发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Disclosure of Product Information After Price Competition 价格竞争后的产品信息披露
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-23 DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2023-0011
Hee Yeul Woo
{"title":"Disclosure of Product Information After Price Competition","authors":"Hee Yeul Woo","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2023-0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2023-0011","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We study under what conditions product information sufficiently unravels in a competitive environment. Information sufficiently unravels if the consumer makes the same purchasing decision as under complete information. The consumer is uncertain about the sellers’ product characteristics while she has private information about her preference for differentiated products. In contrast to the prior literature, we focus on the case where the sellers compete to attract the consumer by disclosing product information only after they set prices for their individual products. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition on the consumer’s relative comparison of one seller’s product to the other’s for every outcome to be sufficient unraveling under comparative and non-comparative advertisements, respectively. We show, by example, that competition may enhance information disclosure only if the consumer has limited reasoning capability.","PeriodicalId":508480,"journal":{"name":"The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":"17 10","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141810396","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Offsetting Distortion Effects of Head Starts on Incentives in Tullock Contests 在图鲁克竞赛中抵消起步阶段对激励机制的扭曲效应
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2024-03-25 DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2024-0006
D. Knyazev, Caspar Moser
{"title":"Offsetting Distortion Effects of Head Starts on Incentives in Tullock Contests","authors":"D. Knyazev, Caspar Moser","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2024-0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2024-0006","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this study, we examine a contest scenario where each player possesses a distinct head start that skews their chances of winning, thereby creating incentive distortions from the efficient level and adversely affecting the contest designer. While affirmative action policies offer a straightforward solution to counteract these distortions, their implementation may not always be viable in real-life applications. We characterize the unique class of non-discriminatory contest success functions (CSF) that enables to achieve an efficient level of effort when there are two players. Additionally, we demonstrate that achieving a symmetric equilibrium is unattainable without affirmative action when the contest involves more than two players.","PeriodicalId":508480,"journal":{"name":"The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":" 22","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140384402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信