{"title":"Does Foreign Direct Investment Lead to Industrial Agglomeration?","authors":"Wen-Tai Hsu, Yi Lu, Xuan Luo, Lianming Zhu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3361487","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3361487","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on industrial agglomeration. Using the differential effects of FDI deregulation in 2002 in China on different industries, we find that FDI actually affects industrial agglomeration negatively. This result is somewhat counter-intuitive, as the conventional wisdom tends to suggest that FDI attracts domestic firms to cluster for various agglomeration benefits, in particular technology spillovers. To reconcile our empirical findings and the conventional wisdom, we develop a theory of FDI and agglomeration based on two counter-veiling forces. Technology diffusion from FDI attracts domestic firms to cluster, but fiercer competition drives firms away. Which force dominates depends on the scale of the economy. When the economy is sufficiently large, FDI discourages agglomeration. We find various evidence on this competition mechanism.","PeriodicalId":104715,"journal":{"name":"INSEAD: Economics & Political Science (Topic)","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132986446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Explaining Growth Differences Across Firms: The Interplay between Innovation and Management Practices","authors":"Livio Romano","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3109411","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3109411","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides first empirical evidence of the joint effects that innovation strategies and human resource management practices exert on firm growth. By exploiting unique information from a large sample of Italian manufacturing companies in the very recent years, it shows that investing in technology and implementing performance-based pay policies are both positively associated with a significant turnover, employment and labor productivity growth premium. However, their joint adoption does not necessarily sum the two effects. In particular, performance-based rewards boost growth of non-innovators and of firms pursuing relatively simple innovation strategies, centered around the acquisition of embodied technology. For firms strongly relying on R&D as an additional lever for product and process upgrading, the estimated effect of having in place monetary incentive mechanisms is null or even negative.","PeriodicalId":104715,"journal":{"name":"INSEAD: Economics & Political Science (Topic)","volume":"197 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133626783","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Return to Political Power in a Low Corruption Environment","authors":"M. Amore, Morten Bennedsen, K. Nielsen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2666087","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2666087","url":null,"abstract":"We use exogenous changes in the size of local municipalities in Denmark to estimate the effect of political power on the income of politicians and their family members. We exploit two dimensions of political power: heterogeneity in politicians’ roles within a given district, and exogenous increases in political power as proxied by population and budget size. Our difference-in-differences results indicate that an increase in political power has: 1) an economically small but statistically significant effect on the income of re-elected politicians; 2) an economically larger effect on income of influential politicians such as coalition party leaders and mayors; and 3) an economically large effect on politicians’ offspring. We estimate a positive and significant elasticity of income to political power, which spans from 3 percent for re-elected candidates to 14 percent for mayors. To control for differential changes in electoral competition, we instrument the likelihood of re-election with average party votes in other municipalities and in national elections. We conclude that, even in a low-corruption environment, there is an economically relevant return to political power — beyond the return to office holding — which mostly benefits influential politicians and their offspring.","PeriodicalId":104715,"journal":{"name":"INSEAD: Economics & Political Science (Topic)","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116005918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Apportionment Behind the Veil of Ignorance","authors":"Junichiro Wada","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2672305","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2672305","url":null,"abstract":"To bring apportionment closer to quotas or the apportionment quotient closer to the population quotient, instead of using “distance,” we introduce f-divergence for utilitarianism and Bregman divergence for suitable optimization. Even in our relaxed condition, we find that we must use alpha-divergence for optimization and show that the minimization of alpha-divergence induces the same divisor methods that correspond to the Kolm-Atkinson social welfare function, which is bounded by constant relative risk aversion.","PeriodicalId":104715,"journal":{"name":"INSEAD: Economics & Political Science (Topic)","volume":"73 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127281068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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