{"title":"Legitimacy After Violence: Evidence from Two Lab-in-the-Field Experiments in Liberia","authors":"R. Blair","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2326671","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2326671","url":null,"abstract":"Despite its importance to both the theory and practice of statebuilding, legitimacy remains notoriously difficult to measure. I posit conditions under which legitimacy is distinguishable from other forms of political suasion and control, then develop two lab-in-the-field experiments to isolate those conditions in Liberia, one of the world’s weakest states. I show that when a legitimate authority instructs them to do so, citizens will make costly contributions to a public good even in the absence of sanctions or rewards, and even when they know others will not do the same. I also show that the de-legitimizing consequences of abuse of power are more severe for “alien” authorities (like United Nations peacekeepers) than for their “native” counterparts. Finally, I show that exposure to violence is associated with higher rates of compliance with authority, but that the strength of the relationship varies by authority and by type of violence.","PeriodicalId":102498,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Studies eJournal","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128458183","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Erik O. Kimbrough, Jared Rubin, Roman M. Sheremeta, Timothy W. Shields
{"title":"Commitment Problems in Conflict Resolution","authors":"Erik O. Kimbrough, Jared Rubin, Roman M. Sheremeta, Timothy W. Shields","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2251525","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2251525","url":null,"abstract":"Commitment problems are inherent to non-binding conflict resolution mechanisms, since an unsatisfied party can ignore the resolution and initiate conflict. We provide experimental evidence suggesting that even in the absence of binding contractual agreements individuals often avoid conflict by committing to the outcome of a conflict resolution mechanism. Commitment problems are mitigated to a greater extent for groups that opt-in to the conflict resolution mechanism, but only when opting-in is costly. Although conflict rates are higher when opting-in is costly than when it is free or exogenously imposed, commitment problems are greatly reduced among those groups who choose to opt-in.","PeriodicalId":102498,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Studies eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129814921","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"International Crime and Punishment: The Gap Through Which to Drive a Mafia","authors":"W. McCormack","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2199639","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2199639","url":null,"abstract":"International crimes against the person are now widely recognized but lacking any cohesive enforcement. Universal principles of human dignity make it easy enough to define behaviors as illegal. What is much more difficult is finding the means and resources to deploy enforcement mechanisms. The lack of enforcement opens the path to enormously powerful and wealthy criminal organizations as well as to the unsophisticated jihadist. Mass atrocities, terrorism, slavery, and piracy may be linked in a number of ways. Terrorist tactics can be used to enslave a population, and enslaved populations can be trained in the ways of terrorism. In the modern world, human trafficking may provide both funds and camouflage for terrorist organizations. Both are linked in organized crime along with drug trafficking and piracy. Despite universal revulsion toward slavery, there are many forms of forced labor still in practice with no supra-national enforcement whatsoever. Similarly, terrorism is now subject to almost universal condemnation but virtually no transnational enforcement mechanisms. We may not see an effective international police force within my lifetime, but surely the increasing pressure for international cooperation in these arenas ultimately must lead to an effective law enforcement response. Perhaps not in my lifetime, but someday there must be an enforcement mechanism to match the world’s norms.","PeriodicalId":102498,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Studies eJournal","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121556233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Cost of a Revolution","authors":"Mohammad R. Jahan-Parvar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2144857","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2144857","url":null,"abstract":"I attempt to quantify the economic opportunity cost of 1979 Iranian revolution and the subsequent policies adopted by the Islamic Republic for the average Iranian citizen.Based on the difference between the actual outcomes of Iranian economy in 1979-2010 period against a set of carefully chosen counterfactuals, I construct a measure for cumulative opportunity cost/gain. Some of these counterfactual scenarios are based on the performance of the Iranian economy over the pre-revolution years, while others are based on the actual performance of economies of Iran’s regional neighbors. My results indicate a substantial opportunity cost in the form of loss in per capita real GDP ranging between 50% to 25% of annual income.","PeriodicalId":102498,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Studies eJournal","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122995637","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Armed Conflict, Household Victimization, and Child Health in Cote d'Ivoire","authors":"Camelia Minoiu, Olga N. Shemyakina","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1978334","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1978334","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the causal impact of the 2002–2007 civil conflict in Cote d'Ivoire on children's health using household surveys collected before, during, and after the conflict, and information on the exact location and date of conflict events. Our identification strategy relies on exploiting both temporal and spatial variation across birth cohorts to measure children's exposure to the conflict. We find that children from regions more affected by the conflict suffered significant health setbacks compared with children from less affected regions. We further examine possible war impact mechanisms using rich survey data on households' experience of war. Our results suggest that conflict-related household victimization, and in particular economic losses, is an important channel through which armed conflict negatively impacts child health.","PeriodicalId":102498,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Studies eJournal","volume":"127 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122460251","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Schelling, von Neumann, and the Event that Didn't Occur","authors":"A. Field","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1095946","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1095946","url":null,"abstract":"Thomas Schelling was recognized by the Nobel Prize committee as a pioneer in the application of game theory and rational choice analysis to problems of politics and international relations. However, although he makes frequent references in his writings to this approach, his main explorations and insights depend upon and require acknowledgment of its limitations. One of his principal concerns was how a country could engage in successful deterrence. If the behavioral assumptions that commonly underpin game theory are taken seriously and applied consistently, however, nuclear adversaries are almost certain to engage in devastating conflict, as John von Neumann forcefully asserted. The history of the last half century falsified von Neumann’s prediction, and the “event that didn’t occur” formed the subject of Schelling’s Nobel lecture. The answer to the question “why?” is the central concern of this paper.","PeriodicalId":102498,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Studies eJournal","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122223313","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Proposal for Regional Governance in Sri Lanka","authors":"Jude Sooriyajeevan","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2339861","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2339861","url":null,"abstract":"China has selectively devolved administrative responsibilities to Hong Kong and Macau while remaining as a unitary country. This is a suitable model for Sri Lanka. Based on this Chinese system, this document describes a political infrastructure, an approach to evolve that infrastructure, and solutions provided by this infrastructure for existing contentious issues.","PeriodicalId":102498,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Studies eJournal","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131712725","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Metanegotiation Support System: Supporting Protocol Search between Rival Agents","authors":"Fabian Lang, M. Klein","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2325640","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2325640","url":null,"abstract":"Designing successful negotiation protocols for particular negotiation scenarios is a very challenging task. Negotiations not only have to cope with strategic behavior by the negotiators but also with restricted and false centrally available information. Recent research covers this design problem and proposes a variety of potential procedures. However, there is no single protocol that is the answer to everything. Furthermore, the protocol choice can have a significant influence on the outcome of the negotiation. Since there is no benevolent mechanism designer in real-worlds applications, the negotiators have to find an agreement on the rules of encounter on their own. In consequence of self-interest, the protocol search constitutes a negotiation problem in itself. This paper introduces and discusses the problem of metanegotiation. A metanegotiation represents a higher-level negotiation for a protocol which is used for an underlying lower-level negotiation. To support the parties in finding adequate protocols, we present an architecture for a metanegotiation support system (MNSS). The MNSS comprises different tools such as logs, repositories, or analytical tools that can also serve as a stand-alone decision support system for the agents. The framework features ex ante and live support, protocol selection and generation, and different learning approaches. Moreover, we develop preliminary classifications for negotiation scenarios as well as protocol rule categories and show how related tools from literature can be integrated in the system. Finally, we give an overview on how we intend to approach the presented problem in future work.","PeriodicalId":102498,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Studies eJournal","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114327646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Strengthening the Enforcement of CSR through Mediation and Conflict Resolution by National Contact Points: Finding a New Balance between Hard Law and Soft Law","authors":"K. Sørensen, Birgitte Egelund Olsen","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2269555","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2269555","url":null,"abstract":"Since 2000, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (the Guidelines) have required OECD Members to establish national contact points (NCPs) to promote the effective implementation of the Guidelines. The aim of this article is to examine the role of the NCPs in implementing the Guidelines, including how the influence of the NCPs may change the nature of the Guidelines from being purely voluntary to become more in the nature of binding requirements. The examination focuses on the NCPs in Denmark, Norway and the United Kingdom. It is concluded that the way in which the NCPs operate, including the extensive right to refer complaints to them, the broad scope of the recommendations in the Guidelines and especially the use of naming and shaming in cases of breaches of the Guidelines, has changed the original character of the Guidelines as a purely soft law instrument. Furthermore, it is shown that the use of very broad and vague terminology in the Guidelines makes it very difficult for enterprises to comply with them. This is further complicated by the fact that many of the terms, which lay down when the NCPs have jurisdiction, are not clearly defined or explained. The three NCPs examined have implemented the Guidelines very differently. In particular the Danish NCP stands out. It has a jurisdiction which in many respects goes far beyond that envisioned in the Guidelines. This may put in question the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Danish NCP, but at the same time it can also be viewed as an interesting innovation which may provide useful lessons for other NCPs and their approaches to implementing the Guidelines.","PeriodicalId":102498,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Studies eJournal","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122478810","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Disciplinary Power and the UN Security Council Counter Terrorism Committee","authors":"I. Roele","doi":"10.1093/JCSL/KRT018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JCSL/KRT018","url":null,"abstract":"The UN Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) exercises soft rather than hard power to change states’ behaviour through monitoring and capacity-building activities. Through the lens of Michel Foucault’s disciplinary power, these activities are reconceived as practices of surveillance and correction that aim at the normalization of states according to model dictated by the efficacy of the collective security system. While the processes of normalization rely on the consent and cooperation of states, and therefore are difficult to characterize as repressive, they nevertheless involve complex power relations, which deserve the attention and scrutiny of international lawyers. The CTC has prided itself on its guiding principles of even-handedness, transparency and cooperation, but the disciplinary lens reveals practices of ranking, lack of accountability and a residual willingness to resort to coercion where the self-corrective ideal fails that call into question the effectiveness of these principles in guiding the CTC’s work.","PeriodicalId":102498,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Studies eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126320441","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}