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Personal identity and mental time travel 个人身份和心理时空旅行
Philosophy and the mind sciences Pub Date : 2024-06-10 DOI: 10.33735/phimisci.2024.10639
M. Schechtman
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引用次数: 0
Going ballistic: The dynamics of the imagination and the issue of intentionalism 弹道导弹：想象力的动力与意向主义问题
Philosophy and the mind sciences Pub Date : 2024-02-05 DOI: 10.33735/phimisci.2024.10257
Felipe Morales Carbonell
{"title":"Going ballistic: The dynamics of the imagination and the issue of intentionalism","authors":"Felipe Morales Carbonell","doi":"10.33735/phimisci.2024.10257","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2024.10257","url":null,"abstract":"Do we have control over the content of our imaginings? More precisely: do we have control over what our imaginings are about? Intentionalists say yes. Until recently, intentionalism could be taken as the received view. Recently, authors like Munro & Strohminger (2021) have developed some arguments against it. Here, I tentatively join their ranks and develop a new way to think about the way in which imaginings develop their contents that also goes against intentionalism. My proposal makes use of what we may call a ballistic framework for mental dynamics, which I sketch to some length. In this model, imaginings are articulated by ballistic events sensitive to constraints that modify the trajectories that imaginings trace in a special working space. This framework leaves room for alternatives to pre-assigned-content models, such as Kung’s (2016). In the ballistic-based models sketched here, and against intentionalism, imaginings can fail to be about what we intend them to be about. The framework also has applications beyond the intentionalism debate, some of which I will sketch.","PeriodicalId":500426,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy and the mind sciences","volume":"245 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139862365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Going ballistic: The dynamics of the imagination and the issue of intentionalism 弹道导弹：想象力的动力与意向主义问题
Philosophy and the mind sciences Pub Date : 2024-02-05 DOI: 10.33735/phimisci.2024.10257
Felipe Morales Carbonell
{"title":"Going ballistic: The dynamics of the imagination and the issue of intentionalism","authors":"Felipe Morales Carbonell","doi":"10.33735/phimisci.2024.10257","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2024.10257","url":null,"abstract":"Do we have control over the content of our imaginings? More precisely: do we have control over what our imaginings are about? Intentionalists say yes. Until recently, intentionalism could be taken as the received view. Recently, authors like Munro & Strohminger (2021) have developed some arguments against it. Here, I tentatively join their ranks and develop a new way to think about the way in which imaginings develop their contents that also goes against intentionalism. My proposal makes use of what we may call a ballistic framework for mental dynamics, which I sketch to some length. In this model, imaginings are articulated by ballistic events sensitive to constraints that modify the trajectories that imaginings trace in a special working space. This framework leaves room for alternatives to pre-assigned-content models, such as Kung’s (2016). In the ballistic-based models sketched here, and against intentionalism, imaginings can fail to be about what we intend them to be about. The framework also has applications beyond the intentionalism debate, some of which I will sketch.","PeriodicalId":500426,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy and the mind sciences","volume":"35 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139802523","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Remembering religious experience: Reconstruction, reflection, and reliability 记住宗教经历：重建、反思和可靠性
Philosophy and the mind sciences Pub Date : 2024-01-22 DOI: 10.33735/phimisci.2024.10205
Daniel Munro
{"title":"Remembering religious experience: Reconstruction, reflection, and reliability","authors":"Daniel Munro","doi":"10.33735/phimisci.2024.10205","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2024.10205","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000\u0000\u0000This paper explores the relationship between religious belief and religious experience, bringing out a role for episodic memory that has been overlooked in the epistemology of religion. I do so by considering two questions. The first, the “Psychological Question,” asks what psychological role religious experiences play in causally bringing about religious beliefs. The second, the “Reliability Question,” asks: for a given answer to the Psychological Question about how religious beliefs are formed, are those beliefs formed using generally truth-conducive cognitive mechanisms or patterns of reasoning? I argue that the standard way of answering the Psychological Question overlooks the fact that religious beliefs are often formed via reflection on episodic memories of past religious experiences. Furthermore, recognizing this opens up room to make more meaningful progress on answering the Reliability Question.\u0000\u0000\u0000","PeriodicalId":500426,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy and the mind sciences","volume":"24 7","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139607346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Promiscuous Kinds and Individual Minds 滥交种类与个体心理
Philosophy and the mind sciences Pub Date : 2023-10-22 DOI: 10.33735/phimisci.2023.9936
Jennifer Corns
{"title":"Promiscuous Kinds and Individual Minds","authors":"Jennifer Corns","doi":"10.33735/phimisci.2023.9936","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2023.9936","url":null,"abstract":"Promiscuous realism is the thesis that there are many equally legitimate ways of classifying the world’s entities. Advocates of promiscuous realism are typically taken to hold the further the- sis, often undistinguished, that kind terms usefully deployed in scientific generalisations are no more natural than those deployed for any other purposes. Call this further thesis promiscuous nat- uralism. I here defend a version of promiscuous realism which denies promiscuous naturalism. To do so, I introduce the notion of a promiscuous kind: a kind that is maximally usefully referenced in predictive and explanatory generalisations, none of which are scientific generalisations. I first defend the claim that pain is a promiscuous kind before extending these considerations to everyday mental kinds more generally. I draw on further reflections from both everyday life and contem- porary psychology to make credible the novel suggestion that our everyday theory of our minds is for the explanation and prediction of individuals. Combined with the complex idiosyncrasy of individual minds, this suggested aim of everyday theory gives us reason to think that promiscuity is prevalent among everyday mental kinds.","PeriodicalId":500426,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy and the mind sciences","volume":"13 6","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135463078","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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