes of properties they live in, and the characteristics of the neighborhoods where they live. PRA residents have lower incomes, have more chronic and disabling conditions, and are more likely to have had long-term stays in inpatient settings. Looking at early outcomes for a sample of units in just six states, both housing unit and neighborhood quality are lower for PRA units than for PRAC units. PRA units have greater access to public transportation and are in neighborhoods with greater walkability, but PRA residents do not feel as safe in their neighborhoods.","PeriodicalId":10619,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Social Welfare Policy eJournal","volume":"143 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78280549","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}