SysTEX '19Pub Date : 2019-10-27DOI: 10.1145/3342559.3365337
Ahmed Awad, B. Karp
{"title":"Execution integrity without implicit trust of system software","authors":"Ahmed Awad, B. Karp","doi":"10.1145/3342559.3365337","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3342559.3365337","url":null,"abstract":"When trusted application code in a TEE computes over results produced by an untrusted kernel and hypervisor [1, 2], it is difficult at best to reason about the secrecy and integrity properties achieved by the overall ensemble---to establish, despite the wide breadth of the Linux system call interface, that in-enclave code is immune to Iago attacks [3]. In this paper, we argue that an attractive use case for TEEs is tamper-proof audit: the TEE executes a trusted observer (TO) that allows efficient offline validation that application code running outside the TEE has executed as expected. We describe a TO design that inherently does not require any trust of system call results (and thus of the kernel or hypervisor), and DOG, a prototype TO implementation for Intel SGX that upholds application execution integrity, even for applications that do not fit within today's SGX virtual memory limits, and incurs modest execution overhead.","PeriodicalId":440321,"journal":{"name":"SysTEX '19","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116779309","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
SysTEX '19Pub Date : 2019-10-27DOI: 10.1145/3342559.3365334
Furkan Turan, I. Verbauwhede
{"title":"Propagating trusted execution through mutual attestation","authors":"Furkan Turan, I. Verbauwhede","doi":"10.1145/3342559.3365334","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3342559.3365334","url":null,"abstract":"Attestation is used in a trusted computing context to verify the expected good behaviour. It defines a prover and verifier relationship. It requires the presence of an authority if any two devices want to question each other for a sensitive collaborative work. In contrast, the mutual attestation defined in this paper allows the same rank and type devices to directly evaluate each other, and manage their own cooperation. In addition, it provides the attestations with response actions so that a device with an untrusted state can be recovered with the help of others on the network. These features are supported with a Root-of-Trust (RoT) module capable of enforcing actions even on exploited devices. A proof-of-concept FPGA implementation of the proposed RoT module is demonstrated on Zynq SoCs, as an add-on extension to a RISC-V processor for establishing trust between applications of connected devices. Besides, it assists to explore the implementation decisions, abnormal execution situations, resource utilisation, and performance overheads.","PeriodicalId":440321,"journal":{"name":"SysTEX '19","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128415954","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
SysTEX '19Pub Date : 2019-10-27DOI: 10.1145/3342559.3365338
Hassaan Janjua, M. Ammar, B. Crispo, D. Hughes
{"title":"Towards a standards-compliant pure-software trusted execution environment for resource-constrained embedded devices","authors":"Hassaan Janjua, M. Ammar, B. Crispo, D. Hughes","doi":"10.1145/3342559.3365338","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3342559.3365338","url":null,"abstract":"Trusted execution environments (TEEs) are becoming a requirement to protect a wide range of platforms, from cloud servers to embedded sensors. In this paper, we take a first step towards providing a pure-software Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) for resource-constrained embedded devices that lack basic hardware-based security features, such as Memory Protection Units (MPUs). Our key instrument in providing the features of TEEs is a formally-verified software-based memory isolation technique called the Security MicroVisor (SμV), that serves as a programmable trusted layer, which provides isolation by policing and regulating the execution of assembly-level instructions. This paper contributes the first architecture of a pure software TEE that supports all of the features that have been standardized by the GlobalPlatform Organization. Our implementation and evaluation results demonstrate the feasibility of implementing a standards-compliant software-based TEE for low-end embedded devices without hardware support or modification that has proven security against all networked attacks.","PeriodicalId":440321,"journal":{"name":"SysTEX '19","volume":"181 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129181949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
SysTEX '19Pub Date : 2019-10-27DOI: 10.1145/3342559.3365335
Juhyeng Han, Seongmin Kim, Taesoo Kim, Dongsu Han
{"title":"Toward scaling hardware security module for emerging cloud services","authors":"Juhyeng Han, Seongmin Kim, Taesoo Kim, Dongsu Han","doi":"10.1145/3342559.3365335","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3342559.3365335","url":null,"abstract":"The hardware security module (HSM) has been used as a root of trust for various key management services. At the same time, rapid innovation in emerging industries, such as container-based microservices, accelerates demands for scaling security services. However, current on-premises HSMs have limitations to afford such demands due to the restricted scalability and high price of deployment. This paper presents ScaleTrust, a framework for scaling security services by utilizing HSMs with SGX-based key management service (KMS) in a collaborative, yet secure manner. Based on a hierarchical model, we design a cryptographic workload distribution between HSMs and KMS enclaves to achieve both the elasticity of cloud software and the hardware-based security of HSM appliances. We demonstrate practical implications of ScaleTrust using two case studies that require secure cryptographic operations with low latency and high scalability.","PeriodicalId":440321,"journal":{"name":"SysTEX '19","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125755057","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
SysTEX '19Pub Date : 2019-10-27DOI: 10.1145/3342559.3365333
Kai Mast, Lequn Chen, E. G. Sirer
{"title":"A vision for autonomous blockchains backed by secure hardware","authors":"Kai Mast, Lequn Chen, E. G. Sirer","doi":"10.1145/3342559.3365333","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3342559.3365333","url":null,"abstract":"Blockchains have emerged as a potential mechanism to enable immutable and consistent sharing of data across organizational boundaries. While much of the discussion on blockchains to date has been structured around public versus permissioned blockchains, both of these architectures have significant drawbacks. Public blockchains are energy inefficient, hard to scale and suffer from limited throughput and high latencies, while permissioned blockchains depend on specially designated nodes, potentially leak metainformation, and also suffer from scale and performance bottlenecks. This raises the question if blockchains, in their current form, are the only class of datastores that can provide such strong integrity guarantees.\u0000 We introduce autonomous blockchains, an architecture based on free-standing, immutable, eidetic databases that implement independent timelines, linked together through interactions. Autonomous blockchains can be realized using trusted execution environments in combination with audit mechanisms. This architecture does not only provide block-chain-like integrity and auditability guarantees but also supports storing and querying private data. Further, multiple autonomous blockchains can be linked together through federated transactions to exchange data and order mutual operations. These transactions are amenable to audits and yield tamper-proof witnesses. Evaluation shows that this design can achieve high throughput while providing stronger integrity guarantees than conventional datastores.","PeriodicalId":440321,"journal":{"name":"SysTEX '19","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122427335","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}