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Correction to: Politics and gender in the executive suite 更正为行政套间中的政治与性别
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2024-08-09 DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewae020
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引用次数: 0
Money and cooperative federalism: evidence from EPA civil litigation 金钱与合作联邦制：环保局民事诉讼的证据
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2024-07-16 DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewae018
Juan‐Pablo González, H. You
{"title":"Money and cooperative federalism: evidence from EPA civil litigation","authors":"Juan‐Pablo González, H. You","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewae018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewae018","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The federalism structure of the US government requires active cooperation from state governments to successfully enforce federal environmental regulations. What explains the variation in state governments’ participation in lawsuits against firms that are accused of violating major environmental statutes? We argue that firms’ political connections with state politicians affect a state government’s decision to join the litigation process. By constructing a novel dataset on the EPA’s civil cases and settlements for the period 1998–2021, we show that state environmental agencies are less likely to join the EPA in court when the defendant firms contributed to Republican state legislators. We do not find the same pattern when firms have connections with Democratic legislators. We present various mechanisms of how state politicians influence behaviors of state bureaucrats. Our findings highlight how state politics can be an avenue for firms to exert influence on federal environmental regulations.","PeriodicalId":485553,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"22 10","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141644171","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Censorship, industry structure, and creativity: evidence from the Catholic Inquisition in Renaissance Venice 审查、产业结构和创造力：来自文艺复兴时期威尼斯天主教宗教裁判所的证据
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2024-05-22 DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewae015
Stefano Comino, Alberto Galasso, Clara Graziano
{"title":"Censorship, industry structure, and creativity: evidence from the Catholic Inquisition in Renaissance Venice","authors":"Stefano Comino, Alberto Galasso, Clara Graziano","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewae015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewae015","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We examine the effects of the book censorship implemented by the Catholic Inquisition on printing outcomes in Renaissance Venice. We collect detailed information on indexes of prohibited books and publication activities by the main printers active in Venice during the 1500s. We construct treatment and comparison groups based on the specialization of each printer in transgressive publications before the Inquisition. We show that censorship had a significant impact on publication levels and industry structure, with the firms targeted by the Inquisition losing market shares to those less affected by censorship. These effects appear long lasting and associated to changes in survival and entry. We also show that censorship led to a change in the direction of publishing. These findings support the idea that censorship may have dynamic effects on the structure, evolution, and creativity of industries that go beyond the removal of certain types of creative work from the market (JEL O33, N33, L51).","PeriodicalId":485553,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"85 7","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141112114","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Know your rights! A field experiment on legal knowledge, property rights, and investment in Kenya 了解你的权利!在肯尼亚进行的关于法律知识、产权和投资的实地实验
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2023-09-28 DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewad020
Adam Aberra, Matthieu Chemin
{"title":"Know your rights! A field experiment on legal knowledge, property rights, and investment in Kenya","authors":"Adam Aberra, Matthieu Chemin","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewad020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewad020","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Knowledge of the laws is needed for them to have an impact. In this article, we test the effects of disseminating legal knowledge, carefully designed to the particular circumstances of small-scale farmers living with uncertain property rights on their land. We find that greater legal knowledge increases the security of property rights and investment on the land (JEL K4, O1).","PeriodicalId":485553,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135425859","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The evolution of contracting: evidence from the US freight rail industry 承包的演变:来自美国货运铁路行业的证据
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2023-09-28 DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewad022
Jeffrey T Macher, John W Mayo, David E M Sappington
{"title":"The evolution of contracting: evidence from the US freight rail industry","authors":"Jeffrey T Macher, John W Mayo, David E M Sappington","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewad022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewad022","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Although they lie at the very foundation of economic exchange, the primal questions of whether and when economic actors employ contracts and how the propensity to contract evolves over time have received relatively little empirical attention. We address these lacunas using an extensive database of spot market and contract shipments in the US freight rail industry. We find that the evolution of contracting is driven by many factors, including legislative changes, contracting experience, the extent and nature of prevailing competition, transaction complexity, asset specificity, and technological change (JEL L22, L24, L51, L92).","PeriodicalId":485553,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135425721","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Simon says? Equilibrium obedience and the limits of authority 西蒙说吗?平衡服从和权力的限制
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2023-09-28 DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewad026
Heikki Rantakari
{"title":"Simon says? Equilibrium obedience and the limits of authority","authors":"Heikki Rantakari","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewad026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewad026","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Authority, as the right to instruct others and to expect obedience, is often presented as a key mechanism for coordination. But when obedience is voluntary, how is authority sustained and how effective is it in managing behavior? This article examines a repeated game of collaboration with no formal contracting. In equilibrium, the players self-organize either horizontally, with each player evaluating and executing his own task, or vertically, where a single player (“superior”) evaluates both tasks and then instructs the other (“subordinate”) what to do. Interpreting the latter as an authority relationship, obedience is then sustained solely by the value of the relationship. Either arrangement can be optimal. The main advantage of authority arises from the superior’s ability to control the information available to the subordinate, limiting the subordinate’s opportunism, while the main disadvantage of authority arises from the superior’s temptation to abuse the (endogenous) ignorance of the subordinate (JEL D23, D83, L23).","PeriodicalId":485553,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135425724","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Board composition and performance of state-owned enterprises: quasi-experimental evidence 国有企业董事会构成与绩效:准实验证据
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2023-08-22 DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewad014
Audinga Baltrunaite, Mario Cannella, Sauro Mocetti, Giacomo Roma
{"title":"Board composition and performance of state-owned enterprises: quasi-experimental evidence","authors":"Audinga Baltrunaite, Mario Cannella, Sauro Mocetti, Giacomo Roma","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewad014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewad014","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We analyze the impact of board composition on the performance of companies controlled by public entities in Italy, using a reform-induced change. The law’s provisions, aimed at increasing female representation and at reducing the revolving-door phenomenon, were binding for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), but not for companies with a minority share of public ownership, allowing to adopt a difference-in-differences estimation. Results show that female presence on the boards of directors of SOEs increased, while that of former politicians decreased. New directors replaced older and less talented men, thereby rejuvenating the boards and improving their quality. To assess the effects on firm performance, we analyze companies’ balance sheets and survey information on citizens’ satisfaction with the provision of local public services and on objective measures of their quality. While firm productivity remains unaffected, we find that profitability increases and leverage decreases, thereby lowering corporate credit risk, and that SOEs’ output quality improves (JEL G34, L32, H42).","PeriodicalId":485553,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135621251","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Transactional-governance structures:new cross-country data and an application to the effect of uncertainty 交易治理结构:新的跨国数据和对不确定性影响的应用
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Pub Date : 2023-02-16 DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewad002
Peter Murrell, Nona Karalashvili, David C Francis
{"title":"Transactional-governance structures:new cross-country data and an application to the effect of uncertainty","authors":"Peter Murrell, Nona Karalashvili, David C Francis","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewad002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewad002","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract To what extent are personal trust, mutual interests, and third parties important in enforcing agreements to trade? How do firms combine these to form transactional-governance structures? This article answers these questions in a whole-economy, cross-country setting that considers a full spectrum of transactional-governance strategies. The data collection requires a new survey question answerable in any context. The question is applied in six South American countries using representative samples, with the resultant survey weights facilitating a whole-economy analysis. Without imposing an a priori model, latent class analysis estimates meaningful governance structures. Bilateralism is always used. Law is never used alone. Bilateralism and formal institutions are rarely substitutes. Within country, inter-regional variation in governance is greater than inter-country variation. The usefulness of the data is shown by testing one element of Williamson’s discriminating-alignment agenda: greater uncertainty in the transactional environment increases the involvement of third parties.","PeriodicalId":485553,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization","volume":"157 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135473115","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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