{"title":"Organization","authors":"Yuichi Nakamura, Yi-Shing Chang","doi":"10.1109/siot48044.2019.9637069","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/siot48044.2019.9637069","url":null,"abstract":"Technical Program Committee (in alphabetical order) Tsahi Yitzhak Birk, Technion Benoit Charbonnier, CEA Leti Chen-Huan Chiang, Intel Shai Cohen, Mellanox Luan Huu Kinh Duong, Nanyang Technological University Qinfen Hao, Chinese Academy of Sciences Tohru Ishihara, Nagoya University Kiyo Ishii, National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology Mahdi Nikdast, Colorado State University Ian O'Connor, Lyon Institute of Nanotechnology David Z. Pan, University of Texas at Austin Nikos Pleros, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki Robert Senger, IBM Yaoyao Ye, Shanghai Jiao Tong University","PeriodicalId":429014,"journal":{"name":"2019 International Workshop on Secure Internet of Things (SIOT)","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115090371","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"liOS: Lifting iOS Apps for Fun and Profit","authors":"J. Schütte, Dennis Titze","doi":"10.1109/SIOT48044.2019.9637076","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SIOT48044.2019.9637076","url":null,"abstract":"Although iOS is the second most popular mobile operating system and is often considered the more secure one, approaches to automatically analyze iOS applications are scarce and generic app analysis frameworks do not exist. This is on the one hand due to the closed ecosystem putting obstacles in the way of reverse engineers and on the other hand due to the complexity of reverse engineering and analyzing app binaries. Reliably lifting accurate call graphs, control flows, and data dependence graphs from binary code, as well as reconstructing object-oriented high-level concepts is a non-trivial task and the choice of the lifted target representation determines the analysis capabilities. None of the various existing intermediate representations is a perfect fit for all types of analysis, while the detection of vulnerabilities requires techniques ranging from simple pattern matching to complex inter-procedural data flow analyses. We address this gap by introducing liOS, a binary lifting and analysis framework for iOS applications that extracts lifted information from several frontends and unifies them in a “supergraph” representation that tolerates missing parts and is further extended and interlinked by liOS “passes”. A static analysis of the binary is then realized in the form of graph traversal queries, which can be considered as an advancement of classic program query languages. We illustrate this approach by means of a typical JavaScript/Objective-C bridge, which can lead to remote code execution in iOS applications.","PeriodicalId":429014,"journal":{"name":"2019 International Workshop on Secure Internet of Things (SIOT)","volume":"82 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114283090","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"TIO - Secure Input/Output for Intel SGX Enclaves","authors":"F. Stancu, Dumitru-Cristian Tranca, Mihai Chiroiu","doi":"10.1109/SIOT48044.2019.9637105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SIOT48044.2019.9637105","url":null,"abstract":"The new trusted execution environments (TEE) integrated within CPUs (e.g., Intel Software Guard Extensions) enable isolation of security-critical applications from the rest of the software running on the system. However, they lack support for trusted I/O such as keyboard or display, making those technologies unreliable in the case of user-centric applications. In this paper we introduce TIO, a practical hardware module that creates a secure channel between any USB HID device (e.g., keyboard/mouse) and a TEE (e.g., Intel SGX) using only local authentication and attestation. We describe the architecture and implementation of our solution, as well as practical considerations for deploying it in a real scenario and different USB devices. We evaluate the benefits of using our hardware module and show that there is no lag or noticeable impact on the input while it enhances the security of several applications. Moreover, TIO can be extended to any other input/output devices.","PeriodicalId":429014,"journal":{"name":"2019 International Workshop on Secure Internet of Things (SIOT)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117007694","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Timothy Werquin, Mathijs Hubrechtsen, A. Thangarajan, F. Piessens, Jan Tobias Muehlberg
{"title":"Automated Fuzzing of Automotive Control Units","authors":"Timothy Werquin, Mathijs Hubrechtsen, A. Thangarajan, F. Piessens, Jan Tobias Muehlberg","doi":"10.1109/SIOT48044.2019.9637090","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SIOT48044.2019.9637090","url":null,"abstract":"Modern vehicles are governed by a network of Electronic Control Units (ECUs), which are programmed to sense inputs from the driver and the environment, to process these inputs, and to control actuators that, e.g., regulate the engine or even control the steering system. ECUs within a vehicle communicate via automotive bus systems such as the Controller Area Network (CAN), and beyond the vehicles boundaries through upcoming vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-infrastructure channels. Approaches to manipulate the communication between ECUs for the purpose of security testing and reverse-engineering of vehicular functions have been presented in the past, all of which struggle with automating the detection of system change in response to message injection. In this paper we present our findings with fuzzing CAN networks, in particular while observing individual ECUs with a sensor harness. The harness detects physical responses, which we then use in a oracle functions to inform the fuzzing process. We systematically define fuzzers, fuzzing configurations and oracle functions for testing ECUs. We evaluate our approach based on case studies of commercial instrument clusters and with an experimental framework for CAN authentication. Our results show that the approach is capable of identifying interesting ECU states with a high level of automation. Our approach is applicable in distributed cyber-physical systems beyond automotive computing.","PeriodicalId":429014,"journal":{"name":"2019 International Workshop on Secure Internet of Things (SIOT)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130785050","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
J. Großschädl, Zhe Liu, Zhi Hu, Chunhua Su, Lu Zhou
{"title":"Fast ECDH Key Exchange Using Twisted Edwards Curves with an Efficiently Computable Endomorphism","authors":"J. Großschädl, Zhe Liu, Zhi Hu, Chunhua Su, Lu Zhou","doi":"10.1109/SIOT48044.2019.9637091","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SIOT48044.2019.9637091","url":null,"abstract":"It is widely accepted that public-key cryptosystems play a major role in the security arena of the Internet of Things (IoT), but they need to be implemented efficiently to not deplete the scarce resources of battery-operated devices such as wireless sensor nodes. This paper describes a highly-optimized software implementation of scalar multiplication for Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key exchange on resource-limited IoT devices that achieves fast execution times along with reasonably small code size and RAM consumption. Our software uses a special class of elliptic curves, namely twisted Edwards curves with an efficiently computable endomorphism similar to that of the socalled Gallant-Lambert-Vanstone (GLV) curves. This allows us to combine the main advantage of the GLV model, which is an efficiently-computable endomorphism to speed up variable-base scalar multiplication, with the fast and complete addition rules of the (twisted) Edwards model. We implemented variable-base scalar multiplication for static ECDH on two such curves, one over a 159-bit and the second over a 207-bit pseudo-Mersenne prime field, respectively, and evaluated their execution time on a 16-bit MSP430F1611 processor. The arithmetic operations in the prime field do not contain operand-dependent conditional statements (in particular no “if-then-else” clauses) and also the scalar multiplication follows a fixed execution path for a given (static) scalar. A variable-base scalar multiplication on curves over the 159 and 207-bit field takes about 2.63 and 4.84 million clock cycles, respectively, on an MSP430F1611 processor. These results compare favorably with the Montgomery ladder on the equivalent Montgomery curves, which is almost 50% slower.","PeriodicalId":429014,"journal":{"name":"2019 International Workshop on Secure Internet of Things (SIOT)","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130950876","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Finding Security Vulnerabilities in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Using Software Verification","authors":"O. Alhawi, Mustafa A. Mustafa, L. Cordeiro","doi":"10.1109/SIOT48044.2019.9637109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SIOT48044.2019.9637109","url":null,"abstract":"The proliferation of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) embedded with vulnerable monolithic software has recently raised serious concerns about their security due to concurrency aspects and fragile communication links. However, verifying security in UAV software based on traditional testing remains an open challenge mainly due to scalability and deployment issues. Here we investigate software verification techniques to detect security vulnerabilities in typical UAVs. In particular, we investigate existing software analyzers and verifiers, which implement fuzzing and bounded model checking (BMC) techniques, to detect memory safety and concurrency errors. We also investigate fragility aspects related to the UAV communication link. All UAV components (e.g., position, velocity, and attitude control) heavily depend on the communication link. Our preliminary results show that fuzzing and BMC techniques can detect various software vulnerabilities, which are of particular interest to ensure security in UAVs. We were able to perform successful cyber-attacks via penetration testing against the UAV both connection and software system. As a result, we demonstrate real cyber-threats with the possibility of exploiting further security vulnerabilities in real-world UAV software in the foreseeable future.","PeriodicalId":429014,"journal":{"name":"2019 International Workshop on Secure Internet of Things (SIOT)","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114614422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}