{"title":"The authority and politics of epiphanic experience.","authors":"Matthieu Queloz","doi":"10.1007/s42048-026-00250-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s42048-026-00250-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In <i>Epiphanies: An Ethics of Experience,</i> Sophie Grace Chappell offers a phenomenology of epiphanies-those high points in experience when values most vividly reveal themselves to us. Yet Chappell's method of using phenomenological descriptions to show that we live by our epiphanies leaves open the question of their <i>authority</i>. Why should the epiphanic carry more authority than more sober experiences? The answer, I argue, had better be sensitive to our explanatory understanding of epiphanies. Moreover, it should be sensitive to how the very power of epiphanies threatens to distort our experience of other values. We must beware of what Lichtenberg called <i>transcendent ventriloquism</i>, whereby subjective experience is made to sound like something more than what it is-an eternal truth to be enacted at any cost. I then turn to the <i>politics</i> of epiphanic experience: how to live together given that we live by different epiphanies. I raise several problems for Chappell's proposal that the normativity inherent in conversation both imposes transcendental constraints on epiphanic ethics and is determinate enough to prescribe specific political arrangements. These constraints determine either too little or too much; they come too late not to beg crucial questions; they cannot offer an independent check on epiphanic ethics; and they introduce a tension at the heart of the book between the romantic openness to experience, emotion, and enthusiasm and the rationalist aspiration to exclude non-rational influences. This threatens to cast as an illicit intrusion precisely the experiential dimension that epiphanies were to introduce into the conversation.</p>","PeriodicalId":521128,"journal":{"name":"Zeitschrift fur Ethik und Moralphilosophie = Journal for ethics and moral philosophy","volume":"9 1","pages":"8"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC13661765/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149187644","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Testimonial injustice in the treatment of children's testimonies: inconsiderate and unjust cases.","authors":"Peter Paul Elicor, Bettina Bussmann","doi":"10.1007/s42048-025-00226-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s42048-025-00226-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In this article, we propose a framework for understanding testimonial injustice as it applies to children. Building on the work of Fricker and other scholars in the field, we maintain that age-based discrimination in testimonial exchanges undermines children as knowers, disadvantaging them from being heard and recognized as credible sources of knowledge. To contribute to this discourse, we distinguish <i>inconsiderate</i> and <i>unjust</i> responses to children's testimonies to refine our evaluative categories in protecting children from epistemic harm while also maintaining conceptual clarity. We define inconsiderate treatments as dismissals or disbelief rooted in misguided personal assumptions, conflicting options for action, or unreflected norm conflicts rather than systemic age-based prejudice. Unjust treatments, by contrast, involve similar dismissiveness but are driven by personal bias reinforced by systemic discrimination. Although this distinction also applies to adults, our framework highlights the unique vulnerability of children, whose developmental stage and social status make them particularly susceptible to unintentional disregard and structural injustice. We conclude with a discussion of interpersonal and structural silencing to illustrate how testimonial injustice is committed against children.</p>","PeriodicalId":521128,"journal":{"name":"Zeitschrift fur Ethik und Moralphilosophie = Journal for ethics and moral philosophy","volume":"8 2","pages":"431-447"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12662018/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145650815","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}