{"title":"Knowledge from the Outside","authors":"H. Kornblith","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197609552.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197609552.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"Knowledge may be examined from the third-person perspective, as psychologists and sociologists do, or it may be examined from the first-person perspective, as each of us does when we reflect on what we ought to believe. This chapter takes the third-person perspective. One obvious source of knowledge is perception, and some general features of how our perceptual systems are able to pick up information about the world around us are highlighted. The role of the study of visual illusions in this research is an important focus of the chapter. Our ability to draw out the consequences of things we know by way of inference is another important source of knowledge, and some general features of how inference achieves its successes are discussed. Structural similarities between the ways in which perception works and the ways in which inference works are highlighted.","PeriodicalId":440844,"journal":{"name":"Scientific Epistemology","volume":"140 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123423214","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"From the Individual to the Social","authors":"H. Kornblith","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197609552.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197609552.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter focuses on social factors in cognition. There is a puzzle about the human capacity to reflect on our beliefs. As argued in Chapter 4, this capacity, when exercised privately, does not make our belief acquisition more reliable. If we assume, however, that this capacity was selected for by evolution, like other features of the human body and human mind, then the question arises as to what it was selected for. This chapter focuses on a hypothesis due to Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber: that our capacity to reflect was selected for its role in cooperative activity. The upshot of this hypothesis, if it should prove correct, is that reflection does indeed contribute to greater reliability in belief acquisition, but only when it is used in cooperative problem-solving rather than private reflection.","PeriodicalId":440844,"journal":{"name":"Scientific Epistemology","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132973450","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}