Two-Party Negotiations eJournal最新文献

Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items: Compatibilities and Incompatibilities 不可分割物品的两人公平划分:兼容性和不兼容性

Two-Party Negotiations eJournal Pub Date : 2021-08-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3911298

S. Brams, M. Kilgour, Christian Klamler

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引用次数: 0

Organization and Bargaining: Sales Process Choice at Auto Dealerships 组织与议价:汽车经销商的销售流程选择

Two-Party Negotiations eJournal Pub Date : 2012-11-19 DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1120.1691

V. M. Bennett

引用次数: 55

Revisiting 'The [Social-Cognitive] Nature of Salience': Social-Cognitive Effort Focuses Attention on the 'Next-Most Obvious' Bargaining Compromise -- Equal Shares 重新审视“突出性的[社会认知]本质”:社会认知努力将注意力集中在“下一个最明显的”讨价还价妥协上——平等份额

Two-Party Negotiations eJournal Pub Date : 2012-06-16 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2136587

John Voiklis, J. Nickerson

{"title":"Revisiting 'The [Social-Cognitive] Nature of Salience': Social-Cognitive Effort Focuses Attention on the 'Next-Most Obvious' Bargaining Compromise -- Equal Shares","authors":"John Voiklis, J. Nickerson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2136587","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2136587","url":null,"abstract":"Collaborators often invest unequal resources towards a common good. Without agreement on sharing that good, collaboration might devolve into parallel, possibly competitive, individual efforts. Reaching agreement requires bargaining. Before bargaining, collaborators independently decide how much to demand and how little to accept. These decisions constitute a tacit form of bargaining. When collaborators cannot verify a common construal of fairness, tacit agreement on equal shares offers the next-most obvious (least unfair) compromise between conflicting interests. Across two experiments, we show that reasoning to this conclusion requires more social-cognitive effort than people automatically expend. Participants played a card game with an alleged opponent and shared the resulting prize. Social-cognitive practice prior to tacit bargaining increased egalitarian proposals. Experiment 2 ruled out facilitation through general-cognitive effort or improvements in social-reasoning skills. Instead, we found that cognitive perspective-takers minimize unfairness, while affective perspective-takers seek minimal fairness. We discuss the differing implications of these motivations.","PeriodicalId":433547,"journal":{"name":"Two-Party Negotiations eJournal","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128242417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Risk Allocation in Acquisitions: The Uses and Value of MAE-Exclusions. 收购中的风险分配:mae排除的用途和价值。

Two-Party Negotiations eJournal Pub Date : 2011-10-04 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1392304

Antonio J. Macias

引用次数: 1

A Human Relations Paradox 人际关系悖论

Two-Party Negotiations eJournal Pub Date : 2011-04-26 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1823342

H. Gersbach, H. Haller

引用次数: 1

Merger Negotiations and Ex-Post Regret 并购谈判和事后后悔

Two-Party Negotiations eJournal Pub Date : 2006-11-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1053461

Dennis L. Gärtner, A. Schmutzler

引用次数: 32