Mississippi law journal最新文献

{"title":"The Half-Virtuous Integrity of Atticus Finch","authors":"Andrew B. Ayers","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2735054","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2735054","url":null,"abstract":"Atticus Finch has two kinds of integrity, but only one of them is genuinely admirable. On one hand, he is rightly admired for standing up for the things he values. On the other hand, he is also praised for being “the same in his house as he is on the public streets.” But we shouldn’t praise him for this. Atticus has achieved a kind of harmony between his identity as a lawyer and other identities like parent, neighbor, citizen, and moral person. This is a good thing for him, but it isn’t morally admirable. In fact, integrating one’s identities can sometimes make it harder to act virtuously. For example, the way that Atticus organizes his identities around his commitment to the justice system prevents him from noticing his only chance to save Tom Robinson’s life. \"To Kill a Mockingbird\" shows that it is sometimes better to have tension in our identities. Far from presenting Atticus as the sole paradigm of ethical goodness, it shows other characters who are admirable because they are not like Atticus at all. The identities of characters like Calpurnia, Maudie, and Scout others are conflicted or divided, and these tensions allow them to be admirable in ways that Atticus is not. They can cross social boundaries, subvert their own social roles, and radically criticize their community precisely because their identities are fragmented or in flux. This should be inspiring to lawyers, and to the legal ethicists who have long worried that lawyers’ roles will cause schisms in their identities. Sometimes tension in the self is exactly what we need to be good.","PeriodicalId":82024,"journal":{"name":"Mississippi law journal","volume":"86 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68279696","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Rebuilding Schools, Rebuilding Communities: The Civic Role of Mississippi's Public Schools after Hurricane Katrina","authors":"Kristine Bowman","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1135309","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1135309","url":null,"abstract":"When public elementary and secondary schools in the six Mississippi Gulf Coast-area counties opened in August 2006, they enrolled 92% of the number of students they had before Hurricane Katrina made landfall just one year earlier. The one-year return rate in Mississippi's Gulf Coast public schools varied among districts depending on the extent of damage, but was nearly double that in New Orleans. Some lessons from Mississippi school districts-yes, from schools in a state known for having one of the most quantitatively weak public school systems in the country-can tell us what government did exceptionally well in Katrina's aftermath. This chapter tells the story of those Mississippi school districts. I first set the stage by comparing the coastal Mississippi public schools and the New Orleans public schools before the hurricane and then quantifying the hurricane's immediate damage to schools in both regions. Then, I describe the crucial roles Mississippi schools played in the immediate and short-term recovery efforts in their communities as well as schools' initiatives to address students' mental health needs. Finally, I return to a comparative perspective, quantifying ways in which the two regions' schools have changed in the two years since Katrina.","PeriodicalId":82024,"journal":{"name":"Mississippi law journal","volume":"77 1","pages":"711"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68145826","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Back to the Future: Kyllo, Katz, and Common Law","authors":"D. Sklansky","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.321450","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.321450","url":null,"abstract":"Commissioned in connection with a symposium at the University of Mississippi School of Law on the effect of technology on Fourth Amendment rights, this article assesses the significance of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Kyllo v. United States. The ruling in Kyllo was relatively narrow: police officers need a warrant to aim a thermal imaging device at a house. But the Court's reasoning was expansive. Led by Justice Scalia, the majority took the occasion to set ground rules for determining when any new technology of surveillance constitutes a search and thus must comply with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. In doing so, the Court substantially reinterpreted Katz v. United States and rethought the relationship between the Fourth Amendment and common law, a relationship that over the past decade has come to figure prominently in the Court's approach to the Fourth Amendment. Kyllo can easily be seen as a repudiation of Katz and a continuation of the originalist turn in search-and-seizure law, but that reading is mistaken. In some respects Kyllo is strikingly faithful to Katz. It strongly reaffirms, for example, the Court's holding in Katz that a search requires no trespass or physical intrusion. And the originalism in Kyllo is not the originalism the Court has applied in other recent Fourth Amendment cases. The use of history in Kyllo is looser, and it has a different focus. The Court has shifted its attention, if only temporarily, from the content of eighteenth-century rules of search and seizure to what those rules accomplished. In these respects the methodology of Kyllo itself represents something of a return to the past - albeit to a past more open to the future. If the Court means what it says in Kyllo, the new Fourth Amendment originalism has been modified for the better. Kyllo may also point the way toward a better understanding of Katz, depending on how the Court answers two questions that Kyllo leaves open. The first concerns the measure of Fourth Amendment protection outside the home. Kyllo treats the home as a special place for Fourth Amendment purposes - hardly a novel proposition for the Supreme Court, but one that throws into doubt not only the reasoning of Katz, as it usually has been understood, but also the narrow holding of the case, that electronic surveillance of telephone conversations constitutes a search. The solution lies in recognizing that the Fourth Amendment protects communications as well as places - or, to use a modern metaphor, that virtual places as well as physical places can receive Fourth Amendment protection. The second question Kyllo leaves open is whether devices like thermal images are regulated by the Fourth Amendment only so long as they remain uncommon. The answer should be no, but that defending this answer may require the Court to reconsider certain other features of search-and-seizure law - features that are due for reconsideration in any event.","PeriodicalId":82024,"journal":{"name":"Mississippi law journal","volume":"16 1","pages":"143"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68574860","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Change of Control Board: Federal Preemption of the Law Governing A Target's Directors","authors":"S. Thompson","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.281168","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.281168","url":null,"abstract":"This article sets out a proposed federal uniform standard governing the actions by the board of directors of a publicly held corporation that is the target of a change of control transaction. This proposal would apply in each of the following four merger and acquisition transactions: (1) the acquisition of a target in an arm's length negotiated merger or acquisition; (2) the acquisition of a target in a management buyout; (3) the proposed acquisition of a target in a hostile tender offer; and (4) the acquisition by a target's controlling shareholder of the minority interests in such target in a freezeout merger. Under this proposal, an independent and knowledgeable change of control board would be appointed for the target, and this board would have complete authority over the acquisition process. Because of the board's obvious independence, a uniform governance standard, the business judgment rule, would apply in determining if the board acted properly. Thus, this article proposes that federal law preempt state law rules governing the actions of a publicly held target's board in each of these transactions. However, this is only a default rule because a corporation's shareholders could elect not to have the provision apply or could elect to have it apply only in certain circumstances, such as in a hostile tender offer. The adoption of this provision would enhance the competition for corporate governance rules in change of control transactions. This proposal would replace the four separate governance rules generally applicable to a target's directors under Delaware and other state law in arm's length transactions, management buyouts, tender offers, and freezeouts. This article also rejects the four sets of rules proposed for these transactions in the American Law Institute's PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION. This proposal would also override all state takeover laws, such as control share statutes, business combination statutes and disgorgement statutes, which generally have the purpose or effect of protecting incumbent management. By placing the control of the change of control process in the hands of truly disinterested directors and applying the business judgment rule in all cases in which a change of control board acts, this proposal should cure the problem of unpredictability and vagueness, should result in a substantial decrease in litigation in change of control situations, and should enhance the efficiency of the change of control market.","PeriodicalId":82024,"journal":{"name":"Mississippi law journal","volume":"70 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68343399","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The right to die: death with dignity in America.","authors":"D J Garrow","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82024,"journal":{"name":"Mississippi law journal","volume":"68 2","pages":"407-30"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"22403171","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}