{"title":"The Points Of Language.","authors":"Richard P Meier, Diane Lillo-Martin","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Signed languages display a variety of pointing signs that serve the functions of deictic and anaphoric pronouns, possessive and reflexive pronouns, demonstratives, locatives, determiners, body part labels, and verb agreement. We consider criteria for determining the linguistic status of pointing signs. Among those criteria are conventionality, indexicality, phonological compositionality, being subject to grammatical constraints, and marking the kinds of grammatical distinctions expected of pronouns. We conclude that first-person points meet all these proposed criteria, but that nonfirst person points are in part gestural. Lastly, we review evidence for the grammaticization over time of systems of pointing signs within signed languages.</p>","PeriodicalId":43704,"journal":{"name":"Humana Mente-Journal of Philosophical Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2013-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5461920/pdf/nihms861222.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"35079378","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Self-Deception, Delusion and the Boundaries of Folk Psychology.","authors":"Lisa Bortolotti, Matteo Mameli","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>To what extent do self-deception and delusion overlap? In this paper we argue that both self-deception and delusions can be understood in folk-psychological terms. \"Motivated\" delusions, just like self-deception, can be described as beliefs driven by personal interests. If self-deception can be understood folk-psychologically because of its motivational component, so can motivated delusions. Non-motivated delusions also fit (to a large extent) the folk-psychological notion of belief, since they can be described as hypotheses one endorses when attempting to make sense of unusual and powerful experiences. We suggest that there is continuity between the epistemic irrationality manifested in self-deception and in delusion.</p>","PeriodicalId":43704,"journal":{"name":"Humana Mente-Journal of Philosophical Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2012-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3364711/pdf/ukmss-47039.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"30663854","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}