{"title":"Quality of Will and (Some) Unusual Behavior","authors":"Nomy Arpaly","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198868811.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198868811.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter explores how far one can go accounting for the moral responsibility implications of several unusual mental conditions using a parsimonious quality-of-will account that relies on the way we talk about moral responsibility in more mundane situations. By contrasting situations involving epistemic irrationality versus cognitive impairment, it becomes clear that the presence of those often (but not always) excuses actions performed by unusual agents. The discussion turns to situations involving unusual motivational states, which are more problematic for quality-of-will accounts, and sketches a way for quality-of-will accounts to approach them. Of some of these mental conditions, there is no particular reason to think that they excuse, once we ignore whether the condition is currently regarded as a disorder by psychiatrists.","PeriodicalId":443352,"journal":{"name":"Agency in Mental Disorder","volume":"164 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133786300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Mental Disorders Involve Limits on Control, Not Extreme Preferences","authors":"C. Sripada","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198868811.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198868811.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"According to a standard picture of agency, a person’s actions always reflect what they most desire, and many theorists extend this model to mental illness. In this chapter, I pin down exactly where this “volitional” view goes wrong. The key is to recognize that human motivational architecture involves a regulatory control structure: we have both spontaneous states (e.g., automatically-elicited thoughts and action tendencies, etc.) as well as regulatory mechanisms that allow us to suppress or modulate these spontaneous states. Our regulatory abilities, however, are bounded. Mental illnesses, I argue, arise precisely where these bounds are reached, thus allowing inappropriate spontaneous states to regularly manifest in thought and action. I conclude that the volitional view of mental illness is wrong: when a person with mental illness reaches the limits of control, what they do often does not reflect what they most prefer.","PeriodicalId":443352,"journal":{"name":"Agency in Mental Disorder","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130786897","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Taking Control with Mechanisms of Psychotherapy","authors":"R. Waller","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198868811.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198868811.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines the control capacities of individuals with certain mental disorders and how, specifically, their reasons-responsiveness improves with treatment. Successful talk therapy, in particular, can bring individuals with disorders of agency closer to full-blown agency. The discussion focuses, first, on Agoraphobia and Exposure Therapy and, second, on Borderline Personality Disorder and Dialectical Behavior Therapy. We can see effective techniques of talk therapy, such as gradual exposure or radical acceptance exercises, as operating on the ability of patients to respond appropriately to reasons. In this way, reasons-responsiveness is a lens through which to better appreciate the flourishing of patients, via improved control in both moral and nonmoral contexts. The chapter bridges philosophical concepts of reasons-responsiveness with key psychiatric constructs, such as distress tolerance and experiential avoidance.","PeriodicalId":443352,"journal":{"name":"Agency in Mental Disorder","volume":"136 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116391721","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Brain Pathology and Moral Responsibility","authors":"A. Jefferson","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198868811.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198868811.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"Does a diagnosis of brain dysfunction matter for ascriptions of moral responsibility? This chapter argues that, while knowledge of brain pathology can inform judgments of moral responsibility, its evidential value is currently limited for a number of practical and theoretical reasons. These include the problem of establishing causation from correlational data, drawing inferences about individuals from group data, and the reliance of the interpretation of brain findings on well-established psychological findings. Brain disorders sometimes matter for moral responsibility, however, because they change an individual’s moral psychology in a way that is beyond their control. While control over psychological changes is not an excusing factor, brain disorders can mitigate moral responsibility because they confront individuals with new psychological deficits or urges for which their previous moral education and existing external and internal moral resources have not prepared them.","PeriodicalId":443352,"journal":{"name":"Agency in Mental Disorder","volume":"525 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116337394","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Legal Insanity and Moral Knowledge","authors":"K. Sifferd","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198868811.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198868811.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter argues that a successful plea of legal insanity ought to rest upon proof that a criminal act is causally related to symptoms of a mental disorder. Diagnosis of a mental disorder can signal to the court that the defendant had very little control over relevant moral ignorance or incompetence. Must we draw the same conclusion for defendants who lack moral knowledge due to miseducation or other extreme environmental conditions, unrelated to a mental disorder? Adults who were brainwashed as children, for example, might seem “insane” due to their lack of moral knowledge. However, since legal culpability rests on the capacity to understand the criminal law’s moral demands, to reflect on these demands across time, and to control one’s behavior in light of them, simple ignorance of morality’s demands does not excuse.","PeriodicalId":443352,"journal":{"name":"Agency in Mental Disorder","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121672528","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}