{"title":"Justice and Egalitarian Relations","authors":"C. Schemmel","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190084240.001.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190084240.001.0001","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter introduces the key features and motivations of liberal relational egalitarianism. It notes that social justice and social equality have mostly been treated as separate values in the history of modern Western political thought, and that contemporary liberal egalitarianism is traditionally thought to require a form of distributive equality. It then argues that weaving social justice and social equality together in an account of relational equality as an urgent and stringent demand of liberal social justice is therefore a novel project worth attempting. It goes on to outline the overall argument of the book and the contribution of each chapter, as well as the different literatures and rival theories it draws on, and concludes by delineating the social scenario it is a theory for: primarily, for a society characterized by a reasonably well-functioning institutional structure capable of organizing social cooperation by enabling and sustaining a complex division of labour.","PeriodicalId":445090,"journal":{"name":"Justice and Egalitarian Relations","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127218902","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Conclusion","authors":"C. Schemmel","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190084240.003.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190084240.003.0010","url":null,"abstract":"The Conclusion briefly recapitulates the main argument of the book, and discusses different possible avenues for challenging it. It also comments on how relational egalitarianism, and liberal relational egalitarianism in particular, can be fruitfully applied to policy and institutional questions beyond the ones addressed in the book, in collaboration with empirical social science, and identifies the questions and issues which have to be central for an extension of the theory to matters of international, transnational, global, and intergenerational justice.","PeriodicalId":445090,"journal":{"name":"Justice and Egalitarian Relations","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132977049","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Distributive Justice","authors":"C. Schemmel","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190084240.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190084240.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter develops the implications of liberal relational egalitarianism for the distribution of goods produced by social cooperation. It shows that there are not only strong instrumental reasons to set stringent limits to inequality of income, wealth, and opportunity, on grounds of both non-domination and social status, but, contrary to what both many critics and proponents of relational equality argue, strong non-instrumental, expressive reasons to do so, as well: since participants in social cooperation are equals, all inequalities in social goods need to be justified by justice-relevant reasons even where they do not lead to domination or social status inequality. Rightly understood, relational egalitarianism thus requires a concentric attack on material inequality in society as well as on its sources in power inequality, through a plurality of rationales.","PeriodicalId":445090,"journal":{"name":"Justice and Egalitarian Relations","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124050195","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Health Inequality","authors":"C. Schemmel","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190084240.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190084240.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter argues that relational egalitarianism has distinctive, and plausible, implications not only for the goods directly produced by social cooperation, but also for health. First, it yields a clear ordering of the injustice of different kinds of health inequalities: inequalities caused by inegalitarian relations which are independently unjust are more unjust than those caused by other social processes, which in turn are more unjust (unless justified according to the model developed in the preceding chapter) than those not so caused. The resulting requirements fit well with important strands in public health research on the social determinants of health. Second, it also justifies the universal provision of healthcare, and relational egalitarians need not, and should not, be committed to prioritizing patients with socially caused health deficiencies at the point of delivery of treatment. There are other, better ways to justly prioritize the fight against such health inequalities.","PeriodicalId":445090,"journal":{"name":"Justice and Egalitarian Relations","volume":"83 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133525870","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Social Status, Self-Respect, and Opportunity","authors":"C. Schemmel","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190084240.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190084240.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter extends the requirements of liberal relational egalitarianism by way of an account of esteem-based norms of social status, analysing three kinds of injustices that such norms can engender or constitute. First, they can enable or aggravate domination. Second, they can harm self-respect. However, a closer analysis of self-respect and its crucial role for individual autonomy reveals that not all inegalitarian status norms can be classified as threats to self-respect without threatening precisely that role. Third, they can be unjust simply by depriving individuals of significant social opportunities, because losing such opportunities due to norm-coordinated, self-sustaining disesteem by others is a threat to one’s equal standing in social cooperation not present when they are foreclosed in other ways. This is an independent rationale for combating these norms which is fully accessible to liberals, and does better at capturing the distinct evil of status hierarchy than rival views.","PeriodicalId":445090,"journal":{"name":"Justice and Egalitarian Relations","volume":"91 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123512592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Liberal Non-Domination","authors":"C. Schemmel","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190084240.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190084240.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter develops the fundamental features of liberal non-domination. It connects the expressive perspective (chapter 2) to a liberal framework for social justice, aiming at fair cooperation between free and equal individuals endowed with two moral powers—sense of justice and capacity for a conception of the good—and derives a conception of non-domination from it. Domination consists of the asymmetrical capacity of one agent to arbitrarily interfere in the choices of another; interference is arbitrary when it is not forced to respect others’ prima facie relevant claims arising out of cooperation. This conception improves upon neo-republican accounts of non-domination by showing that domination is a very important, but not the only, requirement of social justice, and by giving a substantive determination to the claims and choices justice requires it to range over. Concluding critical analyses of Lovett’s, Forst’s, and Pettit’s rival conceptions of just non-domination confirm its advantages.","PeriodicalId":445090,"journal":{"name":"Justice and Egalitarian Relations","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131944179","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Political Equality","authors":"C. Schemmel","doi":"10.4159/harvard.9780674864740.c9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4159/harvard.9780674864740.c9","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter argues that liberal relational egalitarianism requires, for reasons of both non-domination and equal respect for persons’ sense of justice, a demandingly egalitarian conception of rights to political participation, and that this requirement has to enjoy a qualified priority over other requirements of justice. However, it must, in principle, be open to some restriction, should this be strictly necessary to fulfil such other requirements. The chapter goes on to identify the conditions governing the justification of such restrictions and shows that these are likely to permit special institutional practices such as constitutional review, while ruling out ground-level political inequality between citizens, because egalitarian strategies for improving the quality of citizen input will almost always be available. It concludes by showing how Ronald Dworkin’s account of political rights fails to do justice to the expressive value of political equality. This result strengthens the case against distributive egalitarian theories made earlier.","PeriodicalId":445090,"journal":{"name":"Justice and Egalitarian Relations","volume":"93 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126370550","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}