The International Journal of Accounting最新文献

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IASB Corner IASB角落
The International Journal of Accounting Pub Date : 2017-03-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.intacc.2017.01.010
Paul Pacter
{"title":"IASB Corner","authors":"Paul Pacter","doi":"10.1016/j.intacc.2017.01.010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intacc.2017.01.010","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":101232,"journal":{"name":"The International Journal of Accounting","volume":"52 1","pages":"Pages 77-91"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.intacc.2017.01.010","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91755106","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Public Disclosure of Audit Fees and Bargaining Power between the Client and Auditor: Evidence from China 审计费用的公开披露与委托人与审计师的议价能力——来自中国的证据☆
The International Journal of Accounting Pub Date : 2017-03-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.intacc.2017.01.001
Xijia Su , Xi Wu
{"title":"Public Disclosure of Audit Fees and Bargaining Power between the Client and Auditor: Evidence from China","authors":"Xijia Su ,&nbsp;Xi Wu","doi":"10.1016/j.intacc.2017.01.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.intacc.2017.01.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Before the public disclosure of audit fees was mandated, it was unlikely for an audit client to have accurate information about how much other companies were charged by their auditors. Public fee disclosure decreases the cost of auditees' access to audit fee information for the auditor's portfolio of clients and is thus likely to increase the relative bargaining power of auditees over auditors when they negotiate audit fees. Using both proprietary and public audit fee data before and after public fee disclosure was mandated in China, we provide evidence consistent with the preceding conjecture. We find that public fee disclosure reinforces the magnitude of audit fee decreases for overcharged clients and weakens auditors' ability to raise audit fees for undercharged clients. These findings suggest the existence of unintended consequences of public fee disclosure regulation, the original rationale of which was a concern about audit pricing practices that could undermine auditor independence.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":101232,"journal":{"name":"The International Journal of Accounting","volume":"52 1","pages":"Pages 64-76"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.intacc.2017.01.001","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42263418","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 12
《公司治理问题》,D. Larcker, B. Tayan, Pearson Education, Inc. (2016), (US$ 69.99, ISBN: 978-0-13-403156-9 xix + 441 pp)
The International Journal of Accounting Pub Date : 2016-12-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.intacc.2016.10.006
Gunther Friedl, Julian Ludat
{"title":"","authors":"Gunther Friedl,&nbsp;Julian Ludat","doi":"10.1016/j.intacc.2016.10.006","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.intacc.2016.10.006","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":101232,"journal":{"name":"The International Journal of Accounting","volume":"51 4","pages":"Pages 540-541"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.intacc.2016.10.006","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"54429156","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
《法医会计》,全球版,R.J.Rufus,L.S.Miller,B.Hahn。Pearson,Harlow/英国(2016),(432页,59.99英镑,ISBN-13:9781292059372,电子书全球版,ISBN-13:9781292071442)
The International Journal of Accounting Pub Date : 2016-12-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.intacc.2016.10.005
Gerrit Sarens
{"title":"","authors":"Gerrit Sarens","doi":"10.1016/j.intacc.2016.10.005","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.intacc.2016.10.005","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":101232,"journal":{"name":"The International Journal of Accounting","volume":"51 4","pages":"Pages 538-539"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.intacc.2016.10.005","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"54429151","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Segment Disclosure Quantity and Quality under IFRS 8: Determinants and the Effect on Financial Analysts' Earnings Forecast Errors 国际财务报告准则第8号下分部披露的数量和质量:财务分析师盈余预测误差的决定因素和影响
The International Journal of Accounting Pub Date : 2016-12-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.intacc.2016.10.008
Paul André , Andrei Filip , Rucsandra Moldovan
{"title":"Segment Disclosure Quantity and Quality under IFRS 8: Determinants and the Effect on Financial Analysts' Earnings Forecast Errors","authors":"Paul André ,&nbsp;Andrei Filip ,&nbsp;Rucsandra Moldovan","doi":"10.1016/j.intacc.2016.10.008","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.intacc.2016.10.008","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Focusing on segment disclosures under the management approach, we investigate managers' choices with respect to both segment reporting quantity and quality and the usefulness of these two characteristics for financial analysts. We measure quantity as the number of segment-level line items and quality as the cross-segment variation in profitability—arguing that more managerial discretion can be exercised over quality than over quantity. We find that managers solve proprietary concerns either by deviating from the suggested line-item disclosure in the standard, or, if following standard guidance, by decreasing segment reporting quality. Moreover, financial analysts do not always understand the quality of segment disclosures, suggesting that a business-model type of standard creates difficulties even for sophisticated users. Our results inform standard setters as they start working on a disclosure framework and as they consider the business model approach to financial reporting.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":101232,"journal":{"name":"The International Journal of Accounting","volume":"51 4","pages":"Pages 443-461"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.intacc.2016.10.008","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"54429430","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 31
Management Forecasts, Idiosyncratic Risk, and the Information Environment 管理预测、特质风险与资讯环境
The International Journal of Accounting Pub Date : 2016-12-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.intacc.2016.10.002
Norio Kitagawa , Shin’ya Okuda
{"title":"Management Forecasts, Idiosyncratic Risk, and the Information Environment","authors":"Norio Kitagawa ,&nbsp;Shin’ya Okuda","doi":"10.1016/j.intacc.2016.10.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.intacc.2016.10.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Management forecasts are an important source of information for the Japanese stock market. In this paper, we use management forecast error as a proxy for disclosure quality to investigate the relationship between disclosure quality and idiosyncratic risk. We find that management forecast error is positively related to idiosyncratic risk, suggesting that high-quality public information reduces idiosyncratic risk. Furthermore, we present evidence that management forecast error is less positively related to idiosyncratic risk in relatively good information environments.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":101232,"journal":{"name":"The International Journal of Accounting","volume":"51 4","pages":"Pages 487-503"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.intacc.2016.10.002","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"54429139","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 16
Ruling Family Political Connections and Risk Reporting: Evidence from the GCC 执政家族的政治关系和风险报告:来自海湾合作委员会的证据
The International Journal of Accounting Pub Date : 2016-12-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.intacc.2016.10.004
Ahmed Al-Hadi , Grantley Taylor , Khamis Hamed Al-Yahyaee
{"title":"Ruling Family Political Connections and Risk Reporting: Evidence from the GCC","authors":"Ahmed Al-Hadi ,&nbsp;Grantley Taylor ,&nbsp;Khamis Hamed Al-Yahyaee","doi":"10.1016/j.intacc.2016.10.004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.intacc.2016.10.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This study examines whether the presence of ruling family members on boards of directors influences the extent and the quality of risk reporting. Based on a sample of publicly listed financial firms of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries between 2007 and 2011, our regression results show that ruling family board members reduce the quality and extent of risk disclosures. Firms with ruling family board members also disclose significantly less during periods of financial distress and when they are subject to higher levels of risk. We find that risk reporting is negatively associated with the existence of a ruling family director acting as the board chairperson, negatively associated with increasing proportions of ruling family directors on the board, and negatively associated with increasing numbers of board members who are connected to ruling family directors. Our results suggest that politically connected directors seize private benefits at the expense of their firms' shareholders. Our regression results hold after a series of robustness checks that control for endogeneity and for alternative measures of ruling family membership.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":101232,"journal":{"name":"The International Journal of Accounting","volume":"51 4","pages":"Pages 504-524"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.intacc.2016.10.004","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"54429145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 46
Discussion of Segment Disclosure Quantity and Quality under IFRS 8: Determinants and the Effect of Financial Analysts' Earnings Forecast Errors 国际财务报告准则第8号下分部信息披露的数量和质量探讨:财务分析师盈余预测误差的决定因素和影响
The International Journal of Accounting Pub Date : 2016-12-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.intacc.2016.10.007
Giorgio Gotti
{"title":"Discussion of Segment Disclosure Quantity and Quality under IFRS 8: Determinants and the Effect of Financial Analysts' Earnings Forecast Errors","authors":"Giorgio Gotti","doi":"10.1016/j.intacc.2016.10.007","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.intacc.2016.10.007","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Andre, Filip, and Modovan (2016) explores the characteristics—quality and quantity—of segment disclosures under IFRS 8 and their usefulness to financial analysts in accurately estimating earnings per share (EPS). The authors measure quantity of disclosures as the number of segment-level line items disclosed in financial statements and quality as the cross-segment variation in profitability. The results provide evidence that managers solve the issue of proprietary costs by decreasing either the quantity of disclosure below the level of standards' guidance or the quality of disclosures on operating segments, thus reducing the overall information included in disclosures. Results also show that it is difficult even for a sophisticated group of financial statement users such as financial analysts to fully understand the quality of segment disclosures and that too much disclosure quantity might create a “foggy” environment, where even sophisticated investors can have troubles using disclosed information to forecast earnings.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":101232,"journal":{"name":"The International Journal of Accounting","volume":"51 4","pages":"Pages 462-463"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.intacc.2016.10.007","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"54429166","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Environmental Incentives for and Usefulness of Textual Risk Reporting: Evidence from Germany 文本风险报告的环境激励和有用性:来自德国的证据
The International Journal of Accounting Pub Date : 2016-12-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.intacc.2016.10.001
Tamer Elshandidy , Philip J. Shrives
{"title":"Environmental Incentives for and Usefulness of Textual Risk Reporting: Evidence from Germany","authors":"Tamer Elshandidy ,&nbsp;Philip J. Shrives","doi":"10.1016/j.intacc.2016.10.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.intacc.2016.10.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Drawing on distinct German institutional characteristics related to cultural, legal, financial, and regulatory features, this paper investigates the extent to which environmental incentives influence German non-financial firms in revealing risk information in their annual report narratives. The paper also examines whether risk-related disclosure (aggregate risk reporting and the tone of news about risk) is useful by investigating its impact on market liquidity and investor-perceived risk. We find that the decision to provide or withhold such risk information is less likely to be significantly associated with environmental incentives. Among those incentives, we find that German firms are significantly influenced by their underlying risks rather than other factors including ownership structure, capital structure, external equity finance, and borrowing. The decision to disclose is likely to be influenced by the size of the firm and whether or not it produces lengthy annual reports. The results also suggest that the impact of aggregate risk reporting levels was not observable until a distinction was made between bad and good news about risk. Specifically, we find that the German market tends to positively (negatively) price good (bad) news about risk by either improving (worsening) market liquidity through removing (creating) information asymmetries, or reducing (increasing) investor-perceived risk.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":101232,"journal":{"name":"The International Journal of Accounting","volume":"51 4","pages":"Pages 464-486"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.intacc.2016.10.001","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127959276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 66
IASB Corner IASB角落
The International Journal of Accounting Pub Date : 2016-12-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.intacc.2016.10.003
Paul Pacter
{"title":"IASB Corner","authors":"Paul Pacter","doi":"10.1016/j.intacc.2016.10.003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intacc.2016.10.003","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":101232,"journal":{"name":"The International Journal of Accounting","volume":"51 4","pages":"Pages 525-536"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.intacc.2016.10.003","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136936940","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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