Context Dependence in Language, Action, and Cognition最新文献

Frontmatter

Context Dependence in Language, Action, and Cognition Pub Date : 2021-01-18 DOI: 10.1515/9783110702286-fm

引用次数: 0

Success and Knowledge in Action: Saving Anscombe’s Account of Intentionality 成功和行动中的知识:拯救安斯科姆对意向性的描述

Context Dependence in Language, Action, and Cognition Pub Date : 2021-01-18 DOI: 10.1515/9783110702286-009

Markus Kneer

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引用次数: 2

Indirect Relations and Frames: Coreference in Context 间接关系与框架:语境中的共指

Context Dependence in Language, Action, and Cognition Pub Date : 2021-01-18 DOI: 10.1515/9783110702286-013

Magdalena Zawisławska, Maciej Ogrodniczuk, Michał Szczyszek

引用次数: 0

The Role of Presuppositions and Default Implicatures in Framing Effects 预设与预设意涵在框架效应中的作用

Context Dependence in Language, Action, and Cognition Pub Date : 2021-01-18 DOI: 10.1515/9783110702286-011

María Caamaño-Alegre

引用次数: 0