{"title":"Goosewolf: An Embedded Intrusion Detection System for Advanced Programmable Logic Controllers","authors":"David Allison, Kieran McLaughlin, Paul Smith","doi":"10.1145/3617692","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3617692","url":null,"abstract":"Critical infrastructures are making increasing use of digital technology for process control. While there are benefits, such as increased efficiency and new functionality, digitalization also introduces the risk of cyber-attacks to systems that support critical functions. A valuable target in these Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) are the Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) controlling the machinery that manage a physical process. PLCs have proven to be vulnerable to a range of cyber-attacks in the past; however, newer technologies such as embedded servers and virtualization have the potential to improve this situation and be used to monitor a PLC’s function. In this article, the implementation of a Host-based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) for a modern PLC is described. This method uniquely makes use of native technologies on the PLC to monitor a dynamic simulated process in real time. Both the PLC’s integrity (checksum, file size, etc.) and the process control are monitored to determine whether the PLC has been compromised in a cyber-attack. The proposed solution detects a range of attacks, even when the PLC’s control logic is compromised, and – unlike previous PLC HIDS methods – requires no modification of the underlying PLC technology.","PeriodicalId":475505,"journal":{"name":"Digital threats","volume":"35 5","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135513519","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Demonstrating Spoofability of an Originating Number when sending an SMS using SMPP","authors":"Akaki Tsunoda","doi":"10.1145/3615667","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3615667","url":null,"abstract":"The short message service (SMS), a service for exchanging texts via mobile networks, has become a universal means of communication. SMS is a mechanism for sending a text message to a specific mobile phone number. Its protocol enables the sender to specify the destination phone number but not the originating number. However, the short message peer-to-peer (SMPP) protocol, which forwards SMS messages, enables the sender to specify the originating number. If the SMPP protocol allows the sender to specify another person’s phone number as the originator, an attacker can use it to send a short message impersonating another person. In this study, short messages were sent from an SMPP gateway service with any phone number specified as the originator, and their delivery to the Japanese mobile network was verified. All the verified mobile network operators (MNOs) were able to spoof the origin to any international phone number, and one MNO was able to spoof it to any national phone number. The results of this study reveal that SMPP can potentially be exploited to spoof the originating number of an SMS. Furthermore, a threat scenario was devised using spoofing and mitigation measures.","PeriodicalId":475505,"journal":{"name":"Digital threats","volume":"225 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136079068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Counter Measures to Combat Money Laundering in the New Digital Age","authors":"Saikiran Subbagari","doi":"10.1145/3626826","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3626826","url":null,"abstract":"Money Laundering has been a significant concern for governments, law enforcement agencies, and financial institutions worldwide. With the advancement of technology, money laundering techniques have evolved in the digital age, presenting new challenges for authorities and financial institutions. Criminals leverage innovative digital platforms, cryptocurrencies, and virtual assets to launder illicit funds while maintaining anonymity and complexity in their transactions. In this article, we examine the money laundering techniques in the digital age and the challenges posed by these techniques, and the implications for the global financial system. Furthermore, the article explores the role of regulatory frameworks, technological solutions, and international cooperation in mitigating the risks associated with digital money laundering. We also explore the countermeasures implemented to detect and prevent these illicit activities. Enhanced Know Your Customer (KYC) regulations, robust transaction monitoring systems, international collaboration, and innovative technologies are among the critical measures to combat digital money laundering.","PeriodicalId":475505,"journal":{"name":"Digital threats","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135096374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Yurong Chen, Yongsheng Mei, Tian Lan, Guru Venkataramani
{"title":"Exploring Effective Fuzzing Strategies to Analyze Communication Protocols","authors":"Yurong Chen, Yongsheng Mei, Tian Lan, Guru Venkataramani","doi":"10.1145/3526088","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3526088","url":null,"abstract":"While coverage-based greybox fuzzing has gained great success in the field of vulnerability detection due to its simplicity and efficiency, it could become less powerful when applied directly to protocol fuzzing due to the unique challenges of protocol fuzzing. In particular, (1) The implementation of protocols usually involves multiple program binaries, i.e., multiple fuzzing entries; (2) The communication among multiple ends contains more than one packet, which are not necessarily dependent upon each other, i.e., fuzzing single (usually the first) packet can only achieve extremely limited code coverage. In this paper, we study such challenges and demonstrate the limitation of current non-stateful greybox fuzzer. In order to achieve higher code coverage, we design and implement a stateful protocol fuzzer, yFuzz , to explore the code related to different protocol states. yFuzz is built on AFL (a mainstream greybox fuzzer), and incorporates a stateful fuzzer (which contains a state switching engine) together with a multi-state forkserver (which enables multi-state program forking) to consistently and flexibly fuzz different states of a compiler-instrumented protocol program. Our experimental results on OpenSSL show that yFuzz improves the code coverage by 73% and increases the number of identified unique crashes by 100% when comparing against AFL fuzzing the first packet during a protocol handshake.","PeriodicalId":475505,"journal":{"name":"Digital threats","volume":"110 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135590322","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Introduction to the IMF 2023 Special Issue","authors":"Andreas Dewald, Thomas Schreck","doi":"10.1145/3626105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3626105","url":null,"abstract":"Special Issue Part 1 (Issue 3) and Part 2 (Issue 4) of AIEDAM are based on a workshop on Learning and Creativity held at the 2002 conference on Artificial Intelligence in Design, AID '02 (www.cad.strath.ac.uk/AID02_workshop/Workshop_webpage.html; Gero, ...","PeriodicalId":475505,"journal":{"name":"Digital threats","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135084510","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Introduction to the Special Issue on Memory-Based Malware and Other Unconventional Threats","authors":"Marcus Botacin, Uriel Kosayev, Ruimin Sun","doi":"10.1145/3627521","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3627521","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":475505,"journal":{"name":"Digital threats","volume":"131 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135085473","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Locally and Structurally Private Graph Neural Networks","authors":"Rucha Bhalchandra Joshi, Subhankar Mishra","doi":"10.1145/3624485","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3624485","url":null,"abstract":"Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) are known to address such tasks over graph-structured data, which is widely used to represent many real-world systems. The collection and analysis of graph data using GNNs raise significant privacy concerns regarding disclosing sensitive information. Existing works in privacy-preserving GNNs ensure the privacy of nodes’ features and labels. However, its structure also needs to be privatized. To address this problem, we provide a method LSPGNN that adds noise to the neighborhood data of the node along with its features and label. Here, we perturb the graph structure by sampling non-neighboring nodes and randomizing them along with the neighborhood. We use differentially private mechanisms to perturb the structure of graphs with theoretical guarantees. This introduces the challenge of reducing the impact of noise in the neighborhood on accuracy. In this view, we use the p -hop neighborhood to compensate for the loss of actual neighbors in randomization. We use the node and label privacy as implemented in the previous methods for privacy in GNNs. We conduct extensive experiments over real-world datasets to show the impact of perturbation on the graph structure. We also perform the theoretical analysis of our proposed method.","PeriodicalId":475505,"journal":{"name":"Digital threats","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135308469","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}